Commentaries on Physics
C. Cheng, Nov., 2000
On the Categories Prescribed by Physics
Nature, according to Aristotle, includes cosmological phenomena as well as plants and animals. From the reliable recurrence and optimal functions of nature, Aristotle deduces that nature itself is teleological. In Physics II 8, Aristotle asserts that nature is “among the causes that are for something” (198b10). This statement has two claims. First, he claims that nature is not mere matter; it is dictated by internal causes independent of elemental forces. Second, he claims that all nature has a purpose. Through an analysis of the four primary causes, Aristotle aligns the efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause into one grand entelechy for natural teleology. Before conducting a discourse on natural teleology, a definition of the four causes and nature must first be drawn. Material cause is the “constituent present in [nature], that from which a thing comes to be” (194b25). The formal cause is the pattern and essence of nature (194b27); i.e., the form is the account of the substance as a unified and functional existent, and dictates over what something is and how something functions. This important differentiation from the material cause brands subsequent unified functional group as a substance, rather than a composition of the primary matters (in this case, it is natural animals and plants). The efficient cause is the source of the principle of change and stability as a cause (194b30); it is the agent and medium under which change and stability take place. Lastly, the final cause is the purpose and end of the change or stability; it is the end at which “all intermediate steps are for” (194b36). Nature, on the other hand, is defined as something that “has within itself a principle of motion and stability in place, in growth and decay, or in alteration” (192b15). Nature must be sufficient in itself, and must display itself as a substance with the four causes.
By this definition of nature, it is apparent that nature is its own efficient cause. Since the efficient cause of a substance or change or progress is that which produces it, then the efficient cause of nature must be nature itself. This is so because nature “is a primary matter that is a subject for each thing that has within itself a principle of motion and change” (193a30). By this, it means that natural existent brings about its own growth, movement, and decay without the aid of eternal forces; for example, a fruit ripens as of itself as a spontaneous process, as is a dog moving, and as Aristotle brilliantly puts it, “a man generates a man; and the same is true for motion” (197a28). And thus, Aristotle observes that nature brings about its own changes and stability, and hence is its own medium and agent, or efficient cause. Yet, this is an insufficient conclusion. Aristotle notes that the efficient cause must either be rooted in the material cause or the formal cause. That is to ask whether the growing fruit grows as a result of the nature of the “fruitness”, or by the force of its elements (in this case, the leaf, the core, the tissue, etc.). And the same question applies to the dog, whether it moves because the limbs and legs move it, or the whole dog as a united being moves it. In other words, the efficient cause of nature is either its material cause or its formal cause.
Aristotle excludes the material cause from the natural entelechy process; he notes, rather, that the formal cause brings change and progress about. Since nature is self-sufficient in itself, it must have internal causes of change and stability (194b30). First of all, nature does not operate with its material cause; the internal principles of change and stability must belong to nature in its own rights and not of its constituent matter, or else nature is nothing but a random composition of elements: i.e., all existent objects will demonstrate properties of the four primal elements, which is not true in cases like animal locomotion and botanical growth that recur with reliance. Plants grow because growth occurs by its own rights, and animals move because they are animals, not because of some elementary forces that coincidentally originate from the nature of its constituent matter. Apart from that, the material cause, the matter from which plants and animals are made of, are organs. Yet the purposes of each individual organ do not produce the locomotion and growth. It is the collective essence – or the formal cause - of plants and animals that allow such change and stability. In other words, constituent parts cannot each perform their own functions and reach a unifying and harmonious result (such as growth and locomotion) without coordination and pattern. For a moving dog, each muscle performs its own function; without coordination, these distinctive functions cannot result in a unifying and consistent end as locomotion. As is in an orchestra, each family must be coordinated perfectly; else there is only discord, not music. The same principle applies to natural changes and stability. Hence, it is concluded that nature operates out of its own rights, not coincidentally out of its constituent elements as Aristotle’s predecessors had claim (192b23). The form, the essence of being, dictates over changes and stability, and hence the formal cause is the efficient cause. And hence, by defining nature, Aristotle excludes the material cause of nature from its telos.
Hence, the form, or the essence of nature is the defining cause that brings nature itself into motion, change, and stability. That form is also the final cause of nature. In Physics II 8, Aristotle makes this claim out of an obvious natural phenomenon: nature progresses towards its best end. As Aristotle argues in 198b33 to 199a8, as long as nature has an end at which all progress and changes are directed, nature itself is purposeful. The telos comes from the fact that all progress and changes in natural substances are reliantly and consistently directed to serve the best of the substance itself, i.e., the form of the substance. In 198b35, Aristotle gives the example of a dog’s fangs: teeth are sharp in the front and flat at the end not from natural selection as Empedocles has claimed, but rather, they “come to be as they do either always or usually” (199a1). In this natural process, the goal achieved is “no result of luck or coincidence” (199a2). The optimal arrangement of the fangs comes not by chance, for dogs reliantly produce the best arrangements; and hence, the efficient cause of change and stability cannot be of matter itself, but rather the formal and the essence of the fang. This is so because the randomness of elemental composition fails to explain the consistency and optimization of natural substances. Since natural processes (i.e.: growth, locomotion, death and decay) are not coincidental or come into place by chance, they are purposeful. And that purpose is to serve the form itself; in the fangs’ case, it is to serve to optimal form, to gnash where it ought to gnash and tear where it ought to tear. For a fruit, the natural telos is to be in the fullness of the fruit: to ripen and to be a complete fruit. Thus, nature, according to Aristotle, is purposeful insofar that it progresses towards the best of itself, or the fullness of its formal cause (which in turn is the efficient cause). This whole framework of nature, that the “efficient cause and formal cause and final cause are one” (198a24), is what is known as entelechy in Aristotelian natural teleology.
Aristotle lays groundwork for subsequent medieval theology. Much of St. Aquinas’ work in his Summa Theologica is founded on this doctrine of entelechy. Many of the ecclesiastical teachings at the time is based on this logic; man is destined for a purpose and that purpose is to fulfill the fundamental essence of human nature, as created in the image of God. In fact, much of the principle of entelechy is still prominent in Catholic theology. Anthropologically and metaphysically, entelechy is plausible and logical; however, it will be inadequate to apply the same theory on natural physics as Aristotle had done.
On physical science, this logic has obvious flaws. The downfall is that it neglects the factor of randomness in nature. As both science and later discoveries find out, the fundaments of nature work with random factors In fact, many natural phenomena are not reproducible: this includes quantum theory, heat, light, and other wave mechanics. Yet out of fundamental randomness, there are still great reliability and recurrence. This shows that the form itself cannot be the efficient cause, for the origin of a phenomenon, and in this case movement (as in waves), is completely out of random and comes about only by chance. Hence, the apparent recurrence is explained by probability and tendency. This is the fundamental principle of physics as it is perceived today, which refutes Aristotelian teleology.
Apart from physics, Aristotle’s claim of entelechy comes under serious challenge in the industrial age, most notably by Charles Darwin. The Darwinian theory of evolution, including natural selection, chance mutation, and survival of the fittest are obvious refutations of Aristotle’s claim in Physics. Chance and mutation sought nature’s best, thus says Darwin, rather than a harmonious and purposeful progress. This ongoing debate as to whether nature is purposeful or work merely out of random and mechanistically chooses the best mutants (as claimed by Empedocles and Darwin) continues, and it is beyond the scope of this discourse to discern.
Through the analysis on the four causes and nature, Aristotle draws that nature is purposeful in its causes: since nature works reliantly towards its best possible goal, and is not a random arrangement of constituent elements, nature must be directed towards a purpose. And that purpose is to serve the best of its essence, that is, the formal cause. Yet, this understanding comes under serious challenge as technology and methods of inquiry advance. It is vulnerable in many respects, especially under the rise of modern physics and biology. Despite these vulnerabilities, entelechy continues to hold true in metaphysics and anthropology. The Catholic Church, by far, still advocates this doctrine as the central purpose of human life and human pursuits. Hence, it is fair to say that there are obvious validities and flaws to this Aristotelian claim, and is very hard to draw a definite and conclusive assessment on Aristotelian natural teleology. For one thing, this question is still under fervent debate as of today.