Discussion Hall

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pro Theism                                              onlookers                                                            pro Atheism

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Theist: Call-for-Definition: What is meant by the term "God"? Since the discussion taking place here regards the question: "Wheter the existence of God can be demonstrated by reason, and if so, how?" it is uselful at this point in the discussion to examine more closely the notion of God for three reasons: I. It is clear that the nature of God is not self-evident. For their are a multiplicity of notions of the divine among many cultures. II. Likewise among philosphers there are those who attribute to God various names, about which there is no small disputation: the prime-mover, the first cause, the world-govenor, the infiinite being, the necessary being, etc.. III. Also, in recent centuries there has been no small number of individuals who assert that God is nothing more than a postulat of reason. To address these adequately, I note that first it must be said that it suffices to discuss the question at hand without reference to the authority of revelation of any kind, for to answer the question of the existence of God, to be demonstrable "a posteriori" by reason, there need not be an appeal to the authority of any revelation, since such of its very nature transcends the order of things knowable by reason alone, though not of the order of things knowable by reason in general. Hence when discussing the question "Wheter the existence of God can be demonstrated by reason, and if so, how?" it suffices to employ argumentation based on a philophical reflection of the things known by the human mind in its present state. Now it is clear that the demonstration of conclusion cannot be had without a definition of terms, both of that from which a concludsion is adduced and that to which the conclusion concludes. For example, to demostrate that the acceleration of gravity produced by a heavenly body has certain predictable characteristics it is first necessary to define the nature of the body, of gravity, and of both the characteristics to be predicted and the units of measurement. Otherwise the demonstration cannot proceed. Likewise in the demonstration of the existence of God it is necessary that there be an definition of terms, on which basis the demonstration is to proceed. Now some may object that such is a "petitio principii" in the matter at hand. And this argument seems valid in the case of a demonstratoin "a priori". But that this is not the case either in a demonstration "a priori" or "a posteriori" is clear from the following considerations. A. In a demonstration "a posteriori" the necessary definition of terms is not a "petitio principi" for the demonstration proceeds from known effect to the existence of a cause that stands in a necessary relation of causality in respect to the known effect. In such a case the definition of terms is not a "petitio principi" because the terms so defined are not principles of the demonstration but terminii, Whcih is not what a "petitio principii" means, viz., a begging of principles, and it is clear that a principle is "from which" and not a "to which." B. Moreover in a demonstration "a priori" neither is the definition of terms that proceed the demonstration a "petitio principi," for what is demonstrated is an effect, which is not self evident, from a cause that is defined. This objection would hold if what was to be demonstrated "a priori" pertained to the definition of the cause in a self-evident manner, e.g. "Given: a white object: It has a color. The color is white." Yet, for this reason the demonstration "a priori" of God's existence is held to be invalid by some. This is not the case, however, for if the existence of God were self-evident, then there would be no need of demonstration, let alone of disputation thereof. For the demonstration, here specifically, is not of "Whether the most perfect existing thing does exist" but rather "Whether that which is the formal cause of the notion of perfection qua perfection does actually exist." (By "formal cause" the rational principle of a thing's essence or definition is signified.) Hence it is necessary and valid to define the notion of God prior to any demonstration of God's existence. Now proceeds the definiton of the notion of God: It suffices to define God in any manner that is above the order of things which are caused by another. This is clear from the following consideration. If there is anything which is caused by another then this thing is not absolutely the cause of all things. Wherefore to such a being men do not attribute those characteristics customarily attributed to God, namely, omnipotence, omniscience, infinity in perfection, etc..And this is clear from the relation of that thing which is caused by another and that other which is its cause, for nothing is omnipotent, omniscient, or infiinite in perfection, etc.. which is caused by another, for it cannot have power, knowledge, or greater perfection before it is caused as does that other thing which caused it. Nor is this notion of God contradictory as those who assert that God, so defined, not being caused by another, must be either without a cause or a self-caused cause, asserting, as they do, that both of which are absurd philosphically, and/or, undemonstrable in themselves. However the notion of God as "that which is not caused by another" or "that which is its own cause" is neither absurd nor indemonstrable. It is not absurd for it is not self-contradictory; and it is not indemonstrable simply speaking, as will be shown below. That such a notion of God as "that which is not caused by another" or "that which is its own cause" is not self-contradictory is clear from an examination of the terms of the notion. For the notion of "cause" does not contain the necessity of being "a cause in respect to itself," but only the relation of anything to anything in a certain respect. For John can be said to be the cause of his sitting down or rising, in which both him who is the cause and him in whom the effect is produced are the same. To object further in this regard, namely, that such an effect is not in the same order as the cause which causes it, would be a "petitio principii" for such a further assertion includes, self-evidently, the assertion that it is the nature of a cause to be "a cause of another and not of itself" or "a cause of another thing in another order" which is a definition of that species of "cause" which this notion of God expressely excludes. Nevertheless, there may still be objected that such a definition of God is invalid since no such species of cause has been demonstrated to exist, which is patently a foolish objection, since the existence of such a species of cause is in fact the matter of the demonstration of the thesis "Whether God exists?" For such a principle would prohibit the definition of anything, not yet known, about which an investigation is sought. That such a notion of God as "that which is not caused by another" or "that which is its own cause" is not indemonstrable simply speaking is also made clear from this: namely that which is to be demonstrated in the matter at hand, does not pertain to the essence of the cause but to its existence, and that therefore the demonstration of such does not proceed in the same order. To explain this more fully: What is to be demonstrated in the matter at hand is "Whether God exists?" and such a demonstration cannot proceed without a definition of God in some manner in which a demonstration of God's existence is possible on reason alone, that is, without the appeal to any revealed knowledge or authority. Now what is to be demonstrated in regard to this question is not the nature of God, which answers the question "What is God?", but rather the existence of God, which answers the question, "Whether God exists?" Hence what is to be proved is not what is defined, and therefore there is no "petitio principii". Hence, it suffices to define God as that which is above the order of things which are caused by another. On this basis the demonstration of the thesis "Whether God exists, and if so, how?" can proceed.