But did Tocqueville understand the deeper search for identity and belonging
in those who join a parochial pack in search for truth? Yes, he did.
The personal feeling of belonging to a particular flock, the distinction
of particular habits and recipes, the distance from the ordinary other
people trampling through the underwood in search of truth, is not a democratic
but an ‘aristocratic’ condition. The flight into particular identities
that provide sense beyond the lonely search - the songs, the campfire,
the ritual that make for cozy hours in the lonely wilderness - is a reaction
to the essentially lonely, withdrawn and individualistic condition of democracy.
Aristocratic residues, about which we will have to speak more of later,
provide shelter for the lonely democratic man. Tocqueville feared that
democratic people would lose their distinct selves in the equality of the
crowd, and reminded his readers of aristocratic institutions (he named
family, property and wealth, the practice of law, and religion) that elevate
an individual above the crowd, and give her the possibility of greatness.
I will make the argument in this paper that the function of aristocratic
institutions - providing a sense of stability, distinctiveness and linkage
- can be provided by any order that addresses the individual as a particular,
and places her within a universal order of things. In that sense, Tocqueville
did understand those who join a parochial pack in search for their own
particular distinctive identity above the universally faceless crowd, though
he primarily thought of religious, rather than ethnic (or other) identities.
Is Tocqueville's democratic condition the post-modern condition, his answer
of aristocratic institutions and participatory habits an answer to postmodernity?
In many essential respects, yes. As I have described, postmodernism is
often associated with the intellectual awareness of a kaleidoscopic existence,
but one must not have read books by sociologists and philosophers
to feel the impact of democratic disconnectedness, "where each man is narrowly
shut up in himself", withdrawn from the world, unaware of what transcends
one's secular, self-reliant existence, and feel this disconnectedness as
a loss. We will discuss the history of man's democratic loneliness in the
context of a history of equality, democracy and narratives later on.
Is the perception of confusion in the underwood
not just a professoral hobby-horse that has no impact on the real world?
No. Indeed, with Tocqueville, one can make the argument that the largely
lonely intellectual hustle-bustle in the underwood of the mind in search
for meaning is the real undercurrent underlying the jostling and shoveling
of the lonely crowd on the surface of the plain green meadows of liberal
Western democracies, which falsely understands happiness to be meaning
. The search for sense was what started the Enlightenment project - "the
project of an independent rational justification of morality" according
to Alasdair MacIntyre -, and for sense we still search for today.
But as Tocqueville had anticipated, this search might be somewhat misguided
in a time where money is the yardstick of success, where a modernity has
constructed a Weberian iron cage, where politics starts treating citizens
as consumers, and where markets are becoming the primary forces in our
lives, focusing our aspirations on flexibility and mobility, human features
suited to market success, but reflecting an uprooted, fragmented personality.
Having outlined the postmodern context of this paper - what can we expect
Tocqueville to tell to a liberal democracy in postmodern times? Tocqueville
offers an anthropology, and a history of human aspirations, as well as
many helpful insights into democratic conditions that allow for the effective
assessment of postmodern phenomena, and for a new proposal for the establishment
of civil society. Briefly outlined, I will interpret his anthropology as
one that understands human beings as story-telling beings who seek for
an order of the world that provides them with stability and a distinct
place in it. To be able to tell their own particular story, human beings
fought for universal political and economic equality, which spilled over
into aspirations of social equality, all of which constitute a movement
towards universal ideals that, in turn, endangers the possibility of articulating
a particular personal story of individual human beings because they have
already come to understand themselves in purely secular, rational and universal
terms, rather than in terms that address the totality of their existence
(and emotional and spiritual needs). This is the tension of today, and
the recognition of this is where we can go from toward a civil society.
Why are human beings story-telling beings? Because their self-understanding,
their identity, their yearning for an authentic existence is determined
by the story they are able to tell of themselves. Forced to explain themselves
everyone will be able to speak of his views supporting his decisions and
actions, and find a larger justifying scheme for it. Whether this scheme
is always coherent, or comprehensive, is another matter - but more important
and for the most part, human beings perceive of their explanatory narratives
as coherent and comprehensive. Of course, a narrative is not unalterable.
It is rewritten many times in one's life, and not always are people fully
aware of all implications of their narrative. Such is the case in "people
who seem borne by an unknown force toward a goal of which they themselves
are unaware." Indeed, the personal narrative is principally couched
in the origin of a person, as Tocqueville suggests: "Go back; look at the
baby in his mother's arms; see how the outside world is first reflected
in the still hazy mirror of his mind... only then will you understand the
origin of his prejudices, habits and passions which are to dominate his
life". In other words, look at the first perceptions of a child to understand
her vocabulary of the order of the world, and the account of which I call
a narrative.