


September 14, 18, 1998:
MM: January 1945 - March 1946

Due to the sudden end of World War II, many expected the US to have leverage due to its possession of nuclear warfare. The illusion of a world at peace did not last. A Soviet spy ring was uncovered operating in the United States and Canada. The group had already compromised atomic bomb technology within 30 days of the end of the war.

World leaders were concerned about tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the public was unaware of the mounting strife and wanted troops returned home quickly. In June of 1945, 12 million Americans were serving under arms. One year later, that number had dropped to 3 million, and by June of 1947, there were only 1.5 million serving. As the chart below shows, the rapid return of the armed forces was not as much demobilization as disintegration.



President Truman, Marshall, and Eisenhower wanted to institute "Universal Military Training" in preparation for any future conflicts. Congress, however, nixed the idea, asserting the plan was too costly, and insisting there was no need for a peacetime draft.

Domestically, discussion began over the control of nuclear weaponry and research. Movement began for international control. White House officials stressed they would not agree to international controls unless there was unanimous consent among the concerned parties. Congress opposed a plan which did not require their approval. Rumors on Capitol Hill claimed Truman was about to give away the secret of the bomb.


In the Allied meeting of September 1945, the Soviets escalated their demands and no agreements were made at all. In December of 1945, Secretary of State Burns met with Stalin to discuss the future of Eastern Europe. Stalin's concessions were inconsequential. On February 9, 1946, Stalin delivered a speech in which he declared Communism and Capitalism cannot coexist. War between the superpowers seemed inevitable. When

World War II ended, 54% of Americans were willing to trust the Soviet Union. By February of 1946, that number had dropped to 35%.

President Truman's public rhetoric toward the Soviet Union was neutral or positive. Privately, he was concerned over the Soviet situation, and he used various surrogates to deliver his anti-Soviet rhetoric.

Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech:

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. The speech was titled *Alliance of English-Speaking People*, but it became known as "The Iron Curtain Speech."



Westminster College was a small college in "the middle of nowhere," but Churchill delivered this address with President Truman on hand to introduce the former prime minister. Few reporters were on hand, but the speech was widely covered the next day.

Churchill clearly explained this speech was opinion and not policy. Truman was fully aware of the speech's content, but denied it publicly.

The speech spoke of the "fraternal relation of English-speaking peoples." It was delivered from a viewpoint of British hubris, but it also reflected Churchill's imperialistic views. Some key points of the speech included:

Churchill's contrast of Communism and Christendom

New, permeating language (e.g. "Iron Curtain")

A discussion of "bonding together" forces (later fulfilled in NATO)

On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save our future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines...


Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement...

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound.

Churchill's speech was not well received. The American public was frightened and angered by its sentiment.

Kennan's Long Telegram:

George Kennan served under the U.S. ambassador to Moscow from 1933-37, a period which included Stalin's purges. He had served previous diplomatic posts in Prague, Lisbon, and other sites. When he returned to the U.S., Kennan was an outspoken opponent of policies toward the Soviet Union, but his advice went unheeded. Kennan counseled against the Yalta conference. He asserted the UN would not resolve problems between the world powers, and Kennan said the U.S. must prepare for a long struggle.



On February 3, 1946, the Treasury Department cabled the Moscow embassy requesting information about the Soviet reluctance to join the World Bank. The ambassador had left and Kennan saw an opportunity to express his views on the Soviet Union. Ignoring the actual request, Kennan composed an 8,000-word reply which he telegraphed on February 22.

Kennan's Long Telegram was an essay describing the Soviet worldview. Copies of the document were quickly circulated to the Commander of the Navy, Cabinet Secretaries, the President, and others. The long telegram became the "master document" for understanding the inner workings of the Soviet Union in 1946. When recently appointed Ambassador Harriman saw the document he increased its circulation.

Kennan described the Soviet Union as a secluded, isolationist people. The country, he said, was insulated, and Stalin was one of the few Soviets who had contact with the world outside of his country. Kennan argued the citizenry was naïve of the American view. Therefore leaders must deal with the Soviets in power - not the populace.

The Soviet isolation was partly due to insecurities (an idea that did not catch on for some time). Kennan portrayed the Communist Party as a darkly subversive organization dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism. He also said, however, Soviet propaganda was easily combated by not overreacting.

Kennan called for better communication between the American administration and the American people. He believed the public should be prepared for the imminent rift between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It was, however, another year before the president began to discuss these problems with the public.

Kennan urged American leaders not to engage in an arms race. He believed instead the U.S. should understand internal Soviet turmoils and selectively engage the Soviets to

contain their expansionist tendencies. He argued against becoming like the enemy or creating what Eisenhower dubbed a "garrison state."

Kennan also discussed Soviet ideology. He said Marxist talk was only for internal consumption in the Soviet Union. He asserted the leaders did not believe the Marxist philosophy and were power-mongers. He said the Soviets reject objective truth, which meant they perceived factual statements as possessing an ulterior motive. He predicted the Soviets only wanted to use the UN to further their aims.

Kennan advised the Soviet Union would respect force. He said Soviet leaders did not want war, only the fruits of war and would back down if they see strength. The public was not exposed to this view until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March of 1947.

...we have a political force committed fanatically to the belief ... that it is necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure...

Impervious to logic of reason, [Soviet power] is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw - and usually does - when strong resistance is encountered... Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.

Kennan's Long Telegram became the blueprint for thinking about the Soviet Union in the early cold war.

Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech came two weeks after Kennan's Long Telegram. On the same day Congress wrote the Soviet Union demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iran. Without waiting for a reply, Secretary of State Byrnes released the content of the note to the press. Throughout 1946 the United States made no major concessions.



The Clifford Report:

Clark Clifford delivered the Report on Soviet Relations on September 24, 1946. Clifford concluded Soviets were "in preparation for the inevitable conflict" and trying to weaken their foes any way possible. The report called for the U.S. to band together with Britain to build its own world. The sentiment echoed the Long Telegram - America must show strength. Clifford warned to be prepared for atomic or biological warfare. He asked for patience with firmness.

President Truman decided a stronger stance was necessary. He was so shaken by the Clifford Report he ordered all copies destroyed except for the one he kept in a locked desk drawer. Truman's desire to increase the country's military strength was hampered

when Republicans took both houses of Congress in November with promises of lower taxes, lower spending, and more tariffs.

Truman wanted to increase military spending and foreign aid. He requested \$37.7 billion from Congress. He was able to receive \$34.7 billion only because Sen. Arthur Vandenburg preserved the measure. The public resisted new spending because they were still uninformed of world affairs.

Britain informed the State Department they could no longer afford to support Greece and Turkey. Greece had been fighting internal Communist threats, and if Greece fell, so might several Middle Eastern countries.

On February 27, 1947, Truman invited bipartisan leaders to the White House. Secretary of State Marshall began the meeting with a drab recitation of the facts which bored his audience. Undersecretary Dean Acheson then bluntly laid out the consequences of not supporting Greece and Turkey.

Sen. Vandenburg said, "If you talk like that to the American people, we will support you. You'll have to scare the hell out of the American people for Congress to support you."

Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and got the requested funds within weeks.

The Truman Doctrine:


Delivered on March 12, 1947, Truman's speech to Congress created a clear dichotomy. Powerful rhetoric put Congressional leaders in a tight spot - "whose side are you on?"

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression.


The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.



I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own ways.

On April 28, Secretary Marshall returned from a meeting with Stalin reporting the "recovery of Europe is far slower than expected." Marshall called for action without delay, and the next day he summoned Kennan to fashion a plan to save the struggling European economies.



The Marshall Plan:

On May 16, Kennan recommended American aid to foster a regional political organization. He requested grants - no loans - focusing on Western Europe. His report was submitted on May 23, and from it was born the Marshall Plan. Marshall presented the Plan at the Harvard commencement on June 5.

Though the plan was actually Kennan's creation, it required the authority of someone with confidence and respect in the eyes of the American public. Thus Truman decided Marshall would present the blueprint.

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

Moscow was invited to participate in the new organization (knowing they would decline). Soviet leaders refused to join the initiative on the basis it would interfere with their internal plans (leaders did not want to reveal details of their own economy). In the end, 16 nations including Great Britain, France and Italy participated.

In July of 1947, an article titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. The anonymous article was only signed "X," but those in the foreign policy establishment recognized Kennan as the author. This was the first public viewing of Kennan's remarks.

As 1947 ended, all of the Cold War elements were in place; public attitudes, the Marshall Plan, a security apparatus, and contested territory. It was clear that the Potsdam agreements were dead along with world order.
