Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Part 1
"WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the
things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while
there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects
of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes,
and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all
involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or
less precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being-some
genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua
being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the
things of which they treat; but starting from the essence-some
making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis-they
then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes
of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore,
that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or
of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly
the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they
deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same
kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.
"And
since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about
one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has
the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently
it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things
made the principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art
or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the
doer-viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed
are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or
productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science,
but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved,
and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not
separable from matter. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode
of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this,
inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of 'whats', some
are like 'snub', and some like 'concave'. And these differ because
'snub' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave
nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter.
If then all natural things are a analogous to the snub in their
nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal;
leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can
be defined without reference to movement-they always have matter),
it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what' in the case
of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of
nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of
it as is not independent of matter.
"That physics, then,
is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.
Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects
are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear;
still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them
qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is
something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly
the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science,-not, however,
to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor
to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals
with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and
some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable
but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter;
while the first science deals with things which both exist separately
and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially
these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the
divine as appears to us. There must, then, be three theoretical
philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology,
since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it
is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must
deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences
are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more
to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might
raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or
deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even
the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect,-geometry
and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while
universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if
there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature,
natural science will be the first science; but if there is an
immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must
be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is
first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both
what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.
Part 2
"But since the unqualified term 'being' has several meanings,
of which one was seen' to be the accidental, and another the
true ('non-being' being the false), while besides these there
are the figures of predication (e.g. the 'what', quality, quantity,
place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' may have),
and again besides all these there is that which 'is' potentially
or actually:-since 'being' has many meanings, we must say regarding
the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of
it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical,
productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it. For on the
one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes
that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable;
the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some
people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, and different-to
put it shortly from all things that are; and the science of building
does not aim at producing any of these attributes. And in the
same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which
attach thus to figures, nor whether 'triangle' is different from
'triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles'.-And this
happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a
mere name. And so Plato was in a sense not wrong in ranking sophistic
as dealing with that which is not. For the arguments of the sophists
deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question
whether 'musical' and 'lettered' are different or the same, and
whether 'musical Coriscus' and 'Coriscus' are the same, and whether
'everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be', with
the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come
to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come
to be musical, and all the other arguments of this sort; the
accidental is obviously akin to non-being. And this is clear
also from arguments such as the following: things which are in
another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process,
but things which are accidentally do not. But still we must,
as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental, what
its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps
at the same time become clear why there is no science of it.
"Since, among things which are, some are always in the
same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of
compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot
be otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but
for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of
the existence of the accidental; for that which is neither always
nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in
the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is
an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter
is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it
is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always
nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he
is an animal. And that the builder produces health is an accident,
because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor
to do this,-but the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a
confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome,
but not in virtue of the confectioner's art; and therefore we
say 'it was an accident', and while there is a sense in which
he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does not. For to other
things answer faculties productive of them, but to accidental
results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for
of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also
is accidental. Therefore, since not all things either are or
come to be of necessity and always, but, the majority of things
are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance
a pale man is not always nor for the most part musical, but since
this sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything
will be of necessity). The matter, therefore, which is capable
of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of
the accidental. And we must take as our starting-point the question
whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most
part. Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides these
something which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual
exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal
things? This must be considered later,' but that there is no
science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either
of that which is always or of that which is for the most part.
(For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing
must be determined as occurring either always or for the most
part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever
is true for the most part.) But that which is contrary to the
usual law science will be unable to state, i.e. when the thing
does not happen, e.g.'on the day of new moon'; for even that
which happens on the day of new moon happens then either always
or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such
laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from
what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals
with it.
Part 3
"That there are principles and causes which are generable
and destructible without ever being in course of being generated
or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will be of
necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must
have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. Will A exist
or not? It will if B happens; and if not, not. And B will exist
if C happens. And thus if time is constantly subtracted from
a limited extent of time, one will obviously come to the present.
This man, then, will die by violence, if he goes out; and he
will do this if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if something
else happens; and thus we shall come to that which is now present,
or to some past event. For instance, he will go out if he gets
thirsty; and he will get thirsty if he is eating pungent food;
and this is either the case or not; so that he will of necessity
die, or of necessity not die. And similarly if one jumps over
to past events, the same account will hold good; for this-I mean
the past condition-is already present in something. Everything,
therefore, that will be, will be of necessity; e.g. it is necessary
that he who lives shall one day die; for already some condition
has come into existence, e.g. the presence of contraries in the
same body. But whether he is to die by disease or by violence
is not yet determined, but depends on the happening of something
else. Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point,
but this no longer points to something further. This then will
be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have nothing
else as cause of its coming to be. But to what sort of starting-point
and what sort of cause we thus refer the fortuitous-whether to
matter or to the purpose or to the motive power, must be carefully
considered.
Part 4
"Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently
determined its nature. But since that which is in the sense of
being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on
combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend
on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements (for
the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really
are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the
false judgement has the opposite of this allocation; it is another
question, how it happens that we think things together or apart;
by 'together' and 'apart' I mean thinking them so that there
is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity); for
falsity and truth are not in things-it is not as if the good
were true, and the bad were in itself false-but in thought; while
with regard to simple concepts and 'whats' falsity and truth
do not exist even in thought--this being so, we must consider
later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or
is not in this sense. But since the combination and the separation
are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in this
sense is a different sort of 'being' from the things that are
in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either
the subject's 'what' or its having a certain quality or quantity
or something else), that which is accidentally and that which
is in the sense of being true must be dismissed. For the cause
of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some
affection of the thought, and both are related to the remaining
genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any separate
class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us
consider the causes and the principles of being itself, qua being.
(It was clear in our discussion of the various meanings of terms,
that 'being' has several meanings.)
END
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