Meditations - Cogito Ergo Sum
C. Cheng, Oct., 2000
On Cogito Ergo Sum, de Meditations
Descartes’ proposition, “cogito ergo sum”, is an indubitable claim. This claim stems from the ground of an absolute nothing, from a blank page of thought that has supposedly eliminated all “preconceived opinions”. And thus, it must be free from skeptical doubts raised by the possibility of error: there is no premise to err about, for the claim is drawn directly from internal faculty independent of reason. According to Descartes’ Meditation, this definite assertion enables the first cardinal rule for all subsequent certainties, for it allows certainty to exist as and of itself and thus draw its unique criterion. With this extension, Descartes claims to establish certainty other than the existence of the meditating mind too. Along with the existence of a benevolent God, which implies that certainty yields truth since God cannot deceive man, there is supposedly a proven formula for truth and its certainty. Yet there are obvious logical problems with the second assertion. Yet as and of itself, the cogito argument is primarily flawless, and is advocated by most subsequent philosophers, like Locke and Nietzsche.
The “cogito ergo sum” argument highly resembles the “dubito sum” argument by St. Augustine of Hippo. They both begin with the notion of doubt from the phenomenon of errors, and hence are compelled to begin their inquiries from nothing: “… it was necessary … to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all” (12). Descartes notices the “large number of falsehood that [people] … has accepted [since]… childhood” (12), and proceeds to place all known and to-be-obtained knowledge in doubt. He then alleges these problems of error to several hypothetical origins: a powerful deceiving demon, a possible dream, etc. All knowledge may be imputed as a deception of a powerful demon; in the same way, anything may just have been a dream (18). These doubts and fancies, however, leaves ground for the first certainty.
With the principle of doubt, Descartes begins his speculation on the nature of doubt. When all memories are dubitable, writes Descartes, and all senses are spurious, there remains one certainty, that nothing is certain (16). But apart from these perceptions of external ideas, there is one certainty. Even if a person were to convince himself that there is nothing certain, no sky, no body, no earth, it cannot possibly mean that the person does not exist; for when a person convinces himself of something, the person certainly exists. In the other case, if there is indeed a powerful deceiving demon, distorting the perception of the person, then the person certainly exists too to be deceived. The supposed demon will never bring it about that the person is so long as that the person is being deceived and thus thinking (17). And hence, actively asserting or passively being brought, there is one necessary conclusion: I think, therefore I am (17).
The proposition “I think therefore I am” is legitimate and indubitable. It is free from possible errors, for the existence of mental actions – thinking, doubting, and being deceived – presupposes that there is a mind to take on these actions. The existence of the mind is certified by an examination of internal faculty of consciousness and awareness, which is free from perceptive errors of the senses, rational errors from reason, or errors based on any other preconceived ideas and concepts. Moreover, the certainty of the existence of the mind is independent of the context of the thoughts or doubts; for the certainty lies on the fact that there is an awareness of some mental activities, which subsequently implies that there is an operative mind either actively or passively engaging in the process of the activity. The context of thoughts, be it true or false, does not alter the fact that there is a thought. (Indeed, falsehood and doubt asserts that there is a thought.) The existence of thoughts holds true even for the various hypotheses proposed as possible origins of error. For a powerful demon to deceive, the deceived must still be a thinking mind; for a dreamer, there must still be imagination and has a being that imagines, i.e. the mind (19).
This proposition of the existence of the meditating mind is indubitable, as proven. Yet it is highly vulnerable as and of itself for a tool of inquiry into certainty. Descartes noted carefully that all memories can be erroneous and thus should be placed in doubt. Hence, the certainty of anything, including existence, must be an instantaneous understanding to remain certain. And with the burden of a possible error, especially in memory, there cannot possibly be an archive of knowledge in certitude. In order to find certainties other than the existence of the mind, this first valid proposition must extend to draw an implication to allow subsequent logics and understandings. And that implication is laid in Third Meditation;
“I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting.” (24)
And hence, a general rule is laid down, that whatever a person perceived “very clearly and distinctly is true” (24). This cardinal rule will be used as the fundamental premise for all certain ideas; it provides the criterion necessary to be noted as indubitable.
With this asserted criterion for certainty, there is only one obstacle left for acquiring true knowledge. Since the criterion for certainty is drawn, a person can find certainty of ideas out of the mental existence that yields the same clearness and distinctness. Then, one problem remains: the doubt that memory deceives and senses deceives. If these two faculties of the person are deceptive, then the mental clearness and distinctness only yields certainty, not truth. Descartes proposes the dream and the powerful deceiving demon as possible candidates for this phenomenon. In order to assert that certainty is equivalent to truth, there cannot be such deception: that a certain and clear idea leads to falsehood. Thus, according to Descartes, there is necessarily a benevolent God for the coherence of a clear and distinct conception and the truth of the matter. In order words, to obtain true knowledge, there must be a benevolent God to assure that proper certainty does not deceive the mind into falsehood (25). And in the Third Meditation, Descartes attempts to prove the existence of a benevolent God to finish the grand scheme of the formula for attaining true knowledge.
As and of the argument so far, it is acceptably functional without regarding the proof for God’s existence. Cogito, ergo sum. Then, there is the criterion for certainty: clear and distinct perception. And from these criteria and the fact that certainty must also be true, since God cannot deceive human perception or understanding, man can find true knowledge by looking for ideas that yield clearness and distinctness. Yet this conclusion is drawn without regarding Descartes’ proof for God’s benevolence. Even to grant that God is indeed benevolent, there is still one problem. Clearness and distinctness can sometimes be erroneous; for example, middle age scholars used to clearly and distinctly perceive that the world is geocentric. As seen, the faculty of reason is not perfect; it must operate at its ideal and correct state for this grand scheme of certainty to work. This is indeed one of the modifications Descartes makes in the later Meditation. Hitherto, since human reason cannot be totally perfect, there are limitations to the clearness and distinctness obtained, and hence a limit to the certainty of any knowledge. Yet, comparatively, this is a better scope of acquisition of knowledge than the total skepticism that states nothing is certain.
Other than the limitations of certainly, this scheme of knowledge acquisition also tends to run into a logical circle. Clear and distinct perception yields knowledge, so long as God is benevolent. But in the same manner, we cannot understand God without that concept of clear and distinct perception. The circularity lies in this, which precedes the other? This is a grave logical challenge, which Descartes did address, but unsatisfactorily. Yet his failure to explain this circular logic is feasible, for it is impossible to evaluate a method of inquiry without first appealing to itself as an evaluator. This is another limitation of human reasoning and logic: they cannot use themselves to explain themselves; it is inevitable, and it is feasible to stop at the bounds.
As demonstrated through this small discourse, the cogito ergo sum argument is indubitably correct. It proves nothing but the existence of the meditating mind. Yet, out of this little certainty, the meditator is able to draw the criteria for certainty, and use it as a measuring stick for acquiring certainty. Descartes asserts that clear and distinct perception eventually leads to the certain acquisition of true ideas and concepts, and thus solves the epistemological problem that is proposed in First Meditation. Without regarding the other half of the argument (of God’s benevolence), this argument is feasibly operational as a tool for acquiring certain knowledge, with conditions of a functional faculty of intellect and within certain bounds of reason. And all these certainty and rules for certainty are draw from a blank page of nothing and a meditating mind, with supposedly no preconceived ideas. It is no great wonder that this proposition opens up a new page in the history of human philosophy.