Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Part 1
"'BEGINNING' means (1) that part of a thing from which
one would start first, e.g a line or a road has a beginning in
either of the contrary directions. (2) That from which each thing
would best be originated, e.g. even in learning we must sometimes
begin not from the first point and the beginning of the subject,
but from the point from which we should learn most easily. (4)
That from which, as an immanent part, a thing first comes to
be, e,g, as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house,
while in animals some suppose the heart, others the brain, others
some other part, to be of this nature. (4) That from which, not
as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, and from which
the movement or the change naturally first begins, as a child
comes from its father and its mother, and a fight from abusive
language. (5) That at whose will that which is moved is moved
and that which changes changes, e.g. the magistracies in cities,
and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are called arhchai,
and so are the arts, and of these especially the architectonic
arts. (6) That from which a thing can first be known,-this also
is called the beginning of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are
the beginnings of demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an
equal number of senses; for all causes are beginnings.) It is
common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which
a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some
are immanent in the thing and others are outside. Hence the nature
of a thing is a beginning, and so is the element of a thing,
and thought and will, and essence, and the final cause-for the
good and the beautiful are the beginning both of the knowledge
and of the movement of many things.
Part 2
"'Cause' means (1) that from which, as immanent material,
a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the
statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which
include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of
the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio
2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the
parts included in the definition. (3) That from which the change
or the resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is
a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and
in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing
of the changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for the sake of which
a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For 'Why does
one walk?' we say; 'that one may be healthy'; and in speaking
thus we think we have given the cause. The same is true of all
the means that intervene before the end, when something else
has put the process in motion, as e.g. thinning or purging or
drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached; for
all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from
one another in that some are instruments and others are actions.
"These, then, are practically all the senses in which
causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses
it follows both that there are several causes of the same thing,
and in no accidental sense (e.g. both the art of sculpture and
the bronze are causes of the statue not in respect of anything
else but qua statue; not, however, in the same way, but the one
as matter and the other as source of the movement), and that
things can be causes of one another (e.g. exercise of good condition,
and the latter of exercise; not, however, in the same way, but
the one as end and the other as source of movement).-Again, the
same thing is the cause of contraries; for that which when present
causes a particular thing, we sometimes charge, when absent,
with the contrary, e.g. we impute the shipwreck to the absence
of the steersman, whose presence was the cause of safety; and
both-the presence and the privation-are causes as sources of
movement.
"All the causes now mentioned fall under four
senses which are the most obvious. For the letters are the cause
of syllables, and the material is the cause of manufactured things,
and fire and earth and all such things are the causes of bodies,
and the parts are causes of the whole, and the hypotheses are
causes of the conclusion, in the sense that they are that out
of which these respectively are made; but of these some are cause
as the substratum (e.g. the parts), others as the essence (the
whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen, the physician,
the adviser, and in general the agent, are all sources of change
or of rest. The remainder are causes as the end and the good
of the other things; for that for the sake of which other things
are tends to be the best and the end of the other things; let
us take it as making no difference whether we call it good or
apparent good.
"These, then, are the causes, and this
is the number of their kinds, but the varieties of causes are
many in number, though when summarized these also are comparatively
few. Causes are spoken of in many senses, and even of those which
are of the same kind some are causes in a prior and others in
a posterior sense, e.g. both 'the physician' and 'the professional
man' are causes of health, and both 'the ratio 2:1' and 'number'
are causes of the octave, and the classes that include any particular
cause are always causes of the particular effect. Again, there
are accidental causes and the classes which include these; e.g.
while in one sense 'the sculptor' causes the statue, in another
sense 'Polyclitus' causes it, because the sculptor happens to
be Polyclitus; and the classes that include the accidental cause
are also causes, e.g. 'man'-or in general 'animal'-is the cause
of the statue, because Polyclitus is a man, and man is an animal.
Of accidental causes also some are more remote or nearer than
others, as, for instance, if 'the white' and 'the musical' were
called causes of the statue, and not only 'Polyclitus' or 'man'.
But besides all these varieties of causes, whether proper or
accidental, some are called causes as being able to act, others
as acting; e.g. the cause of the house's being built is a builder,
or a builder who is building.-The same variety of language will
be found with regard to the effects of causes; e.g. a thing may
be called the cause of this statue or of a statue or in general
of an image, and of this bronze or of bronze or of matter in
general; and similarly in the case of accidental effects. Again,
both accidental and proper causes may be spoken of in combination;
e.g. we may say not 'Polyclitus' nor 'the sculptor' but 'Polyclitus
the sculptor'. Yet all these are but six in number, while each
is spoken of in two ways; for (A) they are causes either as the
individual, or as the genus, or as the accidental, or as the
genus that includes the accidental, and these either as combined,
or as taken simply; and (B) all may be taken as acting or as
having a capacity. But they differ inasmuch as the acting causes,
i.e. the individuals, exist, or do not exist, simultaneously
with the things of which they are causes, e.g. this particular
man who is healing, with this particular man who is recovering
health, and this particular builder with this particular thing
that is being built; but the potential causes are not always
in this case; for the house does not perish at the same time
as the builder.
Part 3
"'Element' means (1) the primary component immanent in
a thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds; e.g. the elements
of speech are the parts of which speech consists and into which
it is ultimately divided, while they are no longer divided into
other forms of speech different in kind from them. If they are
divided, their parts are of the same kind, as a part of water
is water (while a part of the syllable is not a syllable). Similarly
those who speak of the elements of bodies mean the things into
which bodies are ultimately divided, while they are no longer
divided into other things differing in kind; and whether the
things of this sort are one or more, they call these elements.
The so-called elements of geometrical proofs, and in general
the elements of demonstrations, have a similar character; for
the primary demonstrations, each of which is implied in many
demonstrations, are called elements of demonstrations; and the
primary syllogisms, which have three terms and proceed by means
of one middle, are of this nature.
"(2) People also transfer
the word 'element' from this meaning and apply it to that which,
being one and small, is useful for many purposes; for which reason
what is small and simple and indivisible is called an element.
Hence come the facts that the most universal things are elements
(because each of them being one and simple is present in a plurality
of things, either in all or in as many as possible), and that
unity and the point are thought by some to be first principles.
Now, since the so-called genera are universal and indivisible
(for there is no definition of them), some say the genera are
elements, and more so than the differentia, because the genus
is more universal; for where the differentia is present, the
genus accompanies it, but where the genus is present, the differentia
is not always so. It is common to all the meanings that the element
of each thing is the first component immanent in each.
Part 4
"'Nature' means (1) the genesis of growing things-the
meaning which would be suggested if one were to pronounce the
'u' in phusis long. (2) That immanent part of a growing thing,
from which its growth first proceeds. (3) The source from which
the primary movement in each natural object is present in it
in virtue of its own essence. Those things are said to grow which
derive increase from something else by contact and either by
organic unity, or by organic adhesion as in the case of embryos.
Organic unity differs from contact; for in the latter case there
need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic unities
there is something identical in both parts, which makes them
grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect
of continuity and quantity, though not of quality.-(4) 'Nature'
means the primary material of which any natural object consists
or out of which it is made, which is relatively unshaped and
cannot be changed from its own potency, as e.g. bronze is said
to be the nature of a statue and of bronze utensils, and wood
the nature of wooden things; and so in all other cases; for when
a product is made out of these materials, the first matter is
preserved throughout. For it is in this way that people call
the elements of natural objects also their nature, some naming
fire, others earth, others air, others water, others something
else of the sort, and some naming more than one of these, and
others all of them.-(5) 'Nature' means the essence of natural
objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary mode
of composition, or as Empedocles says:- "
"Nothing that is has a nature,
"But only mixing
and parting of the mixed,
"And nature is but a name given
them by men. "
Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by
nature, though that from which they naturally come to be or are
is already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unless
they have their form or shape. That which comprises both of these
exists by nature, e.g. the animals and their parts; and not only
is the first matter nature (and this in two senses, either the
first, counting from the thing, or the first in general; e.g.
in the case of works in bronze, bronze is first with reference
to them, but in general perhaps water is first, if all things
that can be melted are water), but also the form or essence,
which is the end of the process of becoming.-(6) By an extension
of meaning from this sense of 'nature' every essence in general
has come to be called a 'nature', because the nature of a thing
is one kind of essence.
"From what has been said, then,
it is plain that nature in the primary and strict sense is the
essence of things which have in themselves, as such, a source
of movement; for the matter is called the nature because it is
qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and growing
are called nature because they are movements proceeding from
this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement
of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially
or in complete reality.
Part 5
"We call 'necessary' (1) (a) that without which, as a
condition, a thing cannot live; e.g. breathing and food are necessary
for an animal; for it is incapable of existing without these;
(b) the conditions without which good cannot be or come to be,
or without which we cannot get rid or be freed of evil; e.g.
drinking the medicine is necessary in order that we may be cured
of disease, and a man's sailing to Aegina is necessary in order
that he may get his money.-(2) The compulsory and compulsion,
i.e. that which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to impulse
and purpose. For the compulsory is called necessary (whence the
necessary is painful, as Evenus says: 'For every necessary thing
is ever irksome'), and compulsion is a form of necessity, as
Sophocles says: 'But force necessitates me to this act'. And
necessity is held to be something that cannot be persuaded-and
rightly, for it is contrary to the movement which accords with
purpose and with reasoning.-(3) We say that that which cannot
be otherwise is necessarily as it is. And from this sense of
'necessary' all the others are somehow derived; for a thing is
said to do or suffer what is necessary in the sense of compulsory,
only when it cannot act according to its impulse because of the
compelling forces-which implies that necessity is that because
of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards
the conditions of life and of good; for when in the one case
good, in the other life and being, are not possible without certain
conditions, these are necessary, and this kind of cause is a
sort of necessity. Again, demonstration is a necessary thing
because the conclusion cannot be otherwise, if there has been
demonstration in the unqualified sense; and the causes of this
necessity are the first premisses, i.e. the fact that the propositions
from which the syllogism proceeds cannot be otherwise.
"Now
some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves;
others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in
other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict
sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than
one, so that it cannot even be in one state and also in another;
for if it did it would already be in more than one. If, then,
there are any things that are eternal and unmovable, nothing
compulsory or against their nature attaches to them.
Part 6
"'One' means (1) that which is one by accident, (2) that
which is one by its own nature. (1) Instances of the accidentally
one are 'Coriscus and what is musical', and 'musical Coriscus'
(for it is the same thing to say 'Coriscus and what is musical',
and 'musical Coriscus'), and 'what is musical and what is just',
and 'musical Coriscus and just Coriscus'. For all of these are
called one by virtue of an accident, 'what is just and what is
musical' because they are accidents of one substance, 'what is
musical and Coriscus' because the one is an accident of the other;
and similarly in a sense 'musical Coriscus' is one with 'Coriscus'
because one of the parts of the phrase is an accident of the
other, i.e. 'musical' is an accident of Coriscus; and 'musical
Coriscus' is one with 'just Coriscus' because one part of each
is an accident of one and the same subject. The case is similar
if the accident is predicated of a genus or of any universal
name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as 'musical man';
for this is either because 'musical' is an accident of man, which
is one substance, or because both are accidents of some individual,
e.g. Coriscus. Both, however, do not belong to him in the same
way, but one presumably as genus and included in his substance,
the other as a state or affection of the substance.
"The
things, then, that are called one in virtue of an accident, are
called so in this way. (2) Of things that are called one in virtue
of their own nature some (a) are so called because they are continuous,
e.g. a bundle is made one by a band, and pieces of wood are made
one by glue; and a line, even if it is bent, is called one if
it is continuous, as each part of the body is, e.g. the leg or
the arm. Of these themselves, the continuous by nature are more
one than the continuous by art. A thing is called continuous
which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have any
other; and the movement is one when it is indivisible, and it
is indivisible in respect of time. Those things are continuous
by their own nature which are one not merely by contact; for
if you put pieces of wood touching one another, you will not
say these are one piece of wood or one body or one continuum
of any other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way
called one, even if they admit of being bent, and still more
those which cannot be bent; e.g. the shin or the thigh is more
one than the leg, because the movement of the leg need not be
one. And the straight line is more one than the bent; but that
which is bent and has an angle we call both one and not one,
because its movement may be either simultaneous or not simultaneous;
but that of the straight line is always simultaneous, and no
part of it which has magnitude rests while another moves, as
in the bent line.
"(b)(i) Things are called one in another
sense because their substratum does not differ in kind; it does
not differ in the case of things whose kind is indivisible to
sense. The substratum meant is either the nearest to, or the
farthest from, the final state. For, one the one hand, wine is
said to be one and water is said to be one, qua indivisible in
kind; and, on the other hand, all juices, e.g. oil and wine,
are said to be one, and so are all things that can be melted,
because the ultimate substratum of all is the same; for all of
these are water or air.
"(ii) Those things also are called
one whose genus is one though distinguished by opposite differentiae-these
too are all called one because the genus which underlies the
differentiae is one (e.g. horse, man, and dog form a unity, because
all are animals), and indeed in a way similar to that in which
the matter is one. These are sometimes called one in this way,
but sometimes it is the higher genus that is said to be the same
(if they are infimae species of their genus)-the genus above
the proximate genera; e.g. the isosceles and the equilateral
are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they
are not the same triangles.
"(c) Two things are called
one, when the definition which states the essence of one is indivisible
from another definition which shows us the other (though in itself
every definition is divisible). Thus even that which has increased
or is diminishing is one, because its definition is one, as,
in the case of plane figures, is the definition of their form.
In general those things the thought of whose essence is indivisible,
and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in definition,
are most of all one, and of these especially those which are
substances. For in general those things that do not admit of
division are called one in so far as they do not admit of it;
e.g. if two things are indistinguishable qua man, they are one
kind of man; if qua animal, one kind of animal; if qua magnitude,
one kind of magnitude.-Now most things are called one because
they either do or have or suffer or are related to something
else that is one, but the things that are primarily called one
are those whose substance is one,-and one either in continuity
or in form or in definition; for we count as more than one either
things that are not continuous, or those whose form is not one,
or those whose definition is not one.
"While in a sense
we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a
sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity
of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow
we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their
continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to
be a shoe and to have already a certain single form. This is
why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is
whole and complete.
"(3) The essence of what is one is
to be some kind of beginning of number; for the first measure
is the beginning, since that by which we first know each class
is the first measure of the class; the one, then, is the beginning
of the knowable regarding each class. But the one is not the
same in all classes. For here it is a quarter-tone, and there
it is the vowel or the consonant; and there is another unit of
weight and another of movement. But everywhere the one is indivisible
either in quantity or in kind. Now that which is indivisible
in quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension
and is without position, a point if it is not divisible in any
dimension and has position, a line if it is divisible in one
dimension, a plane if in two, a body if divisible in quantity
in all--i.e. in three--dimensions. And, reversing the order,
that which is divisible in two dimensions is a plane, that which
is divisible in one a line, that which is in no way divisible
in quantity is a point or a unit,-that which has not position
a unit, that which has position a point.
"Again, some
things are one in number, others in species, others in genus,
others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species
those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same
figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related
as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are
always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in
number are also one in species, while things that are one in
species are not all one in number; but things that are one in
species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus
are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while
things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.
"Evidently
'many' will have meanings opposite to those of 'one'; some things
are many because they are not continuous, others because their
matter-either the proximate matter or the ultimate-is divisible
in kind, others because the definitions which state their essence
are more than one.
Part 7
"Things are said to 'be' (1) in an accidental sense,
(2) by their own nature.
"(1) In an accidental sense,
e.g. we say 'the righteous doer is musical', and 'the man is
musical', and 'the musician is a man', just as we say 'the musician
builds', because the builder happens to be musical or the musician
to be a builder; for here 'one thing is another' means 'one is
an accident of another'. So in the cases we have mentioned; for
when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the musician is a man',
or 'he who is pale is musical' or 'the musician is pale', the
last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same
thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which
is, while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident
of a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because
that of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said
in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because
both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to
which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which
has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself
is.
"(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those
that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses
of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some
predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality,
others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity,
others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning
answering to each of these. For there is no difference between
'the man is recovering' and 'the man recovers', nor between 'the
man is walking or cutting' and 'the man walks' or 'cuts'; and
similarly in all other cases.
"(3) Again, 'being' and
'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not being' that it is not
true but falses-and this alike in the case of affirmation and
of negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that this is true,
or 'Socrates is not-pale' means that this is true; but 'the diagonal
of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that it
is false to say it is.
"(4) Again, 'being' and 'that
which is' mean that some of the things we have mentioned 'are'
potentially, others in complete reality. For we say both of that
which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that
it is 'seeing', and both of that which can actualize its knowledge
and of that which is actualizing it, that it knows, and both
of that to which rest is already present and of that which can
rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances;
we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is
in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it
is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential
must be explained elsewhere.
Part 8
"We call 'substance' (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth
and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general
bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine
beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance
because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else
is predicated of them.-(2) That which, being present in such
things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their
being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.-(3) The parts
which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them
as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed,
as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say,
and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general
number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is
destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.-(4)
The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called
the substance of each thing.
"It follows, then, that
'substance' has two senses, (A) ultimate substratum, which is
no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being
a 'this', is also separable and of this nature is the shape or
form of each thing.
Part 9
"'The same' means (1) that which is the same in an accidental
sense, e.g. 'the pale' and 'the musical' are the same because
they are accidents of the same thing, and 'a man' and 'musical'
because the one is an accident of the other; and 'the musical'
is 'a man' because it is an accident of the man. (The complex
entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these
is the same as it; for both 'the man' and 'the musical' are said
to be the same as 'the musical man', and this the same as they.)
This is why all of these statements are made not universally;
for it is not true to say that every man is the same as 'the
musical' (for universal attributes belong to things in virtue
of their own nature, but accidents do not belong to them in virtue
of their own nature); but of the individuals the statements are
made without qualification. For 'Socrates' and 'musical Socrates'
are thought to be the same; but 'Socrates' is not predicable
of more than one subject, and therefore we do not say 'every
Socrates' as we say 'every man'.
"Some things are said
to be the same in this sense, others (2) are the same by their
own nature, in as many senses as that which is one by its own
nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either
in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are said
to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the
being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is
treated as more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same
as itself; for we treat it as two.
"Things are called
'other' if either their kinds or their matters or the definitions
of their essence are more than one; and in general 'other' has
meanings opposite to those of 'the same'.
"'Different'
is applied (1) to those things which though other are the same
in some respect, only not in number but either in species or
in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other, and
to contraries, and to an things that have their otherness in
their essence.
"Those things are called 'like' which
have the same attributes in every respect, and those which have
more attributes the same than different, and those whose quality
is one; and that which shares with another thing the greater
number or the more important of the attributes (each of them
one of two contraries) in respect of which things are capable
of altering, is like that other thing. The senses of 'unlike'
are opposite to those of 'like'.
Part 10
"The term 'opposite' is applied to contradictories, and
to contraries, and to relative terms, and to privation and possession,
and to the extremes from which and into which generation and
dissolution take place; and the attributes that cannot be present
at the same time in that which is receptive of both, are said
to be opposed,-either themselves of their constituents. Grey
and white colour do not belong at the same time to the same thing;
hence their constituents are opposed.
"The term 'contrary'
is applied (1) to those attributes differing in genus which cannot
belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) to the most
different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most different
of the attributes in the same recipient subject, (4) to the most
different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (5)
to the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely
or in genus or in species. The other things that are called contrary
are so called, some because they possess contraries of the above
kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they
are productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or
suffering them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions
or privations, of such. Since 'one' and 'being' have many senses,
the other terms which are derived from these, and therefore 'same',
'other', and 'contrary', must correspond, so that they must be
different for each category.
"The term 'other in species'
is applied to things which being of the same genus are not subordinate
the one to the other, or which being in the same genus have a
difference, or which have a contrariety in their substance; and
contraries are other than one another in species (either all
contraries or those which are so called in the primary sense),
and so are those things whose definitions differ in the infima
species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible in genus,
but their definitions are different), and those which being in
the same substance have a difference. 'The same in species' has
the various meanings opposite to these.
Part 11
"The words 'prior' and 'posterior' are applied (1) to
some things (on the assumption that there is a first, i.e. a
beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning
determined either absolutely and by nature, or by reference to
something or in some place or by certain people; e.g. things
are prior in place because they are nearer either to some place
determined by nature (e.g. the middle or the last place), or
to some chance object; and that which is farther is posterior.-Other
things are prior in time; some by being farther from the present,
i.e. in the case of past events (for the Trojan war is prior
to the Persian, because it is farther from the present), others
by being nearer the present, i.e. in the case of future events
(for the Nemean games are prior to the Pythian, if we treat the
present as beginning and first point, because they are nearer
the present).-Other things are prior in movement; for that which
is nearer the first mover is prior (e.g. the boy is prior to
the man); and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely.-Others
are prior in power; for that which exceeds in power, i.e. the
more powerful, is prior; and such is that according to whose
will the other-i.e. the posterior-must follow, so that if the
prior does not set it in motion the other does not move, and
if it sets it in motion it does move; and here will is a beginning.-Others
are prior in arrangement; these are the things that are placed
at intervals in reference to some one definite thing according
to some rule, e.g. in the chorus the second man is prior to the
third, and in the lyre the second lowest string is prior to the
lowest; for in the one case the leader and in the other the middle
string is the beginning.
"These, then, are called prior
in this sense, but (2) in another sense that which is prior for
knowledge is treated as also absolutely prior; of these, the
things that are prior in definition do not coincide with those
that are prior in relation to perception. For in definition universals
are prior, in relation to perception individuals. And in definition
also the accident is prior to the whole, e.g. 'musical' to 'musical
man', for the definition cannot exist as a whole without the
part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there is some one who
is musical.
"(3) The attributes of prior things are called
prior, e.g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one is an
attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface.
"Some
things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others
(4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can
be without other things, while the others cannot be without them,-a
distinction which Plato used. (If we consider the various senses
of 'being', firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is
prior; secondly, according as potency or complete reality is
taken into account, different things are prior, for some things
are prior in respect of potency, others in respect of complete
reality, e.g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole
line, and the part to the whole, and the matter to the concrete
substance, but in complete reality these are posterior; for it
is only when the whole has been dissolved that they will exist
in complete reality.) In a sense, therefore, all things that
are called prior and posterior are so called with reference to
this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in
respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and
others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole.
And the same is true in all other cases.
Part 12
"'Potency' means (1) a source of movement or change,
which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same
thing qua other; e.g. the art of building is a potency which
is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is
a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed.
'Potency' then means the source, in general, of change or movement
in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2)
the source of a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself
qua other. For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which
a patient suffers anything, we call it 'capable' of suffering;
and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes
not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers
a change for the better--(3) The capacity of performing this
well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those
who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend,
that they cannot speak or walk. So too (4) in the case of passivity--(5)
The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive
or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called
potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in
general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one
and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect
to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected
by them, because of a 'potency' and because they 'can' do something
and are in some positive state.
"'Potency' having this
variety of meanings, so too the 'potent' or 'capable' in one
sense will mean that which can begin a movement (or a change
in general, for even that which can bring things to rest is a
'potent' thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; and
in one sense that over which something else has such a potency;
and in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something,
whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which
perishes is thought to be 'capable' of perishing, for it would
not have perished if it had not been capable of it; but, as a
matter of fact, it has a certain disposition and cause and principle
which fits it to suffer this; sometimes it is thought to be of
this sort because it has something, sometimes because it is deprived
of something; but if privation is in a sense 'having' or 'habit',
everything will be capable by having something, so that things
are capable both by having a positive habit and principle, and
by having the privation of this, if it is possible to have a
privation; and if privation is not in a sense 'habit', 'capable'
is used in two distinct senses); and a thing is capable in another
sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other,
has a potency or principle which can destroy it. Again, all of
these are capable either merely because the thing might chance
to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. This
sort of potency is found even in lifeless things, e.g. in instruments;
for we say one lyre can speak, and another cannot speak at all,
if it has not a good tone.
"Incapacity is privation of
capacity-i.e. of such a principle as has been described either
in general or in the case of something that would naturally have
the capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already
have it; for the senses in which we should call a boy and a man
and a eunuch 'incapable of begetting' are distinct.-Again, to
either kind of capacity there is an opposite incapacity-both
to that which only can produce movement and to that which can
produce it well.
"Some things, then, are called adunata
in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others are so in
another sense; i.e. both dunaton and adunaton are used as follows.
The impossible is that of which the contrary is of necessity
true, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with
the side is impossible, because such a statement is a falsity
of which the contrary is not only true but also necessary; that
it is commensurate, then, is not only false but also of necessity
false. The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is
not necessary that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should
be seated is possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity
false. The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means
that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true;
in one, that which may be true.-A 'potency' or 'power' in geometry
is so called by a change of meaning.-These senses of 'capable'
or 'possible' involve no reference to potency. But the senses
which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary
kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing
or in the same thing qua other. For other things are called 'capable',
some because something else has such a potency over them, some
because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way.
The same is true of the things that are incapable. Therefore
the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be
'a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua
other'.
Part 13
"'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or
more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and
a 'this'. A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude
if it is a measurable. 'Plurality' means that which is divisible
potentially into non-continuous parts, 'magnitude' that which
is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which
is continuous in one dimension is length; in two breadth, in
three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length
is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid.
"Again,
some things are called quanta in virtue of their own nature,
others incidentally; e.g. the line is a quantum by its own nature,
the musical is one incidentally. Of the things that are quanta
by their own nature some are so as substances, e.g. the line
is a quantum (for 'a certain kind of quantum' is present in the
definition which states what it is), and others are modifications
and states of this kind of substance, e.g. much and little, long
and short, broad and narrow, deep and shallow, heavy and light,
and all other such attributes. And also great and small, and
greater and smaller, both in themselves and when taken relatively
to each other, are by their own nature attributes of what is
quantitative; but these names are transferred to other things
also. Of things that are quanta incidentally, some are so called
in the sense in which it was said that the musical and the white
were quanta, viz. because that to which musicalness and whiteness
belong is a quantum, and some are quanta in the way in which
movement and time are so; for these also are called quanta of
a sort and continuous because the things of which these are attributes
are divisible. I mean not that which is moved, but the space
through which it is moved; for because that is a quantum movement
also is a quantum, and because this is a quantum time is one.
Part 14
"'Quality' means (1) the differentia of the essence,
e.g. man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed,
and the horse is so because it is four-footed; and a circle is
a figure of particular quality because it is without angles,-which
shows that the essential differentia is a quality.-This, then,
is one meaning of quality-the differentia of the essence, but
(2) there is another sense in which it applies to the unmovable
objects of mathematics, the sense in which the numbers have a
certain quality, e.g. the composite numbers which are not in
one dimension only, but of which the plane and the solid are
copies (these are those which have two or three factors); and
in general that which exists in the essence of numbers besides
quantity is quality; for the essence of each is what it is once,
e.g. that of is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is
once; for 6 is once 6.
"(3) All the modifications of
substances that move (e.g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness,
heaviness and lightness, and the others of the sort) in virtue
of which, when they change, bodies are said to alter. (4) Quality
in respect of virtue and vice, and in general, of evil and good.
"Quality, then, seems to have practically two meanings,
and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is the
differentia of the essence, and of this the quality in numbers
is a part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not
of things that move or not of them qua moving. Secondly, there
are the modifications of things that move, qua moving, and the
differentiae of movements. Virtue and vice fall among these modifications;
for they indicate differentiae of the movement or activity, according
to which the things in motion act or are acted on well or badly;
for that which can be moved or act in one way is good, and that
which can do so in another--the contrary--way is vicious. Good
and evil indicate quality especially in living things, and among
these especially in those which have purpose.
Part 15
"Things are 'relative' (1) as double to half, and treble
to a third, and in general that which contains something else
many times to that which is contained many times in something
else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as
that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which
can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to
the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable
to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception.
"(1)
Relative terms of the first kind are numerically related either
indefinitely or definitely, to numbers themselves or to 1. E.g.
the double is in a definite numerical relation to 1, and that
which is 'many times as great' is in a numerical, but not a definite,
relation to 1, i.e. not in this or in that numerical relation
to it; the relation of that which is half as big again as something
else to that something is a definite numerical relation to a
number; that which is n+I/n times something else is in an indefinite
relation to that something, as that which is 'many times as great'
is in an indefinite relation to 1; the relation of that which
exceeds to that which is exceeded is numerically quite indefinite;
for number is always commensurate, and 'number' is not predicated
of that which is not commensurate, but that which exceeds is,
in relation to that which is exceeded, so much and something
more; and this something is indefinite; for it can, indifferently,
be either equal or not equal to that which is exceeded.-All these
relations, then, are numerically expressed and are determinations
of number, and so in another way are the equal and the like and
the same. For all refer to unity. Those things are the same whose
substance is one; those are like whose quality is one; those
are equal whose quantity is one; and 1 is the beginning and measure
of number, so that all these relations imply number, though not
in the same way.
"(2) Things that are active or passive
imply an active or a passive potency and the actualizations of
the potencies; e.g. that which is capable of heating is related
to that which is capable of being heated, because it can heat
it, and, again, that which heats is related to that which is
heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, in the sense
that they actually do these things. But numerical relations are
not actualized except in the sense which has been elsewhere stated;
actualizations in the sense of movement they have not. Of relations
which imply potency some further imply particular periods of
time, e.g. that which has made is relative to that which has
been made, and that which will make to that which will be made.
For it is in this way that a father is called the father of his
son; for the one has acted and the other has been acted on in
a certain way. Further, some relative terms imply privation of
potency, i.e. 'incapable' and terms of this sort, e.g. 'invisible'.
"Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore,
are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature
a reference to something else, not because something else involves
a reference to it; but (3) that which is measurable or knowable
or thinkable is called relative because something else involves
a reference to it. For 'that which is thinkable' implies that
the thought of it is possible, but the thought is not relative
to 'that of which it is the thought'; for we should then have
said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is the sight of something,
not 'of that of which it is the sight' (though of course it is
true to say this); in fact it is relative to colour or to something
else of the sort. But according to the other way of speaking
the same thing would be said twice,-'the sight is of that of
which it is.'
"Things that are by their own nature called
relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if
the classes that include them are of this sort; e.g. medicine
is a relative term because its genus, science, is thought to
be a relative term. Further, there are the properties in virtue
of which the things that have them are called relative, e.g.
equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness because
the like is. Other things are relative by accident; e.g. a man
is relative because he happens to be double of something and
double is a relative term; or the white is relative, if the same
thing happens to be double and white.
Part 16
"What is called 'complete' is (1) that outside which
it is not possible to find any, even one, of its parts; e.g.
the complete time of each thing is that outside which it is not
possible to find any time which is a part proper to it.-(2) That
which in respect of excellence and goodness cannot be excelled
in its kind; e.g. we have a complete doctor or a complete flute-player,
when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their proper
excellence. And thus, transferring the word to bad things, we
speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed
we even call them good, i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger.
And excellence is a completion; for each thing is complete and
every substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its
proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude.-(3)
The things which have attained their end, this being good, are
called complete; for things are complete in virtue of having
attained their end. Therefore, since the end is something ultimate,
we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely
spoilt, and completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short
of destruction and badness, but is at its last point. This is
why death, too, is by a figure of speech called the end, because
both are last things. But the ultimate purpose is also an end.-Things,
then, that are called complete in virtue of their own nature
are so called in all these senses, some because in respect of
goodness they lack nothing and cannot be excelled and no part
proper to them can be found outside them, others in general because
they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part
proper to them is outside them; the others presuppose these first
two kinds, and are called complete because they either make or
have something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way
or other involve a reference to the things that are called complete
in the primary sense.
Part 17
"'Limit' means (1) the last point of each thing, i.e.
the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part,
and the first point within which every part is; (2) the form,
whatever it may be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that
has magnitude; (3) the end of each thing (and of this nature
is that towards which the movement and the action are, not that
from which they are-though sometimes it is both, that from which
and that to which the movement is, i.e. the final cause); (4)
the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for this
is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the object
also. Evidently, therefore, 'limit' has as many senses as 'beginning',
and yet more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit
is a beginning.
Part 18
"'That in virtue of which' has several meanings:-(1)
the form or substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which
a man is good is the good itself, (2) the proximate subject in
which it is the nature of an attribute to be found, e.g. colour
in a surface. 'That in virtue of which', then, in the primary
sense is the form, and in a secondary sense the matter of each
thing and the proximate substratum of each.-In general 'that
in virtue of which' will found in the same number of senses as
'cause'; for we say indifferently (3) in virtue of what has he
come?' or 'for what end has he come?'; and (4) in virtue of what
has he inferred wrongly, or inferred?' or 'what is the cause
of the inference, or of the wrong inference?'-Further (5) Kath'
d is used in reference to position, e.g. 'at which he stands'
or 'along which he walks; for all such phrases indicate place
and position.
"Therefore 'in virtue of itself' must likewise
have several meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue
of itself:-(1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in
virtue of himself Callias and what it was to be Callias;-(2)
whatever is present in the 'what', e.g. Callias is in virtue
of himself an animal. For 'animal' is present in his definition;
Callias is a particular animal.-(3) Whatever attribute a thing
receives in itself directly or in one of its parts; e.g. a surface
is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of
himself; for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a part
of the man.-(4) That which has no cause other than itself; man
has more than one cause--animal, two-footed--but yet man is man
in virtue of himself.-(5) Whatever attributes belong to a thing
alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of
itself considered apart by itself.
Part 19
"'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has
parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for
there must be a certain position, as even the word 'disposition'
shows.
Part 20
"'Having' means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and
of what he has-something like an action or movement. For when
one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making;
so too between him who has a garment and the garment which he
has there is a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we
cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if it is
to be possible to have the having of what we have.-(2) 'Having'
or 'habit' means a disposition according to which that which
is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself
or with reference to something else; e.g. health is a 'habit';
for it is such a disposition.-(3) We speak of a 'habit' if there
is a portion of such a disposition; and so even the excellence
of the parts is a 'habit' of the whole thing.
Part 21
"'Affection' means (1) a quality in respect of which
a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter,
heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind.-(2) The
actualization of these-the already accomplished alterations.-(3)
Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all
painful injuries.-(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when
on a large scale are called affections.
Part 22
"We speak of 'privation' (1) if something has not one
of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if
this thing itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is
said to be 'deprived' of eyes.-(2) If, though either the thing
itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has
it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses 'deprived'
of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in
contrast with his own normal nature.-(3) If, though it would
naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have
it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not
'blind' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at
the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing
is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and
in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference
to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances
in which, it would naturally have it.-(4) The violent taking
away of anything is called privation.
"Indeed there are
just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative
prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality
though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because
it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and
apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has
imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the
thing has little of the attribute (and this means having it in
a sense imperfectly), e.g. 'kernel-less'; or because it has it
not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only
if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well);
or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the
one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called
blind. This is why not every man is 'good' or 'bad', 'just' or
'unjust', but there is also an intermediate state.
Part 23
"To 'have' or 'hold' means many things:-(1) to treat
a thing according to one's own nature or according to one's own
impulse; so that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to
have their cities, and people to have the clothes they wear.-(2)
That in which a thing is present as in something receptive of
it is said to have the thing; e.g. the bronze has the form of
the statue, and the body has the disease.-(3) As that which contains
holds the things contained; for a thing is said to be held by
that in which it is as in a container; e.g. we say that the vessel
holds the liquid and the city holds men and the ship sailors;
and so too that the whole holds the parts.-(4) That which hinders
a thing from moving or acting according to its own impulse is
said to hold it, as pillars hold the incumbent weights, and as
the poets make Atlas hold the heavens, implying that otherwise
they would collapse on the earth, as some of the natural philosophers
also say. In this way also that which holds things together is
said to hold the things it holds together, since they would otherwise
separate, each according to its own impulse.
"'Being
in something' has similar and corresponding meanings to 'holding'
or 'having'.
Part 24
"'To come from something' means (1) to come from something
as from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect of
the highest genus or in respect of the lowest species; e.g. in
a sense all things that can be melted come from water, but in
a sense the statue comes from bronze.-(2) As from the first moving
principle; e.g. 'what did the fight come from?' From abusive
language, because this was the origin of the fight.-(3) From
the compound of matter and shape, as the parts come from the
whole, and the verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the
house; (in every such case the whole is a compound of matter
and shape,) for the shape is the end, and only that which attains
an end is complete.-(4) As the form from its part, e.g. man from
'two-footed'and syllable from 'letter'; for this is a different
sense from that in which the statue comes from bronze; for the
composite substance comes from the sensible matter, but the form
also comes from the matter of the form.-Some things, then, are
said to come from something else in these senses; but (5) others
are so described if one of these senses is applicable to a part
of that other thing; e.g. the child comes from its father and
mother, and plants come from the earth, because they come from
a part of those things.-(6) It means coming after a thing in
time, e.g. night comes from day and storm from fine weather,
because the one comes after the other. Of these things some are
so described because they admit of change into one another, as
in the cases now mentioned; some merely because they are successive
in time, e.g. the voyage took place 'from' the equinox, because
it took place after the equinox, and the festival of the Thargelia
comes 'from' the Dionysia, because after the Dionysia.
Part 25
"'Part' means (1) (a) that into which a quantum can in
any way be divided; for that which is taken from a quantum qua
quantum is always called a part of it, e.g. two is called in
a sense a part of three. It means (b), of the parts in the first
sense, only those which measure the whole; this is why two, though
in one sense it is, in another is not, called a part of three.-(2)
The elements into which a kind might be divided apart from the
quantity are also called parts of it; for which reason we say
the species are parts of the genus.-(3) The elements into which
a whole is divided, or of which it consists-the 'whole' meaning
either the form or that which has the form; e.g. of the bronze
sphere or of the bronze cube both the bronze-i.e. the matter
in which the form is-and the characteristic angle are parts.-(4)
The elements in the definition which explains a thing are also
parts of the whole; this is why the genus is called a part of
the species, though in another sense the species is part of the
genus.
Part 26
"'A whole' means (1) that from which is absent none of
the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2)
that which so contains the things it contains that they form
a unity; and this in two senses-either as being each severally
one single thing, or as making up the unity between them. For
(a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good
as a whole (which implies that it is a kind whole) is true of
a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being predicated
of each, and by all of them, e.g. man, horse, god, being severally
one single thing, because all are living things. But (b) the
continuous and limited is a whole, when it is a unity consisting
of several parts, especially if they are present only potentially,
but, failing this, even if they are present actually. Of these
things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in
a higher degree than those which are so by art, as we said in
the case of unity also, wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness.
"Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a middle
and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference
are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes. Those
which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals.
These are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition,
but whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called
both wholes and totals; for they have both characteristics. Water
and all liquids and number are called totals, but 'the whole
number' or 'the whole water' one does not speak of, except by
an extension of meaning. To things, to which qua one the term
'total' is applied, the term 'all' is applied when they are treated
as separate; 'this total number,' 'all these units.'
Part 27
"It is not any chance quantitative thing that can be
said to be 'mutilated'; it must be a whole as well as divisible.
For not only is two not 'mutilated' if one of the two ones is
taken away (for the part removed by mutilation is never equal
to the remainder), but in general no number is thus mutilated;
for it is also necessary that the essence remain; if a cup is
mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no longer
the same. Further, even if things consist of unlike parts, not
even these things can all be said to be mutilated, for in a sense
a number has unlike parts (e.g. two and three) as well as like;
but in general of the things to which their position makes no
difference, e.g. water or fire, none can be mutilated; to be
mutilated, things must be such as in virtue of their essence
have a certain position. Again, they must be continuous; for
a musical scale consists of unlike parts and has position, but
cannot become mutilated. Besides, not even the things that are
wholes are mutilated by the privation of any part. For the parts
removed must be neither those which determine the essence nor
any chance parts, irrespective of their position; e.g. a cup
is not mutilated if it is bored through, but only if the handle
or a projecting part is removed, and a man is mutilated not if
the flesh or the spleen is removed, but if an extremity is, and
that not every extremity but one which when completely removed
cannot grow again. Therefore baldness is not a mutilation.
Part 28
"The term 'race' or 'genus' is used (1) if generation
of things which have the same form is continuous, e.g. 'while
the race of men lasts' means 'while the generation of them goes
on continuously'.-(2) It is used with reference to that which
first brought things into existence; for it is thus that some
are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former
proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter.
And the word is used in reference to the begetter more than to
the matter, though people also get a race-name from the female,
e.g. 'the descendants of Pyrrha'.-(3) There is genus in the sense
in which 'plane' is the genus of plane figures and solid' of
solids; for each of the figures is in the one case a plane of
such and such a kind, and in the other a solid of such and such
a kind; and this is what underlies the differentiae. Again (4)
in definitions the first constituent element, which is included
in the 'what', is the genus, whose differentiae the qualities
are said to be 'Genus' then is used in all these ways, (1) in
reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference
to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it
moves, (3) as matter; for that to which the differentia or quality
belongs is the substratum, which we call matter.
"Those
things are said to be 'other in genus' whose proximate substratum
is different, and which are not analysed the one into the other
nor both into the same thing (e.g. form and matter are different
in genus); and things which belong to different categories of
being (for some of the things that are said to 'be' signify essence,
others a quality, others the other categories we have before
distinguished); these also are not analysed either into one another
or into some one thing.
Part 29
"'The false' means (1) that which is false as a thing,
and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put
together, e.g. 'that the diagonal of a square is commensurate
with the side' or 'that you are sitting'; for one of these is
false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses
that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist,
but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they
are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream;
for these are something, but are not the things the appearance
of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way,
then,-either because they themselves do not exist, or because
the appearance which results from them is that of something that
does not exist.
"(2) A false account is the account of
non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account
is false when applied to something other than that of which it
is true; e.g. the account of a circle is false when applied to
a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i.e.
the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since
the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in
a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false
account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified
sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed
that nothing could be described except by the account proper
to it,-one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion
used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost
that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe
each thing not only by the account of itself, but also by that
of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed,
but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e.g. eight
may be described as a double number by the use of the definition
of two. "
"These things, then, are called false in these senses,
but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts,
not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who
is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as
we say things are which produce a false appearance. This is why
the proof in the Hippias that the same man is false and true
is misleading. For it assumes that he is false who can deceive
(i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who
is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction-for
a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly-by
'limping' Plato means 'mimicking a limp', for if the man were
lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as
in the corresponding case of moral character.
Part 30
"'Accident' means (1) that which attaches to something
and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually,
e.g. if some one in digging a hole for a plant has found treasure.
This-the finding of treasure-is for the man who dug the hole
an accident; for neither does the one come of necessity from
the other or after the other, nor, if a man plants, does he usually
find treasure. And a musical man might be pale; but since this
does not happen of necessity nor usually, we call it an accident.
Therefore since there are attributes and they attach to subjects,
and some of them attach to these only in a particular place and
at a particular time, whatever attaches to a subject, but not
because it was this subject, or the time this time, or the place
this place, will be an accident. Therefore, too, there is no
definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, i.e. an indefinite
one. Going to Aegina was an accident for a man, if he went not
in order to get there, but because he was carried out of his
way by a storm or captured by pirates. The accident has happened
or exists,-not in virtue of the subject's nature, however, but
of something else; for the storm was the cause of his coming
to a place for which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina.
"'Accident' has also (2) another meaning, i.e. all that
attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its
essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches
to the triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but
no accident of the other sort is. This is explained elsewhere.
END
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