Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Part 1
"WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which
all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance.
For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others
also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all
will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said
in the first part of our work. And since 'being' is in one way
divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is
in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete
reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency
and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the
strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our
present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the
cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken
of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality'
explain the other kinds of potency as well.
"We have
pointed out elsewhere that 'potency' and the word 'can' have
several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that
are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy,
as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a 'power' of another
by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between
them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative
sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to
one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of
change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For
one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative
source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed
by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is
a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction
by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of
an originative source of change. In all these definitions is
implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again
these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting
or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that
even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior
kinds of potency are somehow implied.
"Obviously, then,
in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one
(for a thing may be 'capable' either because it can itself be
acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but
in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the
thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative
source, and because even the matter is an originative source,
that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another
by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which
yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all
other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat
and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce
heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far
as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself;
for it is one and not two different things. And 'impotence'and
'impotent' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency
of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject
and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence.
Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has
not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have
it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might
naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g.
when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all.
And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality
lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.
Part 2
"Since some such originative sources are present in soulless
things, and others in things possessed of soul, and in soul,
and in the rational part of the soul, clearly some potencies
will, be non-rational and some will be non-rational and some
will be accompanied by a rational formula. This is why all arts,
i.e. all productive forms of knowledge, are potencies; they are
originative sources of change in another thing or in the artist
himself considered as other.
"And each of those which
are accompanied by a rational formula is alike capable of contrary
effects, but one non-rational power produces one effect; e.g.
the hot is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce
both disease and health. The reason is that science is a rational
formula, and the same rational formula explains a thing and its
privation, only not in the same way; and in a sense it applies
to both, but in a sense it applies rather to the positive fact.
Therefore such sciences must deal with contraries, but with one
in virtue of their own nature and with the other not in virtue
of their nature; for the rational formula applies to one object
in virtue of that object's nature, and to the other, in a sense,
accidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it exhibits
the contrary; for the contrary is the primary privation, and
this is the removal of the positive term. Now since contraries
do not occur in the same thing, but science is a potency which
depends on the possession of a rational formula, and the soul
possesses an originative source of movement; therefore, while
the wholesome produces only health and the calorific only heat
and the frigorific only cold, the scientific man produces both
the contrary effects. For the rational formula is one which applies
to both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which
possesses an originative source of movement; so that the soul
will start both processes from the same originative source, having
linked them up with the same thing. And so the things whose potency
is according to a rational formula act contrariwise to the things
whose potency is non-rational; for the products of the former
are included under one originative source, the rational formula.
"It is obvious also that the potency of merely doing
a thing or having it done to one is implied in that of doing
it or having it done well, but the latter is not always implied
in the former: for he who does a thing well must also do it,
but he who does it merely need not also do it well.
Part 3
"There are some who say, as the Megaric school does,
that a thing 'can' act only when it is acting, and when it is
not acting it 'cannot' act, e.g. that he who is not building
cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building;
and so in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities
that attend this view.
"For it is clear that on this
view a man will not be a builder unless he is building (for to
be a builder is to be able to build), and so with the other arts.
If, then, it is impossible to have such arts if one has not at
some time learnt and acquired them, and it is then impossible
not to have them if one has not sometime lost them (either by
forgetfulness or by some accident or by time; for it cannot be
by the destruction of the object, for that lasts for ever), a
man will not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet
he may immediately build again; how then will he have got the
art? And similarly with regard to lifeless things; nothing will
be either cold or hot or sweet or perceptible at all if people
are not perceiving it; so that the upholders of this view will
have to maintain the doctrine of Protagoras. But, indeed, nothing
will even have perception if it is not perceiving, i.e. exercising
its perception. If, then, that is blind which has not sight though
it would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and
when it still exists, the same people will be blind many times
in the day-and deaf too.
"Again, if that which is deprived
of potency is incapable, that which is not happening will be
incapable of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable
of happening either that it is or that it will be will say what
is untrue; for this is what incapacity meant. Therefore these
views do away with both movement and becoming. For that which
stands will always stand, and that which sits will always sit,
since if it is sitting it will not get up; for that which, as
we are told, cannot get up will be incapable of getting up. But
we cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are
different (but these views make potency and actuality the same,
and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate),
so that it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and
not he, and capable of not being and yet he, and similarly with
the other kinds of predicate; it may be capable of walking and
yet not walk, or capable of not walking and yet walk. And a thing
is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible
in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have
the capacity. I mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of
sitting and it is open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible
in its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable of being
moved or moving, or of standing or making to stand, or of being
or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be.
"The
word 'actuality', which we connect with 'complete reality', has,
in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for
actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with
movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent
things, though they do assign some other predicates. E.g. they
say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire,
but not that they are moved; and this because, while ex hypothesi
they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually
if they were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially;
but they do not exist, because they do not exist in complete
reality.
Part 4
"If what we have described is identical with the capable
or convertible with it, evidently it cannot be true to say 'this
is capable of being but will not be', which would imply that
the things incapable of being would on this showing vanish. Suppose,
for instance, that a man-one who did not take account of that
which is incapable of being-were to say that the diagonal of
the square is capable of being measured but will not be measured,
because a thing may well be capable of being or coming to be,
and yet not be or be about to be. But from the premisses this
necessarily follows, that if we actually supposed that which
is not, but is capable of being, to be or to have come to be,
there will be nothing impossible in this; but the result will
be impossible, for the measuring of the diagonal is impossible.
For the false and the impossible are not the same; that you are
standing now is false, but that you should be standing is not
impossible.
"At the same time it is clear that if, when
A is real, B must be real, then, when A is possible, B also must
be possible. For if B need not be possible, there is nothing
to prevent its not being possible. Now let A be supposed possible.
Then, when A was possible, we agreed that nothing impossible
followed if A were supposed to be real; and then B must of course
be real. But we supposed B to be impossible. Let it be impossible
then. If, then, B is impossible, A also must be so. But the first
was supposed impossible; therefore the second also is impossible.
If, then, A is possible, B also will be possible, if they were
so related that if A,is real, B must be real. If, then, A and
B being thus related, B is not possible on this condition, and
B will not be related as was supposed. And if when A is possible,
B must be possible, then if A is real, B also must be real. For
to say that B must be possible, if A is possible, means this,
that if A is real both at the time when and in the way in which
it was supposed capable of being real, B also must then and in
that way be real.
Part 5
"As all potencies are either innate, like the senses,
or come by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or
by learning, like artistic power, those which come by practice
or by rational formula we must acquire by previous exercise but
this is not necessary with those which are not of this nature
and which imply passivity.
"Since that which is 'capable'
is capable of something and at some time in some way (with all
the other qualifications which must be present in the definition),
and since some things can produce change according to a rational
formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other
things are nonrational and their potencies are non-rational,
and the former potencies must be in a living thing, while the
latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless; as regards
potencies of the latter kind, when the agent and the patient
meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one
must act and the other be acted on, but with the former kind
of potency this is not necessary. For the nonrational potencies
are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce
contrary effects, so that if they produced their effects necessarily
they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this
is impossible. There must, then, be something else that decides;
I mean by this, desire or will. For whichever of two things the
animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and
meets the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency
in question. Therefore everything which has a rational potency,
when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances
in which it has the potency, must do this. And it has the potency
in question when the passive object is present and is in a certain
state; if not it will not be able to act. (To add the qualification
'if nothing external prevents it' is not further necessary; for
it has the potency on the terms on which this is a potency of
acting, and it is this not in all circumstances but on certain
conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances;
for these are barred by some of the positive qualifications.)
And so even if one has a rational wish, or an appetite, to do
two things or contrary things at the same time, one will not
do them; for it is not on these terms that one has the potency
for them, nor is it a potency of doing both at the same time,
since one will do the things which it is a potency of doing,
on the terms on which one has the potency.
Part 6
"Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is
related to movement, let us discuss actuality-what, and what
kind of thing, actuality is. For in the course of our analysis
it will also become clear, with regard to the potential, that
we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move
something else, or to be moved by something else, either without
qualification or in some particular way, but also use the word
in another sense, which is the reason of the inquiry in the course
of which we have discussed these previous senses also. Actuality,
then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express
by 'potentially'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue
of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the
whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the
man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of
studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these
exists actually. Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases
by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything
but be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which
is building is to that which is capable of building, and the
waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which
has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped
out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought
up to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of
this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all things
are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by
analogy-as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are
as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort
of matter.
"But also the infinite and the void and all
similar things are said to exist potentially and actually in
a different sense from that which applies to many other things,
e.g. to that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter
class these predicates can at some time be also truly asserted
without qualification; for the seen is so called sometimes because
it is being seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen.
But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that
it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially
only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing
never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially,
but not that the infinite exists separately.
"Since of
the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative
to the end, e.g. the removing of fat, or fat-removal, and the
bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement
in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the movement
aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for
it is not an end); but that movement in which the end is present
is an action. E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen,
are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have
thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning
and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured). At
the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are
happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had
sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases: but,
as things are, it does not cease; we are living and have lived.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements,
and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete-making
thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete
at that. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is
walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming
to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved,
but what is being moved is different from what has been moved,
and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing
that at the same time has seen and is seeing, seeing, or is thinking
and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an
actuality, and the former a movement.
Part 7
"What, and what kind of thing, the actual is, may be
taken as explained by these and similar considerations. But we
must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it
does not; for it is not at any and every time. E.g. is earth
potentially a man? No-but rather when it has already become seed,
and perhaps not even then. It is just as it is with being healed;
not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but
there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and
only this is potentially healthy. And (1) the delimiting mark
of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in complete
reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent
has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders, while
the condition on the other side-viz. in that which is healed-is
that nothing in it hinders the result. It is on similar terms
that we have what is potentially a house; if nothing in the thing
acted on-i.e. in the matter-prevents it from becoming a house,
and if there is nothing which must be added or taken away or
changed, this is potentially a house; and the same is true of
all other things the source of whose becoming is external. And
(2) in the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the
very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those
things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders
it. E.g. the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be
deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change.
But when through its own motive principle it has already got
such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially
a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle,
just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first
change in order to become brass.)
"It seems that when
we call a thing not something else but 'thaten'-e.g. a casket
is not 'wood' but 'wooden', and wood is not 'earth' but 'earthen',
and again earth will illustrate our point if it is similarly
not something else but 'thaten'-that other thing is always potentially
(in the full sense of that word) the thing which comes after
it in this series. E.g. a casket is not 'earthen' nor 'earth',
but 'wooden'; for this is potentially a casket and this is the
matter of a casket, wood in general of a casket in general, and
this particular wood of this particular casket. And if there
is a first thing, which is no longer, in reference to something
else, called 'thaten', this is prime matter; e.g. if earth is
'airy' and air is not 'fire' but 'fiery', fire is prime matter,
which is not a 'this'. For the subject or substratum is differentiated
by being a 'this' or not being one; i.e. the substratum of modifications
is, e.g. a man, i.e. a body and a soul, while the modification
is 'musical' or 'pale'. (The subject is called, when music comes
to be present in it, not 'music' but 'musical', and the man is
not 'paleness' but 'pale', and not 'ambulation' or 'movement'
but 'walking' or 'moving',-which is akin to the 'thaten'.) Wherever
this is so, then, the ultimate subject is a substance; but when
this is not so but the predicate is a form and a 'this', the
ultimate subject is matter and material substance. And it is
only right that 'thaten' should be used with reference both to
the matter and to the accidents; for both are indeterminates.
"We have stated, then, when a thing is to be said to
exist potentially and when it is not.
Part 8
"From our discussion of the various senses of 'prior',
it is clear that actuality is prior to potency. And I mean by
potency not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle
of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as
other, but in general every principle of movement or of rest.
For nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is a
principle of movement-not, however, in something else but in
the thing itself qua itself. To all such potency, then, actuality
is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it
is prior in one sense, and in another not.
"(1) Clearly
it is prior in formula; for that which is in the primary sense
potential is potential because it is possible for it to become
active; e.g. I mean by 'capable of building' that which can build,
and by 'capable of seeing' that which can see, and by 'visible'
that which can be seen. And the same account applies to all other
cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must
precede the knowledge of the other.
"(2) In time it is
prior in this sense: the actual which is identical in species
though not in number with a potentially existing thing is to
it. I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually
and to the corn and to the seeing subject the matter and the
seed and that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially
a man and corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior
in time; but prior in time to these are other actually existing
things, from which they were produced. For from the potentially
existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually
existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician by musician; there
is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually.
We have said in our account of substance that everything that
is produced is something produced from something and by something,
and that the same in species as it.
"This is why it is
thought impossible to be a builder if one has built nothing or
a harper if one has never played the harp; for he who learns
to play the harp learns to play it by playing it, and all other
learners do similarly. And thence arose the sophistical quibble,
that one who does not possess a science will be doing that which
is the object of the science; for he who is learning it does
not possess it. But since, of that which is coming to be, some
part must have come to be, and, of that which, in general, is
changing, some part must have changed (this is shown in the treatise
on movement), he who is learning must, it would seem, possess
some part of the science. But here too, then, it is clear that
actuality is in this sense also, viz. in order of generation
and of time, prior to potency.
"But (3) it is also prior
in substantiality; firstly, (a) because the things that are posterior
in becoming are prior in form and in substantiality (e.g. man
is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already
has its form, and the other has not), and because everything
that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for
that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and
the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is
the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired.
For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but
they have sight that they may see. And similarly men have the
art of building that they may build, and theoretical science
that they may theorize; but they do not theorize that they may
have theoretical science, except those who are learning by practice;
and these do not theorize except in a limited sense, or because
they have no need to theorize. Further, matter exists in a potential
state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists
actually, then it is in its form. And the same holds good in
all cases, even those in which the end is a movement. And so,
as teachers think they have achieved their end when they have
exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise. For if this
is not the case, we shall have Pauson's Hermes over again, since
it will be hard to say about the knowledge, as about the figure
in the picture, whether it is within or without. For the action
is the end, and the actuality is the action. And so even the
word 'actuality' is derived from 'action', and points to the
complete reality.
"And while in some cases the exercise
is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing,
and no other product besides this results from sight), but from
some things a product follows (e.g. from the art of building
there results a house as well as the act of building), yet none
the less the act is in the former case the end and in the latter
more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is
realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and
is, at the same time as the house.
"Where, then, the
result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is
in the thing that is being made, e.g. the act of building is
in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing
that is being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in
general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but
where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality
is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing
subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject and
the life is in the soul (and therefore well-being also; for it
is a certain kind of life).
"Obviously, therefore, the
substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then,
it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to
potency; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another
in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.
"But (b) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also;
for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things,
and no eternal thing exists potentially. The reason is this.
Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite;
for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject
cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly
not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either
be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being
and of not being. And that which is capable of not being may
possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is perishable,
either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it
is said that it possibly may not be, i.e. in respect either of
place or of quantity or quality; 'in the full sense' means 'in
respect of substance'. Nothing, then, which is in the full sense
imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent (though
there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, e.g.
potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place); all
imperishable things, then, exist actually. Nor can anything which
is of necessity exist potentially; yet these things are primary;
for if these did not exist, nothing would exist. Nor does eternal
movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there
is an eternal mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality,
except in respect of 'whence' and 'whither' (there is nothing
to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement
in various directions). And so the sun and the stars and the
whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they
may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they
may. Nor do they tire in this activity; for movement is not for
them, as it is for perishable things, connected with the potentiality
for opposites, so that the continuity of the movement should
be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter
and potency, not actuality, that causes this.
"Imperishable
things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g.
earth and fire. For these also are ever active; for they have
their movement of themselves and in themselves. But the other
potencies, according to our previous discussion, are all potencies
for opposites; for that which can move another in this way can
also move it not in this way, i.e. if it acts according to a
rational formula; and the same non-rational potencies will produce
opposite results by their presence or absence.
"If, then,
there are any entities or substances such as the dialecticians
say the Ideas are, there must be something much more scientific
than science-itself and something more mobile than movement-itself;
for these will be more of the nature of actualities, while science-itself
and movement-itself are potencies for these.
"Obviously,
then, actuality is prior both to potency and to every principle
of change.
Part 9
"That the actuality is also better and more valuable
than the good potency is evident from the following argument.
Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike
capable of contraries, e.g. that of which we say that it can
be well is the same as that which can be ill, and has both potencies
at once; for the same potency is a potency of health and illness,
of rest and motion, of building and throwing down, of being built
and being thrown down. The capacity for contraries, then, is
present at the same time; but contraries cannot be present at
the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at
the same time, e.g. health and illness. Therefore, while the
good must be one of them, the capacity is both alike, or neither;
the actuality, then, is better. Also in the case of bad things
the end or actuality must be worse than the potency; for that
which 'can' is both contraries alike. Clearly, then, the bad
does not exist apart from bad things; for the bad is in its nature
posterior to the potency. And therefore we may also say that
in the things which are from the beginning, i.e. in eternal things,
there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing perverted (for
perversion is something bad).
"It is an activity also
that geometrical constructions are discovered; for we find them
by dividing. If the figures had been already divided, the constructions
would have been obvious; but as it is they are present only potentially.
Why are the angles of the triangle equal to two right angles?
Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles.
If, then, the line parallel to the side had been already drawn
upwards, the reason would have been evident to any one as soon
as he saw the figure. Why is the angle in a semicircle in all
cases a right angle? If three lines are equal the two which form
the base, and the perpendicular from the centre-the conclusion
is evident at a glance to one who knows the former proposition.
Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions
are discovered by being brought to actuality; the reason is that
the geometer's thinking is an actuality; so that the potency
proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions
that people come to know them (though the single actuality is
later in generation than the corresponding potency). (See diagram.)
Part 10
"The terms 'being' and 'non-being' are employed firstly
with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference
to the potency or actuality of these or their non-potency or
nonactuality, and thirdly in the sense of true and false. This
depends, on the side of the objects, on their being combined
or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated
and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose
thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error.
This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present,
and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms.
It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you
are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.
If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated,
and others are always separated and cannot be combined, while
others are capable either of combination or of separation, 'being'
is being combined and one, and 'not being' is being not combined
but more than one. Regarding contingent facts, then, the same
opinion or the same statement comes to be false and true, and
it is possible for it to be at one time correct and at another
erroneous; but regarding things that cannot be otherwise opinions
are not at one time true and at another false, but the same opinions
are always true or always false.
"But with regard to
incomposites, what is being or not being, and truth or falsity?
A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to 'be' when it
is compounded, and not to 'be' if it is separated, like 'that
the wood is white' or 'that the diagonal is incommensurable';
nor will truth and falsity be still present in the same way as
in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these
cases, so also being is not the same; but (a) truth or falsity
is as follows--contact and assertion are truth (assertion not
being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact.
For it is not possible to be in error regarding the question
what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds
good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible
to be in error about them). And they all exist actually, not
potentially; for otherwise they would have come to be and ceased
to be; but, as it is, being itself does not come to be (nor cease
to be); for if it had done so it would have had to come out of
something. About the things, then, which are essences and actualities,
it is not possible to be in error, but only to know them or not
to know them. But we do inquire what they are, viz. whether they
are of such and such a nature or not.
"(b) As regards
the 'being' that answers to truth and the 'non-being' that answers
to falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the
attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined;
in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in a particular
way, and if it does not exist in this way does not exist at all.
And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity does not exist,
nor error, but only ignorance-and not an ignorance which is like
blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty
of thinking.
"It is evident also that about unchangeable
things there can be no error in respect of time, if we assume
them to be unchangeable. E.g. if we suppose that the triangle
does not change, we shall not suppose that at one time its angles
are equal to two right angles while at another time they are
not (for that would imply change). It is possible, however, to
suppose that one member of such a class has a certain attribute
and another has not; e.g. while we may suppose that no even number
is prime, we may suppose that some are and some are not. But
regarding a numerically single number not even this form of error
is possible; for we cannot in this case suppose that one instance
has an attribute and another has not, but whether our judgement
be true or false, it is implied that the fact is eternal.
END
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