This paper will discuss some aspects of the ideology and application of Queensland government economic development policy during the early decades of the twentieth century. It will also briefly highlight some of the continuities and discontinuities apparent in more recent developmentalist patterns. A clear manifestation of the Queensland developmental ethos can be seen in the post-first world war economic development policies of the Ryan/Theodore Labor administrations. Labor's quest was to usurp the political-economic power of the pastoralist and mercantile classes in order to fundamentally restructure Queensland's socio-economic foundations. To achieve this goal Labor's strategy was to cultivate and institutionalise political-economic relations with small business, agricultural and trade union interests, via economic development policies derived from a populist ideology that supported cooperative agrarian corporatism. The temper of Queensland's developmental policy was distinctly agricultural in design, which reflected the electorally popular yeomanry closer settlement ideal. However, there was an intrinsic contradiction between the ideal and the reality of a demonstrable preference for the urban existence. Moreover, Labor's embryonic strategy to diversify the sectoral composition of Queensland's economy by encouraging the development of the state's secondary industry base in the early 1920s was thwarted by a loans funding crisis instigated by the political and economic intervention of pastoral and capital interests.1

The general consensus drawn from the historiography suggests Queensland was economically dependent on primary production, and when compared to the southern states, its manufacturing sector was relatively underdeveloped and unsophisticated. Generally speaking however, the discipline of economic history has not paid sufficient attention to Queensland history, nor has economic analysis in the general body of Queensland historiography been as rigorous and encompassing as it could be. Some of the main themes on economic development considered in Queensland historiography are the patterns of expansion and dominance of the pastoral industry, the growth in agricultural activity associated with closer settlement schemes, and from after the First World War, the institutionalised responses intended to give primary producers control over marketing their own commodities. This reflects the obvious rural bias that infused the political economy of the period. However, close empirical analysis of the economic processes and sectoral composition of Queensland's industrial base demonstrates that the economic significance of the secondary industry sector has been somewhat understated historiographically. Furthermore, the impact of internal and external political, financial and ideological forces that effectively marginalised early Labor government plans to encourage the development of secondary industries have not been adequately researched. To illustrate the context of this, an examination of the dominant patterns of government sponsored developmental policy needs first to be undertaken.

From 1901 successive Queensland governments sought to consolidate their political-economic autonomy in a manner that entrenched Queensland's exceptionalist reputation in developmental policy. From the 1890s the political marginalisation of the manufacturing sector was obvious in the temper of the developmental policies of the Philp ‘Continuous Ministry'. These policies focused almost entirely upon the expansion of rail networks linked to pastoral expansion, and to a lesser degree, to closer settlement. These were in turn linked to assisted immigration schemes and other domestic policies aimed at encouraging the ‘surplus' urban population to take up life on the land. The Philp government was happy to continue the agrarian push so long as; a) this made the existing rail lines paying propositions and b); did not threaten the rights and privileges of pastoral interests. Philp could not ignore the popular support for agricultural settlement and attempted to control its development in ways that would not compromise the pastoral interests he and his cabinet represented.(Bolton 1990, pp.193-220; Hughes 1980, pp.14-15; Lewis 1973, p.6; Gough, et al. 1964, pp.7-9)

On the surface, one of the main problems facing the Philp, and the later governments, was the enormous costs involved in financing rural development. The fiscal restrictions forced upon these governments, due to the long drought and loss of revenue associated with the Braddon Clause of the Federation agreement, placed severe strains on the Queensland treasury. Indeed, Federation is generally understood to have had a negative impact on Queensland's economy in the short term, especially in the manufacturing sector, which became more exposed to external competition after colonial tariffs were withdrawn. Nevertheless, while weak local manufacturers were overcome by interstate competitors, the stronger ones consolidated their operations, increased their market share, and copped well. In the broader context, the advent of a national ‘free' market had a positive effect on the growth in demand for Queensland's primary produce.(Butlin 1970, pp.311-312; Laverty 1970, pp.40-41) The problems faced by Queensland manufacturers post-federation were exacerbated by official apathy towards the vitality of the sector. The reluctance of Queensland governments to apply a preference for local manufactures in government contracts reflected this attitude, which was not the case in the other states.(QSA, PRE/A386 1911, & A/970 1929) Aside from the problems of funding accelerated rural development, there was a another significant non-fiscal difficulty facing these and future governments.

There is no doubting the broad political popularity of the yeomanry ideal in Queensland during this period. This was the belief that economic growth and security, moral superiority, and social stability, could all best be achieved in an agrarian society based upon the closer settlement of pastoral holdings with small acreage family farms. Despite the political popularity of this ideal, the evidence of urban growth and intensification demonstrates that the majority of immigrants and native born preferred the urban existence rather then taking on the honest privations of the selectors life. In fact, demographically Queensland was as intensely urbanised and decentralised as it was agrarian, with the primary sector dominated by large pastoral runs. Here the contradiction is compelling. Nowhere was the political drive for rural development so strong and the reluctance of the immigrants and urbanites to partake in closer settlement so contradictory. This paradox is not surprising when considered in the context of the influence of the broader international logic of modernity. That is, due to the rise of industrial capitalism and urbanisation, industrial development was understood in the processes of the political economy to be the primary mode of economic and social progress in building the modern nation state. It is expressly this contradictory impasse between ideal and action that presented so many problems for the developmental urges of governments who ignored the realities of the urban intensification and continued to neglect the urban infrastructure so vital to industrial development and sectoral diversity.

Queensland's drive towards the agrarian utopia was also in direct conflict with the dominant economic patterns of urbanisation and industrialisation that characterise this period in Australian history. To a large degree the potential success of closer settlement, and the agricultural sector generally, relied upon the development of urban based manufacturing to provide the domestic consumer demand to underwrite rural intensification. The economics of closer settlement agriculture and the pastoral sector are quite different in terms of the economic outcomes necessary to support the producers themselves. The success of some operations in the agricultural sector in the post-WWI period, for example dairy exports, can in part be attributed to the cooperative corporatism introduced by the Ryan/Theodore Labor governments. Commodity pooling and cooperative marketing allowed the returns necessary to support small family holdings, through various legislative and organisational measures that encouraged cooperative monopolies over commodity supplies and underwrote suitable returns for producers. These institutionalised arrangements, linked to localised processing and manufacturing, won great political kudos and electoral support for the Labor government from the small acreage farmers and those urbanites sympathetic towards rural development.(Cochrane 1989, p.39; AA: A2-1918/871)

One might have expected a shift toward policies that encouraged secondary industry after Labor's victory in May 1915. For example, Premier Ryan's state enterprise programme was initially aimed more at lowering prices and increasing the availability of foodstuffs, rather than being a bold move toward state involvement in manufacturing.(Murphy 1990, pp.135-136 & 282; Fitzgerald & Thornton 1989, pp.70-71) Glen Lewis contends that Queensland's popular opinion and the political will were not impressed by the developmental potential of the manufacturing sector. Labor's political success in Queensland was based upon, in Lewis' words, ‘patronage of primary production', although this didn't extend to mining until the late 1920s. Labor's central criteria in terms of formulating economic policy, was to assess the degree to which a particular industry was linked to the primary sector; the closer the link, the higher the priority. (Lewis 1973, pp.194-195) However, while the conservative and Labor governments of the time largely ignored the manufacturing sector, there is evidence to suggest there was an embryonic shift away from these negative attitudes by the Ryan administration late in the First World War.

Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector performed well during the 1890s through to the early 1920s, despite government apathy and the difficult economic circumstances these industries had to contend with..(Lewis 1973, p.133) The statistics quoting the total number of factories in Queensland between 1900 and 1930 show only a 4.5% growth over the entire period. Indeed, between 1902-1927 the number of factories fluctuates below the 1901 peak of 2110. At first glance these figures suggest a rather laggardly performance in this sector. However, when one considers the associated employment and production figures the picture changes somewhat. Employment in this sector grew by 56% (with at least 17% of those employed being female workers) and the gross value of output increased by over 500%. (QSS 1900-1930) In terms of growth in manufacturing production, Queensland's performance was second only to NSW between 1904 and 1939. (Rich 1986, p.40) Moreover, the relative output values for various industry sectors in Queensland over the period demonstrates that manufacturing consistently out-performed every sector except the pastoral industry, and was more valuable than agriculture and mining combined.(QSS 1930, p.212) As regards industrial geography, Brisbane is often cited as dominating manufacturing production and in terms of numbers employed, and presumably value of production, this is true. Nevertheless, the ratio of factories to head of population in Brisbane was only slightly ahead of its share of the population. Indeed, over 60% of factories were located elsewhere in the state, most being the smaller type of enterprises.(QSS 1900-1930) The uniqueness of the growth in manufacturing production in Queensland was its simultaneous linkage to urban intensification, decentralisation and value adding to primary industry exports. The first linkage encouraged the consolidation of the larger enterprises in the metropolis, and the second enabled smaller operations to exist in distant locales where they enjoyed a degree of immunity from southern competition. The final linkage is also important. There is a sense of condescension in historiographical attitudes towards the contribution of primary processing to the lack of sectoral diversity in Queensland manufacturing. It is true that Queensland's manufacturing sector was not as diverse and developed at it might have been, nevertheless these manufactured exports were of critical importance to Queensland's, and indeed Australia's balance of trade. The close examination of the wealth of available statistical evidence suggests that, while the manufacturing sector could have been a more vibrant component in economy, is nonetheless appears that the manufacturing was more sophisticated and economically significant than is generally assumed.

The relative success of manufacturing in Queensland is all the more notable when one again considers the sector's neglect in favour of rural intensification projects which represented the very core of the Queensland developmentalist ethos. Philp (to a point), Morgan, Kidston, Ryan, Theodore, McCormack and Forgan Smith, all carried this rural developmentalist mantle. It is Theodore, however, who stands out from the rest for the shear audacity of his developmental visions. Theodore, as Minister for Works & Treasurer, and later as Premier, was in a unique position to press his influence upon Labor government developmental policy. He believed that large scale settlement, combined with commodity based marketing bodies, was the only method with which a government could address Queensland's endemic unemployment problems. (Fitzgerald 1994, pp.110-111) High structural unemployment in Queensland at this time was due to the spatial dispersement and seasonal nature of its primary industries, a series of serious droughts, and the surplus labour in urban areas as a result of local manufacturing not keeping pace with urban population growth. Theodore's developmental dreams never left him and his various settlement schemes can be seen as components of a much larger plan. These schemes included the Burnett River closer settlement scheme in 1920 which was envisaged to make provision for 10,000 families. Similarly the Dawson River irrigation scheme was another Theodore favourite. Both schemes were failures. (QPP, 2, 1923, p. 975; Fitzgerald 1994, pp.162-163; Powell, 1991, pp. 114-115; Cochrane, 1989, pp. 38-39; Young 1971, pp.40-42)

The central problem here, as before, was one of finance. The fiscal restrictions placed upon the Queensland government by the London financiers in the early 1920s, virtually crippled the infrastructure programmes required. These works in terms of transport, communications and so forth, were so vital to the viability of the farmers, individually and collectively. Moreover, the success of closer settlement was dependent upon a number of other factors. These included securing enough suitable skilled settlers, having the manufacturing capacity to process their produce, and the domestic and foreign market demand for their commodities. The period when Theodore's developmental ambitions were at their greatest coincided with the greatest reluctance on the part of the London financiers to risk large loans to an ostensibly ‘socialist' State government. The loans embargo was triggered by political intervention in the government's loan negotiations in 1920 by local and British pastoral interests outraged at amendments to the Land Act that threatened the privileged position of pastoral lease holders. Tom Cochrane's study Blockade (1989) clearly identifies a neglect in Queensland historiography to assess the full ramifications of this funding crisis on the economic conditions of the period, and the longer-term effects on Qld's economic structure and growth. A brief examination of one final failed developmental project, the State Iron & Steelworks, well illustrates the detrimental effect these capital restrictions had on Labor's to enhance the sectoral diversity of Queensland's industrial base.

Ryan's proposal to establish a State Iron and Steel Works in 1917 was intended to promote the foundation of a heavy industry base with which to encourage the expansion of rural infrastructure development and aid the growth of the secondary industries sector. (Murphy 1965, pp.64-66) By supplying their own needs in terms of iron manufactures, principally iron rails, corrugated iron, and wire, the Labor government, as the principal consumer of these goods, could cut costs and restrict the double dipping by British capital who repatriated the profits from both the loan repayments and from manufactures exported for rural infrastructure works. Moreover, there was a growing realisation in the Labor cabinet that the iron industry symbolised the pinnacle of economic progress and industrial maturity. In a sense they were coming under the influence of the broader logic of modernity associated with twentieth century industrial capitalism, albeit tempered by their unique brand of agrarian state socialist ideology. This concept of industrialisation existed simultaneously in support of, and in contradiction with, the yeomanry ideal. The post-war years marked a more positive shift in Labor government attitudes towards secondary industry development. There was a growing awareness amongst Ryan, Theodore and their cabinet colleagues that the state should take a more pro-active role in support of the manufacturing sector in response to the rapid industrialisation taking place in the rest of the country.

The State Iron & Steel Works Bill was a cornerstone of this shift in attitude, and was first introduced by Ryan in October, 1917 and was later reintroduced in June 1918. The project stalled after the Legislative Council refused to endorse the loan funds necessary for its establishment. The second Bill was dropped as Ryan was successful in getting the State Enterprises Act 1918 endorsed which would allow for the establishment of the ironworks under its egis. The steelworks project was not an overnight flash in the pan ideal. The State Iron and Steel Works was constituted as a corporate entity under the control of the Mines Department and James W. Brophy was appointed as General Manager and Superintendent in 1919 and worked on the project until at least 1923.A thorough process of site selection, involving the investigation of seventeen sites in ten locations, was undertaken during 1918-1919. A site at Bowen was chosen from a short list of four. The final plans and specifications were compiled and tenders sought. The estimated total cost of the complete plant and its erection at Bowen with the associated materials handling, transport, and mining infrastructure was £2.4 million. This figure demonstrates the magnitude of the project and the political importance attributed to it by Ryan and Theodore. The failure of the project after six years of planning, was almost entirely due to financial restrictions associated with the loans embargo. The government's commitment to the project is confirmed by Theodore's secret efforts to arrange alternative sources of finance directly from British engineering firms. This strategy was detected by parties in London sympathetic to the pastoral leaseholders which only served to further alienate the City financiers and exacerbate the funding difficulties. (DPC, Folios 216-230; QSA, 1921 PRE/A699, 6138; & 1923, PRE/A776, 8477)

If the state steelworks was a victim of this funding crisis, so too were the embryonic plans of the Theodore government to assist the development of Queensland's secondary industries effectively destroyed by the loans embargo. Furthermore any hopes of reviving the project in the late 1920s and 1930s were dashed by the establishment of the Australian Iron and Steel Company's works at Port Kembla and the lasting economic ramifications of the great depression. The level of commitment to industrial development must not however be overstated. The agrarian development ethos would have remained intact regardless of the success or otherwise of a steel industry in Queensland. Indeed, the subsequent Labor governments held fast to the electoral certainties of supporting the rural vote and the manufacturing sector was largely left to fend for itself. Nonetheless, what is historically significant is that the Labor government was moving towards state support for and involvement in the secondary industries sector from late in its first term in office. The die was cast in the loans crisis of the early 1920s, the opportunity of heavy industrialisation was lost, and the primacy of rural development that did not threaten the interests of the pastoralists retained its hegemony in the political economy until the 1950s.

It was only after the transfer of power to the Country-Liberal coalition in 1957 that the inequities in the sectoral balance of Queensland's economy were seriously addressed. Previously, the short lived Moore conservative government of 1929-31 had tried to encourage secondary industries with the Industries Assistance Act of 1929. This had little impact on the sector due to the onset of the depression and the overly selective nature of the legislation. During the urban boom of the post-1950s, the Nicklin, and subsequent Country-Liberal governments adopted pro-active development policies that encompassed both primary and secondary industries, and exploited the previous Labor governments' lack of concern for industrial development. The Nicklin government eventually established a Secondary Industries Division within the Department of Labour and Industry in an attempt to stimulate manufacturing activity in Queensland. These conservative administrations were pro-development and went to great lengths to attract interstate and overseas investment in all industrial sectors, with a shift from British to American and Asian capital. Within the Bejelke-Petersen government of the 1970s, the Liberal coalition partners focused on supporting Queensland manufacturing, while the Country/National party ministers looked to massive foreign investment in mining, minerals processing, and associated infrastructure developments. Moreover, Nicklin and Bejelke-Petersen continued to support the neo-socialist corporatism that was so electorally effective for Labor over the years and pumped money into large irrigation and other rural development projects.(Gough, et al., 1964, p. 85; Fitzgerald 1984, pp. 292-295) The hallmark of the Bejelke-Petersen regime of the late 1970s and 1980s was the massive investment in water resources (dams and irrigation projects), power generation (linked to urban growth and ore smelters), and the rail and materials handling infrastructure (new ports and loaders) to support growth in exports of coal and other minerals. (Cameron 1989, pp.179-296) This developmental ethos created a popular image of Bejelke-Petersen as a autocratic yet benign leader blazing a trail at the controls of his bulldozer, this itself a metaphor for the machinery of state, clearing away the dissenters the Nationalist government perceived to be blocking the path to economic prosperity and progress.

A similar pattern of reliance on foreign investment in resource development continued with the Goss Labor government from 1989 through to the present Borbidge administration. The pro-development line based on the exploitation of natural resources clearly resonates through a recent special supplement on the Queensland economy published in the Australian Financial Review. (October 1996) The paradigm of foreign capital and control dominates and the question of autonomous and secure finance for Queensland is at the centre of the Metway/Suncorp/QIDC "SuperBank" merger. The rationale is the familiar one of a residual fear of outsiders manipulating the development of Queensland beyond the means of control of the state. It is also another manifestation of the otherness of Queensland government economic policy when contrasted to the general pattern of State and Federal governments divesting themselves of public financial institutions rather than consolidating and enlarging them. So there is more than a little irony in the dichotomy between the state's desire to retain fiscal control and the subsequent loss of autonomy due to Commonwealth financial deregulation, reduced tariffs, the attraction of foreign investment and ownership, and the vulnerability of the Queensland economy in the increasingly volatile global commodity markets.

In contrasting, however briefly, the developmentalist policy and ideology of the early twentieth century with more recent times a number of continuities are clear. The mode of governance in Queensland has been generally characterised by autocratic styles of leadership, centralised planning, large scale developmental projects, and decentralised application. Rural development accompanied by assisted immigration remained a favourite until the early 1960s. Decentralisation was fundamental to this ideal, and remains such to this day. Resource development in Central and North Queensland has begun to mature, as reflected in the rapid growth of mining since the 1960s (especially coal), in the geographical zones first targeted for agrarian development by Theodore. Concern over access and control of developmental finance has been common to all Queensland governments. The neglect of manufacturing by government was continuous at least until the 1960s, and even then the measures adopted were ad hoc. Nevertheless this sector grew and has always been a significant contributor to Queensland's economy. By the early 1990s manufacturing was contributing in the order of 12% to Queensland's GDP and is an important employer, whereas the farming sector had declined steadily from 26% in 1954 to just over 5% of GDP by 1994.(Duhs & Duhs 1996, pp.7-8)

Today tourism and other service sector industries of the Sunshine economy provide nearly three quarters of the state's employment. Nevertheless, structural unemployment is now as much an endemic problem as it was for the likes of Philp, Kidston, and Theodore. The loss of labour intensive primary and secondary industries due to shifts in capital investment to low wage nations and advances in technology, have yet to be effectively counterbalanced by simultaneous growth in well paying service sector positions. Another discontinuity can be seen in the death of the yeomanry ideal and the social and economic crises that have overtaken the rural sector, in particular, the economic marginalisation of the family farm. Certainly the agrarian idealists of early decades of this century would find the present economic and social conditions as alien as they are powerfully dynamic. Perhaps the central discontinuity lies in the ideology that informed the role of economic development itself. The economy was believed by the likes of Theodore to be something quite malleable at the hands of state power and to be understood as the servant of the people. Whereas in more recent times, the state's means of economic intervention are limited and both the government and the people have tended to become servants of the economy. An close examination of the political-economic development of Queensland in the twentieth century demonstrates clearly that the continuity of the developmental ethos has contributed significantly to this state's maverick political reputation and continues to underpin the national perception of Queensland as a state obsessed with development.

ENDNOTES & BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Endnote 1. The complete citation of all sources utilised in the research of this paper cannot be reproduced here due to limitations of space. The interpretations presented are based upon doctoral research (through the History Department of the University of Queensland) conducted into the relationships between economic development, social formation and political dynamics in Queensland between 1900 and 1930 . Extensive consultation was made of primary sources, these include the Queensland Parliamentary Debates and Papers (1890-1932), the Queensland State Statistics (1899-1932), the Queensland Industrial Gazette (1916-1931), metropolitan and regional press, union and employer group records, and numerous documents and correspondence drawn from the Premier's and Mines Department files deposited at the Queensland State Archives. The discussion relating to the State Steelworks project is primarily based upon the detailed files contained in The Establishment of Iron & Steel Works in Queensland (1918-1923), Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 1-265, held by the Department of the Premier & Cabinet, Brisbane, the Report on the Queensland State Iron & Steelworks, 1918, Mines Department, MIN/A, Bundle A/8714 and related material from the Premier's Department files (1900-1925) located at the QSA. A copy of this paper with complete citation endnotes is available from the author upon request [see email hotlink at bottom of page].

Australian Financial Review, 11 October 1996.

Bolton, G. C., 1990, Robert Philp: Capitalist as Politician, in The Premiers of Queensland, eds. Murphy, D., Joyce, R., & Cribb, M., University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Butlin, N. G., Some Perspectives of Australian Economic Development, 1890-1965, in Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century, ed. Foster, C., George Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

Cameron, I., 1989, 125 Years of State Public Works in Queensland: 1859-1984, Boolarong Press, Brisbane.

Cochrane, T., 1989, Blockade: The Queensland Loans Affair 1920 to 1924, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Duhs, T. & Duhs, A., Queensland's Exports of Tertiary Education Services: Growth in the Services Sector of the Queensland Economy, paper presented to the Queensland Studies Conference, Brisbane, December 1996.

Fitzgerald, R., 1994, "Red Ted": The Life of E.G. Theodore, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Fitgerald, R., 1984, A History of Queensland: From 1915 to the Early 1980s, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Fitzgerald, R. & Thornton, H., 1989, Labor in Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Gough, M., Hughes, H., McFarlane, B. J., & Palmer, G. R., 1964, Queensland: Industrial Enigma, Manufacturing in the Economic Development of Queensland, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne.

Hughes, C., 1980, The Government of Queensland, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

Inter-State Commission 1918, Inter-State Commission Farm Products Group, Report No. 3, Australian Archives (ACT) A2, 1918/871.

Laverty, J., 1970, The Queensland Economy 1860-1915, in Prelude to Power: The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1885-1915, eds.Murphy, D. J., Joyce, R. B., & Hughes, C. A., Jacaranda Press, Brisbane.

Lewis, G., 1973, A History of the Ports of Queensland: A Study in Economic Nationalism, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia.

Murphy, D. J., 1990, T. J. Ryan: A Political Biography, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.

Murphy, D. J., 1965, The Establishment of State Enterprises in Queensland, 1915-1918, M.A. Quals. thesis., University of Queensland.

Powell, J. M., 1991, Plains of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and the Development of Queensland, 1824-1990, Boolarong Publications, Brisbane.

Queensland, Department of the Premier & Cabinet, Establishment of Iron & Steel Works in Queensland (1918-1923), Batch 291 - Part 1, folios 1-265.

Queensland Government, 1900-1930, Queensland Parliamentary Papers; Queensland Parliamentary Debates; Queensland State Statistics; & Queensland Industrial Gazette (1916-1930).

Queensland State Archives, Premier's Department Correspondence, 1906 PRE/A239, 6617; 1911 PRE/A386, 10038, 10255; 1921 PRE/A699, 6138; 1923 PRE/A776, 8477; 1929 PRE/A970, 4762, 4376; 1930 PRE/A998, 3539, PRE/A999, 3684.

Queensland State Archives, Mines Department Correspondence, Report on the Qld State Iron & Steel Works, 1918, MIN/A, Bundle A/8714.

Rich, D. C., 1986, The Industrial Geography of Australia, Methuen, Sydney.

Young, I., 1971, Theodore: His Life and Times, Alpha Books, Sydney.

For further details and a comprehensively footnoted version of this paper, please contact me via email as follows:

© 1997 david.cameron@mailbox.uq.edu.au

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