i) What do we mean by justice and injustice? Unjust means either lawless or unfair; therefore just means either lawful or fair (equitable). Justice in the former sense is complete virtue; this is universal justice.
ii) We are now concerned with particular justice and injustice. This is either distributive or rectificatory.
iii) Distributive justice employs geometrical proportion.
iv) Rectificatory justice remedies an inequitable division between two parties by means of a sort of arithmetical progression.
v) Although justice cannot be equated with simple reciprocity, proportional reciprocation is the basis of all fair exchange. Proportional requital implies somestandard for the valuation of unequal services. This standard is really demand, which is conveniently represented by money. Such are particular justice and injustice, the latter being a single vice exhibiting both excess and deficiency.
vi) A note on injustice in the wider sense of wrongdoing is drawn. Political justice: its conditions... Domestic justice is similar, but distinct.
vii) Political justice may be based upon natural or upon civil law. Distinctions between certain cognate terms...
viii) Voluntary and involuntary acts: the importance of intention. Grades of misconduct; acts done under provocation; and a note on importance...
ix) Is it possible to suffer injustice willingly? Is it the distributor or the recipient that is guilty of injustice in unfair distribution? To be just is not easy, because just conduct presupposes a virtuous moral state. Particular justice is exercised between parties of normal human probity.
x) A digression on equity, correcting the deficiencies of legal justice.
xi) Return to the question: can a man treat himself unjustly? It is worse to commit than to suffer injustice. How justice and injustice towards oneself are possible...
Back to table of contents of Ethics
Back to list of philosophy collections
1
With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider
what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of
mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is
intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course
as the preceding discussions.
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state
of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and
makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly
by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish
for what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general
basis. For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties
as of states of character. A faculty or a science which is one
and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state
of character which is one of two contraries does not produce
the contrary results; e.g. as a result of health we do not do
what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for
we say a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy man
would.
Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary,
and often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit
them; for (A) if good condition is known, bad condition also
becomes known, and (B) good condition is known from the things
that are in good condition, and they from it. If good condition
is firmness of flesh, it is necessary both that bad condition
should be flabbiness of flesh and that the wholesome should be
that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows for the most
part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be
ambiguous; e.g. if 'just' is so, that 'unjust' will be so too.
Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but
because their different meanings approach near to one another
the ambiguity escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively,
when the meanings are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference
in outward form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of kleis
for the collar-bone of an animal and for that with which we lock
a door. Let us take as a starting-point, then, the various meanings
of 'an unjust man'. Both the lawless man and the grasping and
unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the
law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is
the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.
Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned
with goods-not all goods, but those with which prosperity and
adversity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good,
but for a particular person are not always good. Now men pray
for and pursue these things; but they should not, but should
pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good
for them, and should choose the things that are good for them.
The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the
less-in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser
evil is itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness
is directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping.
And he is unfair; for this contains and is common to both.
Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding
man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts;
for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and
each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments
on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or
of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort;
so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce
and preserve happiness and its components for the political society.
And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not
to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms),
and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor
to gratify one's lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g.
not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with
regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding
some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does
this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. This form
of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but
in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is often
thought to be the greatest of virtues, and 'neither evening nor
morning star' is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in justice is
every virtue comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its
fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete
virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise
his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also;
for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not
in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the saying
of Bias is thought to be true, that 'rule will show the man';
for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member
of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues,
is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our
neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either
a ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is he who exercises
his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends,
and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself
but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult
task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but
virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but
vice entire. What the difference is between virtue and justice
in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same
but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to one's
neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without
qualification, virtue.
2
But at all events what we are investigating is the justice
which is a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind,
as we maintain. Similarly it is with injustice in the particular
sense that we are concerned.
That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that
while the man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness
acts wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws
away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad
temper or fails to help a friend with money through meanness),
when a man acts graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices,-no,
nor all together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for
we blame him) and injustice. There is, then, another kind of
injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and
a use of the word 'unjust' which answers to a part of what is
unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary to the law'. Again if one
man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by
it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he
loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held
to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the former is
unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he is unjust
by reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all other unjust
acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness,
e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a comrade
in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a
man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness
but injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice
in the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which shares
the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls
within the same genus; for the significance of both consists
in a relation to one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with
honour or money or safety-or that which includes all these, if
we had a single name for it-and its motive is the pleasure that
arises from gain; while the other is concerned with all the objects
with which the good man is concerned.
It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of
justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue
entire; we must try to grasp its genus and differentia.
The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the
unfair, and the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful
answers the afore-mentioned sense of injustice. But since unfair
and the unlawful are not the same, but are different as a part
is from its whole (for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not
all that is unlawful is unfair), the unjust and injustice in
the sense of the unfair are not the same as but different from
the former kind, as part from whole; for injustice in this sense
is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly justice
in the one sense of justice in the other. Therefore we must speak
also about particular justice and particular and similarly about
the just and the unjust. The justice, then, which answers to
the whole of virtue, and the corresponding injustice, one being
the exercise of virtue as a whole, and the other that of vice
as a whole, towards one's neighbour, we may leave on one side.
And how the meanings of 'just' and 'unjust' which answer to these
are to be distinguished is evident; for practically the majority
of the acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed
from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole; for the law
bids us practise every virtue and forbids us to practise any
vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole
are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed
with a view to education for the common good. But with regard
to the education of the individual as such, which makes him without
qualification a good man, we must determine later whether this
is the function of the political art or of another; for perhaps
it is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any
state taken at random.
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions
of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided
among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these
it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or
equal to that of another), and (B) one is that which plays a
rectifying part in transactions between man and man. Of this
there are two divisions; of transactions (1) some are voluntary
and (2) others involuntary- voluntary such transactions as sale,
purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing,
letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these
transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some
are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring,
enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others
are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with
violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.
3
(A) We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust
act are unfair or unequal; now it is clear that there is also
an intermediate between the two unequals involved in either case.
And this is the equal; for in any kind of action in which there's
a more and a less there is also what is equal. If, then, the
unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men suppose it to be,
even apart from argument. And since the equal is intermediate,
the just will be an intermediate. Now equality implies at least
two things. The just, then, must be both intermediate and equal
and relative (i.e. for certain persons). And since the equall
intermediate it must be between certain things (which are respectively
greater and less); equal, it involves two things; qua just, it
is for certain people. The just, therefore, involves at least
four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two,
and the things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed,
are two. And the same equality will exist between the persons
and between the things concerned; for as the latter the things
concerned-are related, so are the former; if they are not equal,
they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels
and complaints-when either equals have and are awarded unequal
shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain from
the fact that awards should be 'according to merit'; for all
men agree that what is just in distribution must be according
to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same
sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman,
supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and
supporters of aristocracy with excellence.
The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion
being not a property only of the kind of number which consists
of abstract units, but of number in general). For proportion
is equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that
discrete proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does
continuous proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions
it twice; e.g. 'as the line A is to the line B, so is the line
B to the line C'; the line B, then, has been mentioned twice,
so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional terms
will be four); and the just, too, involves at least four terms,
and the ratio between one pair is the same as that between the
other pair; for there is a similar distinction between the persons
and between the things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will
C be to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be
to D. Therefore also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole;
and this coupling the distribution effects, and, if the terms
are so combined, effects justly. The conjunction, then, of the
term A with C and of B with D is what is just in distribution,
and this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust
is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate,
and the just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this kind
of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion
that it follows that the whole is to the whole as either part
is to the corresponding part.) This proportion is not continuous;
for we cannot get a single term standing for a person and a thing.
This, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the
unjust is what violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes
too great, the other too small, as indeed happens in practice;
for the man who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is
unjustly treated too little, of what is good. In the case of
evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is reckoned a good
in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is
rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice
is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.
This, then, is one species of the just.
4
(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises
in connexion with transactions both voluntary and involuntary.
This form of the just has a different specific character from
the former. For the justice which distributes common possessions
is always in accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned
above (for in the case also in which the distribution is made
from the common funds of a partnership it will be according to
the same ratio which the funds put into the business by the partners
bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to this kind
of justice is that which violates the proportion. But the justice
in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed,
and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that
kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion.
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a
bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or
a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to
the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties
as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged,
and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore,
this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to
equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and
the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other
been slain, the suffering and the action have been unequally
distributed; but the judge tries to equalize by means of the
penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant. For the
term 'gain' is applied generally to such cases, even if it be
not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to the person who
inflicts a woundand 'loss' to the sufferer; at all events when
the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and
the other gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate between the
greater and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively
greater and less in contrary ways; more of the good and less
of the evil are gain, and the contrary is loss; intermediate
between them is, as we saw, equal, which we say is just; therefore
corrective justice will be the intermediate between loss and
gain. This is why, when people dispute, they take refuge in the
judge; and to go to the judge is to go to justice; for the nature
of the judge is to be a sort of animate justice; and they seek
the judge as an intermediate, and in some states they call judges
mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is intermediate
they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate,
since the judge is so. Now the judge restores equality; it is
as though there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he
took away that by which the greater segment exceeds the half,
and added it to the smaller segment. And when the whole has been
equally divided, then they say they have 'their own'-i.e. when
they have got what is equal. The equal is intermediate between
the greater and the lesser line according to arithmetical proportion.
It is for this reason also that it is called just (sikaion),
because it is a division into two equal parts (sicha), just as
if one were to call it sichaion; and the judge (sikastes) is
one who bisects (sichastes). For when something is subtracted
from one of two equals and added to the other, the other is in
excess by these two; since if what was taken from the one had
not been added to the other, the latter would have been in excess
by one only. It therefore exceeds the intermediate by one, and
the intermediate exceeds by one that from which something was
taken. By this, then, we shall recognize both what we must subtract
from that which has more, and what we must add to that which
has less; we must add to the latter that by which the intermediate
exceeds it, and subtract from the greatest that by which it exceeds
the intermediate. Let the lines AA', BB', CC' be equal to one
another; from the line AA' let the segment AE have been subtracted,
and to the line CC' let the segment CD have been added, so that
the whole line DCC' exceeds the line EA' by the segment CD and
the segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line BB' by the segment
CD.
These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary
exchange; for to have more than one's own is called gaining,
and to have less than one's original share is called losing,
e.g. in buying and selling and in all other matters in which
the law has left people free to make their own terms; but when
they get neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves,
they say that they have their own and that they neither lose
nor gain.
Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of
gain and a sort of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it
consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction.
5
Some think that reciprocity is without qualification
just, as the Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without
qualification as reciprocity. Now 'reciprocity' fits neither
distributive nor rectificatory justice-yet people want even the
justice of Rhadamanthus to mean this:
Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would
be done -for in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice
are not in accord; e.g. (1) if an official has inflicted a wound,
he should not be wounded in return, and if some one has wounded
an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in
addition. Further (2) there is a great difference between a voluntary
and an involuntary act. But in associations for exchange this
sort of justice does hold men together-reciprocity in accordance
with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return.
For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds together.
Men seek to return either evil for evil-and if they cana not
do so, think their position mere slavery-or good for good-and
if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange
that they hold together. This is why they give a prominent place
to the temple of the Graces-to promote the requital of services;
for this is characteristic of grace-we should serve in return
one who has shown grace to us, and should another time take the
initiative in showing it.
Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction.
Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder,
then, must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must
himself give him in return his own. If, then, first there is
proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes
place, the result we mention will be effected. If not, the bargain
is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent
the work of the one being better than that of the other; they
must therefore be equated. (And this is true of the other arts
also; for they would have been destroyed if what the patient
suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of the same
amount and kind.) For it is not two doctors that associate for
exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who
are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is
why all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable.
It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes
in a sense an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore
the excess and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house
or to a given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for
a house (or for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond
to the ratio of builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so,
there will be no exchange and no intercourse. And this proportion
will not be effected unless the goods are somehow equal. All
goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said
before. Now this unit is in truth demand, which holds all things
together (for if men did not need one another's goods at all,
or did not need them equally, there would be either no exchange
or not the same exchange); but money has become by convention
a sort of representative of demand; and this is why it has the
name 'money' (nomisma)-because it exists not by nature but by
law (nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make it useless.
There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated
so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker's
work is to that of the farmer's work for which it exchanges.
But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when they
have already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both
excesses), but when they still have their own goods. Thus they
are equals and associates just because this equality can be effected
in their case. Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his
product equated to C. If it had not been possible for reciprocity
to be thus effected, there would have been no association of
the parties. That demand holds things together as a single unit
is shown by the fact that when men do not need one another, i.e.
when neither needs the other or one does not need the other,
they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one has
oneself, e.g. when people permit the exportation of corn in exchange
for wine. This equation therefore must be established. And for
the future exchange-that if we do not need a thing now we shall
have it if ever we do need it-money is as it were our surety;
for it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing
the money. Now the same thing happens to money itself as to goods-it
is not always worth the same; yet it tends to be steadier. This
is why all goods must have a price set on them; for then there
will always be exchange, and if so, association of man with man.
Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and
equates them; for neither would there have been association if
there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality,
nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in truth
it is impossible that things differing so much should become
commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so
sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by
agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it is this
that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured
by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of
B, if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed,
C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal
to a house, viz. five. That exchange took place thus before there
was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is
five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value of five
beds.
We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having
been marked off from each other, it is plain that just action
is intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated;
for the one is to have too much and the other to have too little.
Justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other
virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while
injustice relates to the extremes. And justice is that in virtue
of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that
which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself
and another or between two others not so as to give more of what
is desirable to himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely
with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance
with proportion; and similarly in distributing between two other
persons. Injustice on the other hand is similarly related to
the unjust, which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion,
of the useful or hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess
and defect, viz. because it is productive of excess and defect-in
one's own case excess of what is in its own nature useful and
defect of what is hurtful, while in the case of others it is
as a whole like what it is in one's own case, but proportion
may be violated in either direction. In the unjust act to have
too little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much is to
act unjustly.
Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice
and injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.
6
Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being
unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer
is unjust with respect to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief,
an adulterer, or a brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on
the difference between these types. For a man might even lie
with a woman knowing who she was, but the origin of his might
be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly, then,
but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief, yet he stole, nor
an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly in all
other cases.
Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related
to the just; but we must not forget that what we are looking
for is not only what is just without qualification but also political
justice. This is found among men who share their life with a
view to selfsufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately
or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil
this condition there is no political justice but justice in a
special sense and by analogy. For justice exists only between
men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists
for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is
the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between men
between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (though
there is not injustice between all between whom there is unjust
action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things
good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.
This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle,
because a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a
tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice,
and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is assumed
to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not
assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such
a share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others
that he labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated
previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore
a reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege;
but those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.
The justice of a master and that of a father are not
the same as the justice of citizens, though they are like it;
for there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards
thing that are one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child
until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as
it were part of himself, and no one chooses to hurt himself (for
which reason there can be no injustice towards oneself). Therefore
the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these
relations; for it was as we saw according to law, and between
people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw' are people
who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence justice
can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards children
and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even this
is different from political justice.
7
Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural,
that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by
people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally
indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent,
e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat
and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws
that are passed for particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice shall
be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees.
Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that
which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same
force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see
change in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not
true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather,
with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there
is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable;
but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident
which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise,
is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional,
assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things
the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand is
stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be ambidextrous.
The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency
are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere
equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets.
Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human
enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also
are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere
by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related
as the universal to its particulars; for the things that are
done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal.
There is a difference between the act of injustice and
what is unjust, and between the act of justice and what is just;
for a thing is unjust by nature or by enactment; and this very
thing, when it has been done, is an act of injustice, but before
it is done is not yet that but is unjust. So, too, with an act
of justice (though the general term is rather 'just action',
and 'act of justice' is applied to the correction of the act
of injustice).
Each of these must later be examined separately with
regard to the nature and number of its species and the nature
of the things with which it is concerned.
8
Acts just and unjust being as we have described them,
a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily;
when involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except
in an incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just
or unjust. Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of
justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness;
for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is
then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are
unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not
present as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before,
any of the things in a man's own power which he does with knowledge,
i.e. not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the
instrument used or of the end that will be attained (e.g. whom
he is striking, with what, and to what end), each such act being
done not incidentally nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B's
hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily; for
the act was not in his own power). The person struck may be the
striker's father, and the striker may know that it is a man or
one of the persons present, but not know that it is his father;
a similar distinction may be made in the case of the end, and
with regard to the whole action. Therefore that which is done
in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's
power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many
natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience,
none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g. growing
old or dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike
the injustice or justice may be only incidental; for a man might
return a deposit unwillingly and from fear, and then he must
not be said either to do what is just or to act justly, except
in an incidental way. Similarly the man who under compulsion
and unwillingly fails to return the deposit must be said to act
unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally. Of voluntary
acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice those
which we do after deliberation, not by choice those which we
do without previous deliberation. Thus there are three kinds
of injury in transactions between man and man; those done in
ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the act, the
instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than the
agent supposed; the agent thought either that he was not hiting
any one or that he was not hitting with this missile or not hitting
this person or to this end, but a result followed other than
that which he thought likely (e.g. he threw not with intent to
wound but only to prick), or the person hit or the missile was
other than he supposed. Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary
to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it
is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply
vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the fault
originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin
lies outside him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after
deliberation, it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to
anger or to other passions necessary or natural to man; for when
men do such harmful and mistaken acts they act unjustly, and
the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not imply that
the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due to
vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man
and a vicious man.
Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not
to be done of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who
acts in anger but he who enraged him that starts the mischief.
Again, the matter in dispute is not whether the thing happened
or not, but its justice; for it is apparent injustice that occasions
rage. For they do not dispute about the occurrence of the act-as
in commercial transactions where one of the two parties must
be vicious-unless they do so owing to forgetfulness; but, agreeing
about the fact, they dispute on which side justice lies (whereas
a man who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing
that he has done so), so that the one thinks he is being treated
unjustly and the other disagrees.
But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly;
and these are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer
is an unjust man, provided that the act violates proportion or
equality. Similarly, a man is just when he acts justly by choice;
but he acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily.
Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For
the mistakes which men make not only in ignorance but also from
ignorance are excusable, while those which men do not from ignorance
but (though they do them in ignorance) owing to a passion which
is neither natural nor such as man is liable to, are not excusable.
9
Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering
and doing of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth
in expressed in Euripides' paradoxical words:
I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?
Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly,
or is all suffering of injustice the contrary involuntary, as
all unjust action is voluntary? And is all suffering of injustice
of the latter kind or else all of the former, or is it sometimes
voluntary, sometimes involuntary? So, too, with the case of being
justly treated; all just action is voluntary, so that it is reasonable
that there should be a similar opposition in either case-that
both being unjustly and being justly treated should be either
alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it would be thought
paradoxical even in the case of being justly treated, if it were
always voluntary; for some are unwillingly treated justly. (2)
One might raise this question also, whether every one who has
suffered what is unjust is being unjustly treated, or on the
other hand it is with suffering as with acting. In action and
in passivity alike it is possible to partake of justice incidentally,
and similarly (it is plain) of injustice; for to do what is unjust
is not the same as to act unjustly, nor to suffer what is unjust
as to be treated unjustly, and similarly in the case of acting
justly and being justly treated; for it is impossible to be unjustly
treated if the other does not act unjustly, or justly treated
unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is simply to harm
some one voluntarily, and 'voluntarily' means 'knowing the person
acted on, the instrument, and the manner of one's acting', and
the incontinent man voluntarily harms himself, not only will
he voluntarily be unjustly treated but it will be possible to
treat oneself unjustly. (This also is one of the questions in
doubt, whether a man can treat himself unjustly.) Again, a man
may voluntarily, owing to incontinence, be harmed by another
who acts voluntarily, so that it would be possible to be voluntarily
treated unjustly. Or is our definition incorrect; must we to
'harming another, with knowledge both of the person acted on,
of the instrument, and of the manner' add 'contrary to the wish
of the person acted on'? Then a man may be voluntarily harmed
and voluntarily suffer what is unjust, but no one is voluntarily
treated unjustly; for no one wishes to be unjustly treated, not
even the incontinent man. He acts contrary to his wish; for no
one wishes for what he does not think to be good, but the incontinent
man does do things that he does not think he ought to do. Again,
one who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomede
Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves
for nine, is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his
power, to be unjustly treated is not, but there must be some
one to treat him unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly
treated is not voluntary.
Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain
for discussion; (3) whether it is the man who has assigned to
another more than his share that acts unjustly, or he who has
the excessive share, and (4) whether it is possible to treat
oneself unjustly. The questions are connected; for if the former
alternative is possible and the distributor acts unjustly and
not the man who has the excessive share, then if a man assigns
more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily, he
treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to
do, since the virtuous man tends to take less than his share.
Or does this statement too need qualification? For (a) he perhaps
gets more than his share of some other good, e.g. of honour or
of intrinsic nobility. (b) The question is solved by applying
the distinction we applied to unjust action; for he suffers nothing
contrary to his own wish, so that he is not unjustly treated
as far as this goes, but at most only suffers harm.
It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but
not always the man who has the excessive share; for it is not
he to whom what is unjust appertains that acts unjustly, but
he to whom it appertains to do the unjust act voluntarily, i.e.
the person in whom lies the origin of the action, and this lies
in the distributor, not in the receiver. Again, since the word
'do' is ambiguous, and there is a sense in which lifeless things,
or a hand, or a servant who obeys an order, may be said to slay,
he who gets an excessive share does not act unjustly, though
he 'does' what is unjust.
Again, if the distributor gave his judgement in ignorance,
he does not act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his
judgement is not unjust in this sense, but in a sense it is unjust
(for legal justice and primordial justice are different); but
if with knowledge he judged unjustly, he is himself aiming at
an excessive share either of gratitude or of revenge. As much,
then, as if he were to share in the plunder, the man who has
judged unjustly for these reasons has got too much; the fact
that what he gets is different from what he distributes makes
no difference, for even if he awards land with a view to sharing
in the plunder he gets not land but money.
Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and
therefore that being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with
one's neighbour's wife, to wound another, to deliver a bribe,
is easy and in our power, but to do these things as a result
of a certain state of character is neither easy nor in our power.
Similarly to know what is just and what is unjust requires, men
think, no great wisdom, because it is not hard to understand
the matters dealt with by the laws (though these are not the
things that are just, except incidentally); but how actions must
be done and distributions effected in order to be just, to know
this is a greater achievement than knowing what is good for the
health; though even there, while it is easy to know that honey,
wine, hellebore, cautery, and the use of the knife are so, to
know how, to whom, and when these should be applied with a view
to producing health, is no less an achievement than that of being
a physician. Again, for this very reason men think that acting
unjustly is characteristic of the just man no less than of the
unjust, because he would be not less but even more capable of
doing each of these unjust acts; for he could lie with a woman
or wound a neighbour; and the brave man could throw away his
shield and turn to flight in this direction or in that. But to
play the coward or to act unjustly consists not in doing these
things, except incidentally, but in doing them as the result
of a certain state of character, just as to practise medicine
and healing consists not in applying or not applying the knife,
in using or not using medicines, but in doing so in a certain
way.
Just acts occur between people who participate in things
good in themselves and can have too much or too little of them;
for some beings (e.g. presumably the gods) cannot have too much
of them, and to others, those who are incurably bad, not even
the smallest share in them is beneficial but all such goods are
harmful, while to others they are beneficial up to a point; therefore
justice is essentially something human.
10
Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes),
and their respective relations to justice and the just. For on
examination they appear to be neither absolutely the same nor
generically different; and while we sometime praise what is equitable
and the equitable man (so that we apply the name by way of praise
even to instances of the other virtues, instead of 'good' meaning
by epieikestebon that a thing is better), at other times, when
we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something
different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the
just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or,
if both are good, they are the same.
These, then, are pretty much the considerations that
give rise to the problem about the equitable; they are all in
a sense correct and not opposed to one another; for the equitable,
though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and
it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better
than the just. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and
while both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the
problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just
but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law
is universal but about some things it is not possible to make
a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases,
then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not
possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though
it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none
the less correct; for the error is in the law nor in the legislator
but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical
affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally,
then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal
statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and
has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what
the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and
would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable
is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than
absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the
absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the
equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to
its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are
not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible
to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing
is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule
used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to
the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree
is adapted to the facts.
It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it
is just and is better than one kind of justice. It is evident
also from this who the equitable man is; the man who chooses
and does such acts, and is no stickler for his rights in a bad
sense but tends to take less than his share though he has the
law oft his side, is equitable, and this state of character is
equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state
of character.
11
Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident
from what has been said. For (a) one class of just acts are those
acts in accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the
law; e.g. the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what
it does not expressly permit it forbids. Again, when a man in
violation of the law harms another (otherwise than in retaliation)
voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and a voluntary agent is one who
knows both the person he is affecting by his action and the instrument
he is using; and he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself
does this contrary to the right rule of life, and this the law
does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly. But towards
whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers
voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This
is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of
civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the
ground that he is treating the state unjustly.
Further (b) in that sense of 'acting unjustly' in which
the man who 'acts unjustly' is unjust only and not bad all round,
it is not possible to treat oneself unjustly (this is different
from the former sense; the unjust man in one sense of the term
is wicked in a particularized way just as the coward is, not
in the sense of being wicked all round, so that his 'unjust act'
does not manifest wickedness in general). For (i) that would
imply the possibility of the same thing's having been subtracted
from and added to the same thing at the same time; but this is
impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more than one
person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done by
choice, and takes the initiative (for the man who because he
has suffered does the same in return is not thought to act unjustly);
but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same things
at the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself
unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides,
(iv) no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts
of injustice; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife
or housebreaking on his own house or theft on his own property,
In general, the question 'can a man treat himself unjustly?'
is solved also by the distinction we applied to the question
'can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly?'
(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly
treated and acting unjustly; for the one means having less and
the other having more than the intermediate amount, which plays
the part here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that
good condition does in the art of bodily training. But still
acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves vice and is blameworthy-involves
vice which is either of the complete and unqualified kind or
almost so (we must admit the latter alternative, because not
all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state of character),
while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice
in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad,
but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally a greater
evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy a
more serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become
incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to
your being taken prisoner or put to death the enemy.)
Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance
there is a justice, not indeed between a man and himself, but
between certain parts of him; yet not every kind of justice but
that of master and servant or that of husband and wife. For these
are the ratios in which the part of the soul that has a rational
principle stands to the irrational part; and it is with a view
to these parts that people also think a man can be unjust to
himself, viz. because these parts are liable to suffer something
contrary to their respective desires; there is therefore thought
to be a mutual justice between them as between ruler and ruled.
Let this be taken as our account of justice and the other,
i.e. the other moral, virtues.
END
Back to list