Before we can consider the reasons for the success of the First Crusade, we must first ask some preliminary questions that should be kept in mind throughout this discussion. First we must ask if the crusade was a success. To do this we must establish the criterion/criteria for success. I would suggest that the only way to judge success is to compare the ideals and aims of the crusade with what happened and what was actually achieved. Here, though, we encounter yet another problem in that we must ask which ideals/aims do we look at? Those of pope Urban II? Those of those entrusted with the military leadership of the crusade, or those of the ordinary participants? Finally, we may wish to judge success by comparison with another, less successful crusade. Again this presents a problem in that as other crusades took place in disparate time periods, comparisons of success or failure may not be valid due to differing conditions prevailing at those times. Therefore, if we compare the First Crusade to anything, it must be to the People's Crusade, as this was embarked upon in the same era, or to the crusade of 1101.
Let us start by asking what the aims of the First Crusade were. These fall into stated and unstated aims which, if cynical, we could categorise as justification and practical purposes respectively. The most obvious place to look for aims is Pope Urban II's speech, made on 27 November 1095 at the Council of Clermont. There are four main accounts of the speech; those of Fulcher of Chatres, Robert of Rheims, Guilbert of Nogent, and Baldric of Bourgueil. While they have differing emphasis, and while we must be careful not to take their agreement to mean 'truth', there are two aims that appear to emerge.
The first, which all four sources mention, is the cessation of hostilities between fellow christians and the unification of Christendom. Fulcher of Chartres reports Urban as saying Those who once waged war against their brothers and blood relatives should fight lawfully against barbarians (Riley-Smith, 1981:42). Robert of Rheims account comments on Christians fighting each other and advises Stop these hatreds among yourselves (ibid:44). Guilbert of Nogent chronicles Urban as chastising Christians thus...you have often savagely brandished your spears at each other in mutual carnage only out of greed and pride (ibid:46). Finally Baldric of Bourgueil narrates Urban as declaring you butcher your brothers and create factions among yourselves, appealing for them to unite as knights of Christ (ibid:51).
All this suggests that, as much as saving the Holy Land, the aim was to unite a divided Christendom in western Europe, the implication being that they should unite under the ultimate leadership of the pope. Furthermore, ther are indications in Guilbert's account that pope Urban wanted to increase his influence over the eastern Christian church as well as western monarchs. He mentions the mother church of all churches (i.e. the Catholic church) and asksdoes God wish some regions of the East to be restored to the faith against the approaching times of antichrist? (ibid:47). Although Baldric's account seems to negate this by telling Christ's knights to hurry to defend the eastern Church (ibid:51) rather than ensure its submission to Rome, the fact that the call for the crusade came from Urban II could only enhance the position of the western Church, especially as those taking part were doing so with his sanction.
How successful was this aim of uniting Christendom, or of increasing the power of the pope? One indication must be the reaction to the call. Urban's (and the bishops who spread his message) speech certainly had the potency to arouse mass action, much more perhaps than he had expected or wanted. However, it is still an indication the the church had power over the laity and that they looked to the church for leadership. Riley-Smith has gone as far as to state that The only explanation for their enthusiasm seems to be that Urban's message encountered the laity's growing aspirations and the hand stretched out by the Church to lay people was suddenly grasped (Riley-Smith, 1986:153).
However, the aim of the Crusade being totally unified under the strict control of the church was not fully achieved. Pope Urban had envisaged one large army with one military and religious leader. So carefully had he planned events that even before Clermont, Urban had consulted with Count Raymond IV of Toulouse (Mayer 1972:41) who he nominated as military leader, and at Clermont designated Adhemar, Bishop of Le Puy, as the papal legate. This aim was fractured due to the participation of more princes than were expected, who would not accept Raymond's leadership, which meant that Urban was forced to appoint a legate for each contingent, including Arnulf of Rohes. As a result of this the possibility of unified leadership, giving the impression that the whole enterprise was directed by the Pope, vanished (Mayer 1972:47). The aim of using the Crusade to increase papal prestiege had suffered a setback.
The other aim which is mentioned in three of the four accounts of Urban's speech is the recapture of Jerusalem. Robert of Rheims’ text recounts how the unclean races were in control of theHoly Places and instructs crusaders to Take the road to the Holy Sepulchre, rescue that land from a dreadful race and rule over it yourselves, informing them that Jerusalem prays to be liberated (Riley-Smith 1981: 43-44). This provided both motivation and justification for prospective crusaders. Guilbert of Nogent's account states that crusaders must take the greatest pains to try to ensure that the holiness of that city and the glory of his Sepulchre will be cleansed, which makes it clear that Jerusalem is the aim (Riley-Smith 1981: 46). Finally Baldric of Bourgueil's account speaks of relieving the suffering of fellow Christians who are oppressed and injured in Jerusalem and Antioch and other cities along the eastern coastline. This and what the rest of his version goes on to say, again makes it clear that, at least for the chroniclers a decade later, Jerusalem was the goal (Riley-Smith 1981:49).
However these chroniclers were writing in retrospect, with the particular aim of justifying, indeed celebrating, what happened and providing a pleasing account for their patrons. Only Fulcher of Chatres actually went on the Crusade, first with Stephen of Blois, then after his departure with Baldwin of Boulogne, but his account does not cover Jerusalem, perhaps due to his remaining in Edessa with Baldwin, until the latter became king of Jerusalem in 1100. Furthermore, the papal letters calling for a crusade did not at first mention Jerusalem as the main aim but, as in Urban's address to the people of Flanders, the liberation of the eastern church. By September 1096 Urban had latched on to the popular appeal of liberating Jerusalem, and was promising remission on penance for sins for those who set out for the holy city, although this was still part of the general liberation of the eastern Church (Chronicles:63). However, it is likely that the recapture of Jerusalem would have been seen as a desirable aim, and one that crusaders could focus their thoughts on. If not the aim of the pope, it was definitely the aim of the crusaders. Was this achieved? In the short-term yes, given that Jerusalem was in Christian hands after the victory of 15 July 1099, and the defeat later that year of the Egyptians near Ascalon on 12 August.
However, given that all the armies had reached (some even crossed) the Bosporus by April 1097, and that Jerusalem was not 'regained' until July 1099, we must account for this delay as well as asking how they managed to eventually succeed. The first thing to note is that there were three main contingents to the First Crusade; those led by Bohemund of Taranto, those led by Godfrey of Bouillon, and those under the leadership of Raymond of St Gilles, Count of Toulouse. Of the three, only Raymond seems to have been without an ulterior motive, already being rich and able to muster a large force, which is probably why pope Urban chose him as the official leader which the original papal legate would travel with. The motivation of the other two is more suspect, Bohemund described by Mayer as a true Norman rather than a true crusader, had lost land in the Norman-Byzantine war of 1085 and was out to gain compensation (Mayer 1972:46). Godfrey of Bouillon sold all his lands, including his castle, and burned his boats before he set out in August 1096, which indicates that he did not intend to return. The pursuit of personal gain was at times to put the stated aim of the Crusade at risk.
The most distinct example of this is the events surrounding the capture of Antioch. After the submission of Nicaea, which the crusaders left on 26 June 1097, Steven of Blois had written home that unless Antioch proves a stumbling block we hope to be in Jerusalem in five weeks time (ibid:50), yet they did not reach Jerusalem for a further two years. What went wrong? It might appear that Antioch, which the crusaders arrived at on 21 November 1097, was indeed a stumbling block, but I would maintain that the division between the leaders was the real stumbling block. Raymond had wanted to storm the city, but Bohemund preferred a siege, despite the fact that there were not enough troops to surround the city. People came and went from the gate of St George to gather supplies, which made a mockery of the so called siege, and it was not until the arrival of reinforcements in March 1098 that it could be properly instituted. By that time those laying siege were worse off than those inside the city, many had deserted and some were so hungry that they had reportedly turned to cannibalism. Though they finally gained access to the city with the help of an insider on 3 June 1098, they found themselves almost immediately under siege from Kerbogha of Mosul, who had been approaching to aid the captive city. It was not until 28 June that the threat was overcome in battle. It had taken over seven months to secure the city, when storming it would have saved time, money, and prevented morale from falling. Why a siege then? It seems that Bohemund wanted Antioch for himself and thus wanted it in tact, which would not have been the case if they had stormed the city. This is a clear example of how selfish ambition put the Crusade’s success at risk. That the conquest of property was Bohemund’s real aim is confirmed by the fact that he virtually took no further part in the Crusade, never reaching Jerusalem, but becoming prince of Antioch and then continuing a campaign against the Byzantine empire that he and his father had started between 1080-1085, which ceased only with the failure of his attack on Durazzo in 1108. The disagreement over Antioch also counteracted the pope’s plea for Christians to stop fighting each other, as tensions between Bohemund and Raymond, and thus between Normans and Provençals, grew worse, especially after the death of the only mediating voice, papal legate Adhemar of Le Puy, on 1 August 1098. It appears that it was the rank and file that put aside differences and offered to recognise Raymond as the chief military leader, if he would guide them to Jerusalem. This he accepted and they set off on 13 January 1099, nearly fifteen months after arriving at the gates of Antioch.
After the trauma of Antioch, the following months until the capitulation of Jerusalem on 15 July must have seemed relatively trouble free, even though Jerusalem was under siege for over a month. Is it true to say, though, that when the Crusade leaders were united they could achieve their aims, or were there other reasons for their success? There was careful planning and preparation for the attack on Jerusalem, after the initial failure to penetrate it, such as the building of siege towers, which required a unity of purpose, symbolised by the ritualistic act of walking barefoot round the walls of Jerusalem. Also, despite the disagreements about Godfrey becoming the ruler of Jerusalem under the title 'Advocatus Sancti Sepulchri' and of Arnulf's election as patriarch, Raymond and Robert of Normandy were loyal enough to help Godfrey defeat the Egyptians and so secure Jerusalem's 'liberation'.
Perhaps the most important reason for the success of the First Crusade was the disunity within the Muslim world and the underestimation of the threat that the crusaders posed. After the death of the Seldjuk sultan Malik-Shah in 1092, his sons quarrelled over who would succeed him. There were also bitter divisions between Turks and Shi'ite Fatmids, who were in dispute over the Holy Land. While the crusaders were besieging Antioch the Egyptians were regaining control of Jerusalem. Smail has stated that it was this disunity which was unchecked until about 1130 that made the First Crusade and its consolidation a success, rather than any merits on the part of the crusaders (Smail 1973:14). Certainly once they united the Christian controlled areas started to crumble, Edessa as early as 1144, Jerusalem in 1187, Antioch in 1268, Tripoli in 1289, and finally Acre in 1291.
Failure to react sooner to the threat was also due to misconception. The Turkish leader Kilij Arslan was lulled into a false sense of security by the Peoples Crusade. His spies kept watch on their base near Civitot and noted their ravaging of the local countryside, but refrained from action as long as his capital, Nicaea, was safe. When they did threaten the city, they were easily defeated, some massacred at Xerigordon and the rest routed at Civitot on 21 October 1096. Intoxicated by his success, Kilij Arslan pointedly ignored the information that came through the following winter about the arrival of fresh groups of Franj in Constantinople (Maalouf 1984:9). He presumed they would be like the previous grouping, not properly armed or organised and easily defeatable. Thus he concentrated his resources on fighting his fellow Turkish neighbours. As Mayer has commented, to the Turks the First Crusade must have appeared as just another Byzantine military exercise, the kind of thing to which they were thoroughly accustomed and thought they could easily deal with (Mayer 1972:53). Arslan was not even present when Nicaea came under siege, and by the time the danger was realised it was too late. The Seldjuk Turks were not the only ones who misinterpreted the aims of the crusaders. The Fatmids so far misunderstood the character of the crusade that they suggested a partition with the Franks and an anti-Seldjuk alliance (Smail 1973:13). The failure to swiftly send a relief force to Jerusalem also indicates how the threat was underestimated.
One final point illustrates how it was the unprepared state of Islam that accounts for the success of the First Crusade, and that is that fate of the crusade of 1101. Soon after the capture of Jerusalem, even before the death of Urban II on 29 July 1099, a further crusade was being planned. It is estimated that the total numbers involved may have been as many as those who embarked on the First Crusade (Riley-Smith 1981:14). However, this time the Turks were prepared and in two battles in August and September 1101 they easily defeated the crusading forces. Those who went on to Jerusalem in order to fulfil their vows did so only as pilgrims.
Although the main reason for the success of the First Crusade was the divisions within Islam, some credit is due to the crusaders themselves, not the leaders necessarily, but the masses who made up the bulk of the force. All the leaders had ulterior motives, even Raymond tried to seize the Lebanese city of Arqa and later founded the county of Tripoli. However, it was the mass of crusaders that believed in the Holy Lance found in Antioch, they also who encouraged Raymond to lead them to Jerusalem, they who believed in the visions and marched round the walls of Jerusalem. For them this was, despite the atrocities that were committed, a holy pilgrimage, their aim being to capture Jerusalem for God. Their altruistic motives are demonstrated by the fact that barely a month after the capture of Jerusalem most were on their way back home. They were helped by Muslim disunity, but we must not underrate the power of religious fervour that gave the bulk of the crusaders the stubbornness and persistence to suffer all the hardships on route to the Holy Land and was their prime motivating force.
REFERENCES
Le Goff J, Medieval Civilisation 400-1500, (Translation by J Barrow), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.
Hallam E (Ed.), Chronicles of the Crusades, Bramley Books, Godalming, 1989.
Maalouf A, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, (Translation by J Rothschild), Al Saqi Books, London, 1984.
Mayer H E, The Crusades, (Translation by J Gillingham), OUP, Oxford, 1972.
Riley-Smith J, What Were The Crusades?, Edward Arnold, London, 1977.
Riley-Smith J & L, The Crusades: Idea and Reality 1095-1274, Edward Arnold, London, 1981.
Riley-Smith J, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, Athlore Press, London, 1986.
Runciman S, A History of the Crusades, Volume 1: The First Crusade, CUP, Cambridge, 1968.
Smail R C, The crusades in Syria and the Holy Land, Thames & Hudson, London, 1973.
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