By Fareed Zakaria

Tuesday, October 22, 2002; Page A27

Last week George Tenet warned us that al Qaeda is armed and dangerous. He pointed to the series of threats and attacks around the world -- from Kuwait to Yemen to Bali -- as evidence that the organization is rejuvenated and in the "execution phase." One has to take Tenet's warning seriously, and yet the recent episodes of terrorism can be interpreted differently. Consider the two major "successes": the bombing of a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen and the explosions in Bali. In both cases al Qaeda -- or groups inspired by it -- went after non-American targets, and relatively easy-to-hit ones at that. For the past decade al Qaeda's chief objective has been to attack major symbols of American power -- military, political and economic. It bombed embassies, naval vessels and, of course, the World Trade Center. But since 9/11, with the exception of the recent killing of a soldier in Kuwait, it has not been able to hit America. Also, look at where it struck. In Yemen, al Qaeda has deep connections; in Indonesia, it is exploiting a weak and unstable country and government.

The terror attacks in Yemen and Indonesia will also result in much greater anti-terror vigilance and cooperation from France, Australia and Indonesia. Osama bin Laden's strategy should have been to divide America from its allies in the war on terror. His past rhetoric and actions have recognized this. But these latest scattered attacks are forging a more united coalition. It's always dangerous to make claims about al Qaeda. It is certainly trying to do America harm -- and it will certainly strike again. But before 9/11 al Qaeda was doing what it wanted; now it is doing what it can.

The war on terror has had an effect. The destruction of al Qaeda's base camps in Afghanistan, the detention of suspects around the world, the scrutiny of bank accounts -- all this has made mass terror more difficult. But while the Bush administration has a coherent military strategy in place, it does not have a similar political one. And on that crucial front, the war on terror is failing.

Two weeks ago Pakistan held national elections, and Muslim fundamentalists did well. This event did not get the attention it deserved. Islamic politics is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. Voters have gotten used to listening to fiery fundamentalists promising purity and delivering nothing. And yet over a half-century of intermittent elections in Pakistan, the fundamentalists never received more than 5 percent of the vote. This month they got nearly 25 percent.

I asked a Pakistani politician who took part in this election for an explanation. "America became a huge issue in the election," he said. "The fundamentalists were voted in to protest [Gen. Pervez] Musharraf's alliance with America. For those like me who advocate reform and close ties with America, the atmosphere is now very bad. People watch this [Bush] administration -- its arrogance, its bullying, its double standards on the Israel-Palestine issue -- and they conclude America is anti-Muslim."

America has become the big issue around the globe, but particularly in the Muslim world. Pro-American forces are fearful and quiet. This is partly why Indonesia's government did not want to crack down on Muslim fundamentalists. It is why not a single Arab regime -- including many that hate Saddam Hussein -- will publicly back the American campaign against Iraq. Doing what America wants is seen as carrying out orders from an imperious superpower.

This is not simply a public relations problem for Washington. Pakistan could stymie crucial efforts to flush al Qaeda out of provinces along its Afghan border -- provinces that are now run locally by Muslim fundamentalists. Scientists in its large nuclear establishment -- some of whom were sympathetic to the Taliban -- could leak know-how and materials to al Qaeda. Indonesia could become a haven for terror, which, given its size and geography, would be a nightmare. And throughout the Muslim world, the growing anti-Americanism only makes it easier to recruit young men for suicide missions.

During the Cold War, the United States had two approaches to confronting Soviet communism: military and political. The first involved nuclear weapons, proxy wars and covert action. The second was a concerted effort to build alliances with countries that had a common cause, to foster trade and to provide aid to Third World countries that eschewed communism. America built dams, funded magazines and created the Peace Corps, all as part of this effort.

In the war against terror, we are doing well militarily. But it will count for little without an effective political strategy. Otherwise we will kill fundamentalists but feed fundamentalism.

The writer is editor of Newsweek International and is a columnist for Newsweek.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company