Despite the doctrinal innovations of the AirLand Battle, which
recognized the Soviet Army's numerical
preponderance could not be dealt with solely through reliance on
firepower (as shown by the Israeli experiences during the Yom Kippur
War of 1973), the US Army did not embrace the doctrine of maneuver to
the same extent as the German or Israeli
militaries. In spite of its highly effective performance during
Operation Desert Storm, the US Army did not display the sort of
emphasis on speed, even at the cost of risking exposed flanks or
bypassed enemy units, preferring instead to rely on a more methodical,
phaseline-governed advance that maximized the impact of its
considerable firepower. While this approach proved extremely effective
against the Iraqi forces, it (along with political decisionmaking)
contributed to some Iraqi Republican Guard units escaping to Iraq,
where they helped put down Shia and Kurdish rebellions.
The US Army's emphasis on firepower was reflected by the greater
concentration of resources at division, as opposed to brigade, levels.
While maneuver-oriented militaries have tended to make their brigades
and even battalions more self-sufficient and capable of autonomous
operations, the long-standing pro-firepower bias of the US Army
manifested itself through centralizing control at divisional level of
assets that in other armies were permanent components of brigades. To a
certain extent it was due to the magnificent array of weapon systems US
divisions had at their disposal, which made them, at least in terms of
firepower, more powerful than any equivalent unit in the world.
However, it is not a coincidence that armies that embrace maneuver
warfare tend to be relatively small forces whose likely foes outnumber
and/or outgun them. A trauma of defeat by a more agile adversary, as in
the case of France in 1940, can be a powerful stimulus as well. The US
Army has lacked such experiences. In all of its conflicts in the 20th
Century, if it did not outnumber its foes it certainly outgunned them.
Superior firepower (including in the form of air-delivered ordnance)
during World War 2 was more than enough to offset any deficiencies in
maneuver. Nevertheless, although still clinging to the remnants of its
attritional way of war that have served it so well during most of the
20th Century, the US Army of the 1980s compared very favorably with
that of its likely opponents. Its combination of firepower and maneuver
would have likely been sufficient to halt a Soviet offensive. Doctrine and Troop Quality Veteran, Balanced Doctrine, High Morale.
HQ Command Radius 8 (Battalion and Regiment) 16 (Division)
HQ Rating: 5
Cross-attachments:
Battalions may exchange companies. Companies within a battalion may
exchange platoons, or platoon(s) from one company in a battalion may be
attached to other company(s) in the same battalion. Brigades may
exchange or transfer battalions. Unit Organization
Divisional Air Defense Battalion:
4 Stinger SAM Platoons (mp) [Humvee], 9 M163 Vulcan Platoons (mp)
Brigades: Each heavy division had 3 maneuver brigade headquarters, with
semi-permanently assigned armored and mechanized battalions and a
"brigade slice" of divisional assets.
Light or Airborne Infantry Brigade:
3 Light or Airborne Infantry Battalions, 1 TOW Company (lc) [Humvee]
