An Essay Concerning Human Understanding - Critique on Locke's Epistemology
C. Cheng, April, 2001
On Locke's Epistemology
In response to the Neo-Platonic theory of forms, namely the prenatal conception of ideas, John Locke formulates an epistemological philosophy that denies the idea of innate principles. The chief arguments outlined in book one chapter two to four of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding serve as the prelude to Locke’s definitive epistemological empiricism. John Locke disproves the existence of innate principle by showing either its incoherence or its triviality. According to Locke, any ideas or principles, be they moral, conceptual, or ideological, cannot possibly be innate by birth; this impedes upon the “use of natural faculties… [to] attain to all the knowledge they have” (7). Rather, principles come from sensational perception and reflexive contemplation ex substratum; thus, principles are solely dependent on the qualities of substances which bestow ideas unto the mind. This proposition omits certain psychological concerns, especially that of the subconscious; also, although Locke draws a feasible explanation about abstracting logical tools such as the logic of causality, he fails to explain the abstraction of the idea of existing matter itself. All these holes and gaps in his theory make his epistemological philosophy skeptical and doubtful.
Locke begins his criticism on innate ideas with a simple premise: something being conscious is equivalent to something in the mind, i.e., an idea is conscious if and only if it is in the mind. Say, if ideas are present only when they are consciously present, then an innate principle or idea must have universal assent (though Locke well noted that universal assent does not necessary imply innateness) (8). In fact, this is a premise many Neo-Platonist and theologians hold at the time. Their arguments are best summarized by the dualistic theory of forms and the natural theology proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Yet, after carefully examining the latter’s syllogisms, Locke indicates their subsequent incoherence or triviality.
However, the problematic assumption (of consciousness equals in the mind) assumes that man is aware of all mental activities, which modern psychology has proven false. With the current expanded psychological knowledge, it is certain that there are unconscious ideas present in the mind. This finding alone is sufficient to take apart the entire counter-innateness argument offered by Locke, since it disproves his fundamental premise. However, given the science in the seventeenth century, this assumption was logically feasible.
Locke first indicates that there is no such principle that synonymously exists in the minds of all people. He notes that children and idiots do not know those so-called “innate principles” such as God and morality, nor do they know conceptual tools such as causality and contradiction;
‘Tis evident, that all children, and idiots, have not the least apprehension or thought of [the so-called innate principles]: and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths. It seems to me a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if not signify anything, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. (8)
This is a contradiction because “to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it… [is] hardly intelligible” (8). So long as there are exceptions to the universality of a concept, there cannot be any innate ideas. Even if there seems to be ideas that are universally present, like the idea of an existent God or morality, the context of the idea, i.e., what God is and what morality is, still differs greatly between cultures and individuals (27). Hence, the lack of universality disproves the idea of innate principles.
Locke is well aware of arguments from the opposition, and he lays down attacks on several commonly used rationales for existence of innate principles. For the propositions which state that “man acquires these fundamental concepts and principles at the prime age of reason” and “man acquires these principles by first hearing”, Locke answers by indicating its incoherence: if man has to acquire the principle or idea under a condition, then by definition it is not innate. Surely, it is a wrong proposition; in fact, the proposition and the conclusion it aims to claim are mutually exclusive.
If these principles are not learned, says the opposition, then it must be a recollection from some previously known ideas. This Platonic theory of prenatal conception and recollection from memory reaches a trivial conclusion, noted Locke:
For to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this. Whatever idea comes in to the mind is new, and not remembered: this distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. (29)
Since something remembered is something from the consciousness, something from previously conceived ideas, the act of perceiving these principles should not render a sense of unknown novelty. Furthermore, even if is does, the act of remembering merely explains the instance of recalling a former perception. As to the former perception itself, what it is and how it is attained in the first place, this proposition falls short of explaining it. Hence, the conclusion it reaches is simply that man may recollect previously perceived ideas, not prenatal ideas (as said, this theory fails to differentiate), and is trivial.
Rather than relying the perception of principles on renascence and innateness, Locke alleges all principles as products of sensational and mental perceptions (33). If there are innate properties of man, he notes, it is the innate capacity and willingness to learn. All knowledge can be acquired through experiences, by simply abstracting the qualities, or properties, of substances, carriers of qualities. By doing so, the ideas formed are simple ideas concerning the nature of the matter (33,34). Then, from these simple ideas, the mind relates, compares, processes, evaluates (often with preference), and formulates complex ideas (34). This fundamental proposition becomes the basis for empiricism.
The proposition answers the question about the acquisition of logical tools such as the idea of causality and the idea of contradiction. For these are functions of the mind as triggered by qualities in substances. Since qualities are the only part that commute with the human senses, and hence produce ideas, the power to cause ideas rests in the properties alone. This capacity to innovate ideas, or power, is in itself a force of causality; ideas formed are effects. Since the mind is actively engaged in this process, the principle of causality (or power) can be discerned by reflexive contemplation. Other similar principles such as induction, the law of contradiction, etc., can be traced and discerned with the same line of logic: the simple ideas are processed by the mind to formulate complex ideas; the operation performed are then noticeably reflected upon and drawn into ideas (34). Hence, man is not born with the idea of logical and conceptual tools: he learns them through actively abstracting external substances and contemplating on his own mental functions.
Locke has adequate success in explaining the existence of logical principles as well as conceptual ideas; yet, he fails to explain the principles pertaining to the substratum itself. As Locke himself has claimed, all existent is composed of the substratum (carrier of properties) and qualities (through which man comes to know the substance). Since the human mind can only perceive through the senses via the qualities, the substratum itself remains unperceivable (because it is only a carrier by Locke’s definition). The carrier qualifies itself by its qualities; it cannot yield the knowledge of the deciding essence that constitutes the substance itself: i.e., properties only tell man traits; it does not explain its fundamental nature. In fact, Locke himself is aware of this, and he claims that the exactly nature of substance cannot be known. This presents a problem: the idea of the substratum cannot be known. However, it is known, as physics and other sciences teach fairly well of the nature and constitution of substances. Therefore, Locke utterly fails to explain the presence of knowledge or ideas of substances.
There are obvious problems with Locke’s epistemological proposition. First, as noted, there is a false assumption concerning consciousness and mental capacity. Second, there are problems with his proposition that sets man as a receptor of external qualities. According to that theory, a substratum with no qualities cannot possibly be detectable by our senses and hence perceived– and it is not true, with the modern work in quantum physics. With that claim, Locke corners himself and falls short to ask the presence of ontological ideas as discussed. Yet, the biggest problem of his theory is that with the proceedings he claims, no knowledge can arrive at certainty, and no absolutes can ever be drawn. Since all ideas are perceived and processed by individual minds, it is inevitable that sensations are altered by personal preference, especially those of pleasure and pain. With such prejudice, how can man ever produce an objective and absolute idea? The concept of mathematics shows that man is capable of producing absolute and objective ideas. And more so, how can an idea be certain with this huge margin of error known as personal bias and preference? Properties such as taste and sound can clearly demonstrate this point. Hence, Locke’s epistemological philosophy is inconsistent and incorrect.
Through the above analysis, it is apparent that John Locke’s epistemological philosophy has far too many logical flaws to be considered a sound theory. As the first empiricist, he makes a bold attempt to discard all medieval philosophy and open a new page – and he fails, namely in the attempt to disprove innate ideas. The problem lies in his theory as to how ideas are abstracted and formed; hence, it implicitly shows the vulnerability and inadequacy of empiricism. Yet, the theory holds its own validity in certain aspects, like the abstraction and acquisition of simple ideas. And thus, Locke opens a page of history, introducing the debate between empiricist and rationalist. This debate will continue for more than a century, and significantly alters the course of western philosophy, science, and even history.