Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Part 1
"WE must reckon up the results arising from what has
been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing
touch to our inquiry. We have said that the causes, principles,
and elements of substances are the object of our search. And
some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been
advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are
the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the
simple bodies; second plants and their parts, and animals and
the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its
parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects
of mathematics are substances. But there are arguments which
lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the essence
and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more
substantial than the various spccies, and the universal than
the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas
are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument that they
are thought to be substances. And since the essence is substance,
and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason
we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since
the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had
to consider also with respect to the notion of 'part', what are
parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts
of the substance are also parts of the definition. Further, too,
neither the universal nor the genus is a substance; we must inquire
later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics; for some
say these are substances as well as the sensible substances.
"But now let us resume the discussion of the generally
recognized substances. These are the sensible substances, and
sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance,
and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that
which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'),
and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a
'this' can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex
of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is,
without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of
substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable
and some are separable and some are not.
"But clearly
matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that
occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in
respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere,
and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and
again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which
is now healthy and again diseased; and similarly in respect of
substance there is something that is now being generated and
again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a 'this'
and again underlies it in respect of a privation of positive
character. And in this change the others are involved. But in
either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it
is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that
it should also have matter for generation and destruction.
"The
difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming in
a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.
Part 2
"Since the substance which exists as underlying and as
matter is generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially,
it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense
of actuality, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there
are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying
body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either
in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact,
i.e. order. But evidently there are many differences; for instance,
some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their
matter, e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water;
and others by being bound together, e.g. bundle; and others by
being glued together, e.g. a book; and others by being nailed
together, e.g. a casket; and others in more than one of these
ways; and others by position, e.g. threshold and lintel (for
these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by
time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the
winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things,
e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness;
and some things by some of these qualities, others by them all,
and in general some by excess and some by defect. Clearly, then,
the word 'is' has just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold
because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means
its lying in that position, while being ice means having been
solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things
will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of
them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together,
others are solidified, and others use the other differentiae;
e.g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition. We
must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be
the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized
by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by
other such qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect.
And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness
and roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved.
And for other things their being will mean their being mixed,
and their not being will mean the opposite.
"It is clear,
then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause
of each thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae what
is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of
these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter,
yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as
in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality
itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles
full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold, we should
say 'wood or stone in such and such a position', and a house
we should define as 'bricks and timbers in such and such a position',(or
a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if we had to
define ice we should say 'water frozen or solidified in such
and such a way', and harmony is 'such and such a blending of
high and low'; and similarly in all other cases.
"Obviously,
then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter
is different; for in some cases it is the composition, in others
the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have
named. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who
define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of
the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who
propose 'a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings',
or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine
both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is
composed of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae
seems to be an account of the form or actuality, while that which
gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and
the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used
to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter.
E.g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse
of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality
and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material
substratum is the sea, and the actuality or shape is smoothness.
It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance
is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another as form
or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed
of these two.
Part 3
"We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not
clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality
or form, e.g. whether 'house' is a sign for the composite thing,
'a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus',
or for the actuality or form, 'a covering', and whether a line
is 'twoness in length' or 'twoness', and whether an animal is
soul in a body' or 'a soul'; for soul is the substance or actuality
of some body. 'Animal' might even be applied to both, not as
something definable by one formula, but as related to a single
thing. But this question, while important for another purpose,
is of no importance for the inquiry into sensible substance;
for the essence certainly attaches to the form and the actuality.
For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same, but 'to be man' and
'man' are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called
man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as
its essence, and on another it is not.
"If we examine
we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition,
nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition. And this is right; for
the juxtaposition or mixing does not consist of those things
of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing. And the same is true
in all other cases; e.g. if the threshold is characterized by
its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold,
but rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor is man
animal + biped, but there must be something besides these, if
these are matter,-something which is neither an element in the
whole nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate,
and state only the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the
thing's being, and if the cause of its being is its substance,
they will not be stating the substance itself.
"(This,
then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without
being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to
be without ever being in course of coming to be. But it has been
proved and explained elsewhere that no one makes or begets the
form, but it is the individual that is made, i.e. the complex
of form and matter that is generated. Whether the substances
of destructible things can exist apart, is not yet at all clear;
except that obviously this is impossible in some cases-in the
case of things which cannot exist apart from the individual instances,
e.g. house or utensil. Perhaps, indeed, neither these things
themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed
by nature, are substances at all; for one might say that the
nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in
destructible things.)
"Therefore the difficulty which
used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such
uneducated people has a certain timeliness. They said that the
'what' cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a 'long
rigmarole') but of what sort a thing, e.g. silver, is, they thought
it possible actually to explain, not saying what it is, but that
it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined
and formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible
or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists
cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something
of something, and one part of the definition must play the part
of matter and the other that of form.
"It is also obvious
that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this
sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units. For a definition
is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible, and into indivisible
parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number
also is of this nature. And (2) as, when one of the parts of
which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number,
it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if
it is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added,
so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when
anything has been taken away or added. And (3) the number must
be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers
cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it
is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what
it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one,
but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this is
a natural result; for the same reason is applicable, and substance
is one in the sense which we have explained, and not, as some
say, by being a sort of unit or point; each is a complete reality
and a definite nature. And (4) as number does not admit of the
more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form,
but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves
matter. Let this, then, suffice for an account of the generation
and destruction of so-called substances in what sense it is possible
and in what sense impossible--and of the reduction of things
to number.
Part 4
"Regarding material substance we must not forget that
even if all things come from the same first cause or have the
same things for their first causes, and if the same matter serves
as starting-point for their generation, yet there is a matter
proper to each, e.g. for phlegm the sweet or the fat, and for
bile the bitter, or something else; though perhaps these come
from the same original matter. And there come to be several matters
for the same thing, when the one matter is matter for the other;
e.g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat
comes from the sweet; and it comes from bile by analysis of the
bile into its ultimate matter. For one thing comes from another
in two senses, either because it will be found at a later stage,
or because it is produced if the other is analysed into its original
constituents. When the matter is one, different things may be
produced owing to difference in the moving cause; e.g. from wood
may be made both a chest and a bed. But some different things
must have their matter different; e.g. a saw could not be made
of wood, nor is this in the power of the moving cause; for it
could not make a saw of wool or of wood. But if, as a matter
of fact, the same thing can be made of different material, clearly
the art, i.e. the moving principle, is the same; for if both
the matter and the moving cause were different, the product would
be so too.
"When one inquires into the cause of something,
one should, since 'causes' are spoken of in several senses, state
all the possible causes. what is the material cause of man? Shall
we say 'the menstrual fluid'? What is moving cause? Shall we
say 'the seed'? The formal cause? His essence. The final cause?
His end. But perhaps the latter two are the same.-It is the proximate
causes we must state. What is the material cause? We must name
not fire or earth, but the matter peculiar to the thing.
"Regarding
the substances that are natural and generable, if the causes
are really these and of this number and we have to learn the
causes, we must inquire thus, if we are to inquire rightly. But
in the case of natural but eternal substances another account
must be given. For perhaps some have no matter, or not matter
of this sort but only such as can be moved in respect of place.
Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature
but are not substances; their substratum is the substance. E.g
what is the cause of eclipse? What is its matter? There is none;
the moon is that which suffers eclipse. What is the moving cause
which extinguished the light? The earth. The final cause perhaps
does not exist. The formal principle is the definitory formula,
but this is obscure if it does not include the cause. E.g. what
is eclipse? Deprivation of light. But if we add 'by the earth's
coming in between', this is the formula which includes the cause.
In the case of sleep it is not clear what it is that proximately
has this affection. Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes,
but the animal in virtue of what, i.e. what is the proximate
subject? The heart or some other part. Next, by what is it produced?
Next, what is the affection-that of the proximate subject, not
of the whole animal? Shall we say that it is immobility of such
and such a kind? Yes, but to what process in the proximate subject
is this due?
Part 5
"Since some things are and are not, without coming to
be and ceasing to be, e.g. points, if they can be said to be,
and in general forms (for it is not 'white' comes to be, but
the wood comes to be white, if everything that comes to be comes
from something and comes to be something), not all contraries
can come from one another, but it is in different senses that
a pale man comes from a dark man, and pale comes from dark. Nor
has everything matter, but only those things which come to be
and change into one another. Those things which, without ever
being in course of changing, are or are not, have no matter.
"There is difficulty in the question how the matter of
each thing is related to its contrary states. E.g. if the body
is potentially healthy, and disease is contrary to health, is
it potentially both healthy and diseased? And is water potentially
wine and vinegar? We answer that it is the matter of one in virtue
of its positive state and its form, and of the other in virtue
of the privation of its positive state and the corruption of
it contrary to its nature. It is also hard to say why wine is
not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potentially vinegar
(though vinegar is produced from it), and why a living man is
not said to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the
corruptions in question are accidental, and it is the matter
of the animal that is itself in virtue of its corruption the
potency and matter of a corpse, and it is water that is the matter
of vinegar. For the corpse comes from the animal, and vinegar
from wine, as night from day. And all the things which change
thus into one another must go back to their matter; e.g. if from
a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse first goes back to
its matter, and only then becomes an animal; and vinegar first
goes back to water, and only then becomes wine.
Part 6
"To return to the difficulty which has been stated with
respect both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause
of their unity? In the case of all things which have several
parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap,
but the whole is something beside the parts, there is a cause;
for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases,
and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition
is a set of words which is one not by being connected together,
like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.-What then, is
it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, e.g. animal
+ biped, especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself
and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms themselves the man,
so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in-one
Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would
be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
"Clearly,
then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition
and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But
if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and
one is potentially and the other actually, the question will
no longer be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty is the
same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of
'cloak'; for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula,
so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round'
and 'bronze'? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter,
the other form. What, then, causes this-that which was potentially
to be actually-except, in the case of things which are generated,
the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere's
becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either.
Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula
there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality;
e.g. the circle is 'a plane figure'. But of the things which
have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by
its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially
a kind of being-individual substance, quality, or quantity (and
so neither 'existent' nor 'one' is present in their definitions),
and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind
of unity as it is a kind of being-and so none of these has any
reason outside itself, for being one, nor for being a kind of
being; for each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of
unity, not as being in the genus 'being' or 'one' nor in the
sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
"Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of 'participation',
and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and
what is it to participate; and others speak of 'communion', as
Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul;
and others say life is a 'composition' or 'connexion' of soul
with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being
healthy, too, will on this showing be either a 'communion' or
a 'connexion' or a 'composition' of soul and health, and the
fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a 'composition' of
bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will
be a 'composition' of surface and whiteness. The reason is that
people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between
potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate
matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially,
and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general
is the cause of unity and of a thing's being one; for each thing
is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one.
Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something
which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all
things which have no matter are without qualification essentially
unities.
END
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