" First, I shall argue that the Platonic conception of the life of reason, including its emphasis upon stable and highly abstract objects, is itself a direct continuation of an aspiration to rational self-suffiency through the 'trapping' and 'binding' of unreliable features of the world that is repeatedly dramatized in pre-Platonic texts. Plato's own images for his philosophical endeavor reveal that he himself saw this continuity of aim. But at the same time I shall argue that this ongoing picture of reason is not, in the Greek tradition, the only salient model of reason in its relation to luck. What both metis and Platonic self suffiency omit is a picture of excellence that is shown to us in the traditional image of arete as plant : a kind of human worth that is inseparable from vulnerability, an excellence that is in its nature other-related and social, a rationality whose nature it is not to attempt to seize, hold, trap, and control, in whose values openness, receptivity, and wonder play an important part. We shall find, I believe, that at every stage in the chronological development, the picture of reason as hunter is opposed, criticized, constrained by variants of this other picture, which urge us the value of just that exposure that metis seeks to eliminate..."
 
- Nussbaum, C. Martha : The fragility of goodness, Cambridge University Press, 1986.