Euthyphro - Piety et Customs
C. Cheng, Oct., 2000
On Euthyphro - Piety
The Euthyphro examines skillfully the nature of Socrates’ questioning of religion, and compares it critically with a narrow religious “fundamentalism” as proposed by Euthyphro. It does so in such a manner as to leave most readers ready to accept that Socratic doubt is more truthful than unreasoned religious dogmatism. This is achieved in the course of a work which sets out to explore possible definitions of holiness, asking precisely the kind of difficult question that Socrates had become unpopular for. In this particular dialogue, Euthyphro asserts that “pious is what all gods love, and the opposite what all gods hate” (Euthyphro, 9e); subsequently, Socrates successfully counters his assertion by an intrigue argument, within which he separates piety and god-beloved into two separate entities. Though Socrates does not present a positive account of piety himself, he lays a solid ground refuting the conventional view of the virtue piety as mere cult and practice.
In 9e, Euthyphro claims that piety is what all gods love, and the opposite what all gods hate. This proposition immediately brings a problem in definition. When prompted to define piety, Euthyphro first gives examples of it rather than defining it: “Piety is doing as I am doing” (Euthyphro, 5e). Socrates counters this response in the following line: “Bear in mind that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for … all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form” (Euthyphro, 6d). In other words, Socrates is inquiring for the defining essence of piety, the perfect form or idea from which all actions and phenomenon are to be judged. And when Euthyphro is prompted for the second time, he assumes the conclusion that piety is what all the gods love. What he means, in fact, is that “piety is loved by all the gods”. Yet, the fact that something is affected by something else cannot define and cause its very being. The affection is a product of its nature and existence; that which it is made of must precede these products. Gods’ love is a mere trait of piety, outlining one of its functions or effects; the love cannot define and substantiate the form of piety. With Euthyphro’s explanation, the essence that defines piety and provides the model for all pious actions is still missing, i.e., he merely gives affections that identify piety rather than substances that make up piety itself.
Hence, Socrates immediately questions the causality and relationship between affection as an effect and the form of piety itself: whether something is pious because the gods love it, or the gods love that something because it is pious. And after a short discourse, Euthyphro consents that piety is “loved by all gods… because it is pious… and for no other reasons” (Euthyphro, 10d). The “love” is also agreed to be distinguished as a quality of affection, rather than an active causality. And with these two assertions, Socrates proceeds and draws a syllogism that renders this definition flawed and illogical.
With these two basic claims, Socrates draws a syllogism that disproves the equality of pious and god-beloved. He first proceeds to draw premises concerning divine favour: something loved by the gods must be loved and dear to the gods, for that defines “loved” (Euthyphro, 10d). And just as something is led because something else leads it and seen because something else sees it, the god-beloved is beloved because the gods love it, not because it is in a state or having a nature of being loved (Euthyphro, 10c). (For the later only exists with the former cause in place.) This logical premise, along with Euthyphro’s claim on the causality of piety in 10d, renders that god’s love is completely distinct from piety. If something is beloved because the gods love it actively (and not because that it is in the state of being loved, for the latter precedes the cause), and piety is beloved because it is pious in itself and has the nature to be loved, then piety is different from the beloved. This is so because piety precedes the causality of beloved: piety entails the nature of being loved while the latter defines and qualifies that nature. Therefore, the god-beloved “is of a nature to be loved because it is loved by the gods”, while piety “is loved because it is of a nature to be loved” (Euthyphro, 11a). They must be completely different in entity; hence, they fail to define each other.
Socrates is successful in differentiating piety from the beloved. He has logically concluded that Euthyphro merely provides “an affect or quality of [piety], that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but… not telling what the pious is” (Euthyphro, 11b). As a result, he distinguishes the misuse of terms and identifies Euthyphro’s disguised elusion. Yet, the success is limited to disproving Euthyphro’s claim. This particular argument does not discern any truth concerning piety.
This method of discourse, indeed, categorizes him as a sophist: one who is primarily interested in disproving opposing argument. On this ground, the Athenian hostility towards his inquiry is perfectly understandable.
Socrates subsequently concludes that piety must be in accordance with some form of a higher code of virtue. Since all gods agree on the same subject matter, there must exist some objectivity and universality in itself. That he alleges with justice: since all piety is beloved and the gods love only the just, therefore piety must be a part of the just itself. But as to what part of just it is, Euthyphro flees the argument before a conclusion is drawn.