Impressions of Karl Popper's Objective Knowledge

Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach , by Karl Popper.

Finished reading 2/1/1997.

A philosophy book that's actually intelligible! First chapter deals with the problem of induction and I think everyone interested in philosophy of science or anyone who just plain wants to think more clearly ought to read this single chapter. Popper believes he has solved the problem of induction (Hume's problem) by reformulating it. Popper asks Hume's question of himself, "What is the justification for induction?" and gives the same result that Hume gave "None. There is and can be no justification for inductive arguments." I.e. there is no way of reasoning that things will be the future as they have been in the past. However, if we hypothesize theories which explain both events of the past and those of the future, then we might reformulate the problem as follows "Is there a way by which we might prefer one theory to another?" And to this question, he answers, "Yes." We are justified in accepting (tentatively) that theory which has been best tested. Second chapter begins with a wry apology for philosophy and a case for what he calls commonsense realism: the idea that there IS a reality external to us. A good argument from Winston Churchill on this is given. He agrees that we cannot prove that realism is true, but argues that we also cannot prove it false. [This is not, however, a matter of faith like religion, since one cannot help but accept external reality as it appears to be programmed into us even those of us who pretend not to believe in it.] However, he makes a case against the commonsense theory of knowledge (what he calls "The bucket theory of knowledge"), the idea that human minds are tabulae rasae - empty, or partly empty, buckets - onto which are written (or into which are poured, depending on which metaphor we are using) the perceptions from the outside world.

He posits that there are three worlds. World one is the world of physical reality. World two is the world of individual psychology. World three is the world of objective knowledge - knowledge which has survived extreme criticism - consisting of the total of human books and libraries (and presumably other institutional knowledge such as certain computer data, etc.).

He is grateful that the concepts of the existence of reality and of truth have been rehabilitated. He defines truth as correspondence to the facts. He thanks Alfred Tarski (to whom the book is dedicated) for his part in this rehabilitation. He also goes into great detail explaining his concept of verisimilitude which seems to be a growth of Tarski's ideas. (It wasn't always clear to me where Tarski left off, and Popper began. I probably should read this book again in another four or five years.)

A very interesting distinction which Popper draws is that between scientism and science. Scientism is that which has some of the trappings of science - which appears to be scientific to the uninitiated - but which is not science. I presume that scientism is to science as pseudo-intellectualism is to intellectualism. Think of advertisements which use scientific sounding jargon to encourage consumers to buy their products, or, say, the ramblings of certain New Age or other gurus about 'ethers' and 'energies' and 'forces' in an attempt to sell their particular brand of reptilian by-product to a gullible public.

I've got two problems with the book. 1) I don't like the word commonsense (or Common Sense, if you will). I have always found the term to be used by people who want to justify that what THEY know is common sense. However, as it applies to 'commonsense realism' I think, for once, the term is applied in an intelligible way, despite the fact that I've always maintained that "Either common sense does not exist or it is a misnomer. What is wanted is not 'common' sense, but 'good' sense, and all the experiences of my life have taught me that insofar as sense is good, it is seldom very common and insofar as it is common, it is seldom very good." 2) He makes a case against arguing terminology. This was a wise choice in this case, because arguing or justifying terminology can take one far away from whatever case one wants to argue. However, in general, I think that words and their meanings are critically important to communication.

In any case, my favorite part is a quote, a poem by Wilhelm Busch - what he calls an epistemological nursery rhyme:


"Zweimals zwei gleich vier ist Wahrheit.
 Shade, dass es leicht und leer ist.
 Denn ich wollte lieber Klarheit,
 Ueber dass, was voll und schwer ist."

This is my second reading of this book, and I reckon it won't be my last.


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