MORALITY VERSUS MONEY

HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRADE: CANADA IN ASIA

"In contemporary society, where consumption is politics, the politics of consumption manifests itself in all the major acts of the world's rulers. Everything revovles around interests, and these interests are valued in dollars." -Xanana Gusmao, East Timorese Resistance Leader

Written by:

Ryerson B. Christie

Erik Growen

submitted in partial fulfillment for Canadian foreign policy 47.561

Dec. 17, 1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Chapter I

Introduction, R. Christie, E. Growen

Chapter II

Quiet Diplomacy and Human Rights

Canada and China, R. Christie

Chapter III

Trade versus Rights

Canada and Indonesia, E. Growen

Chapter IV

Conclusion

End Notes

Appendix I

Appendix II

Bibliography

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHINA

Annexation of Tibet - 1950

Tianamen Massacre - ~500 killed

INDONESIA

Annexation of Irian Jaya - 1969 - ~300 000 killed

Annexation of East Timor - 1976 - ~200 000 killed

Dili Massacre - ~ 275 killed

In the face of these blatant human rights abuses, is Canada willing to risk trade ties when China (with the return of Hong Kong in 1997) will be Canada's 3^rd largest trading partner and Indonesia is Canada's largest trading partner in the rapidly expanding ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) market, in order to make a moral stand?

Human rights are considered to be a major foreign policy objective for Canada on the basis of over fifty years of rhetoric and official Canadian government documentation. The question is then does the rhetoric match the actualities of international geopolitics? Focusing in on the Asian sphere, China and Indonesia will be examined as case studies of the application, or the lack of application of the stated human rights goals of the Canadian government.

There are differing conceptions of human rights in the West and the East and this will be focused upon along with a brief overview of the Canadian policy on human rights to set the stage for the particulars of the two case studies.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the culmination of a historical, cultural and philosophical process whose roots can be drawn back to Greco-Roman times. The codification of the conceptions of human rights has also been an ongoing process which can be traced from the English Magna Carta (1215), the United States (US) Declaration of Independence and Constitution (1776, 1787), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens (1789) and the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1907 and 1929). The UDHR (1948) was a clarifying document to spell out more precisely the rights of the individual vis a vis the state. Although the UN Charter had made references in this direction, the wording was far too vague to act as a legal document for international law. As the UDHR is considered to be part of the UN Charter it is legally binding on all of the member states.

The UDHR which was passed in the General Assembly in 1948 and reconfirmed at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, covers three main areas 1) Civil Rights: freedom from slavery and servitude, torture and inhuman punishment and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; freedom of speech, faith, opinion and expression; right to life, security, justice, ownership and assembly. 2) Political Rights: right to vote and nominate for public office; right to form and join political parties. 3) Social and Economic Rights: right to education, work, food, clothing, housing and medical care.⁽¹⁾

These basic rights are seen as having universal validity and are viewed as "essential preconditions for economic and social development, for political participation and democracy and for international peace."⁽²⁾

The ideals and values underpinning the UDHR are Western-centric. They come out of such areas as the Judeo-Christian conceptions of morality which "encouraged a drive for moral and social improvement even against worldly authority."⁽³⁾

This belief in individual rights over state rights is one of the major underlying themes of Western thought. In fact "in the Western political tradition, only individual adult moral agents have been accorded the privilege of holding rights."⁽⁴⁾

The ethno-centric assumptions of Western cultural superiority also carried over into the economic sphere which was primarily guided by the Liberal Theory of economics. "Adam Smith considered the capacity of a state society to generate wealth, which he understood to consist of the goods and services that supply the necessaries and conveniences of life to individuals, to be one of the most important determinants of a societies health."⁽⁵⁾

The role of the state was reduced to just providing peace and security for individuals. "The activities that lead directly to wealth generation were best left to individuals acting independently of the state, though within a framework of laws enforced by it."⁽⁶⁾

This belief in legalism also played an important part in the development that was to be legally binding on all states which wanted to join the UN.

The Western ideas have been portrayed as the way of the future for the rest of the world underpinned by the belief that to be industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular and modern means to be developed and therefore good, and any state which is not all of these things must be underdeveloped. The fact that most of the world is economically dependent on the West, even if formally independent and decolonialized, has helped the West to advance its beliefs upon other states. This does not mean that the West has been entirely successful in its attempt at ideological hegemony however, as the Eastern read of the UDHR comes up with different conclusions on the 'individual versus the state' rights argument as to whether the state is seen as primarily an impediment or a guarantor of human rights.

The western conceptualization of human rights, as codified in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was written by only a handful of states, the participation of non-western governments was minimal. The initial debate in the mid 1940s was between the liberal/capitalist model and the socialist approach to human rights. What must be pointed out is that the two systems are inherently European, having grown out of the same cultural pool. The question is how far can the western/liberal tradition of human rights be applied. To restate the problem, is there a cultural relativism in examining human rights. Within Asia the governments have often stated that the West's notion of human rights is not applicable to the Asian oriental culture. Underlying this statement is a belief that there are different political cultures, and that the liberal notion of human rights is culturally specific. How is Asian political culture different from the West's?

As was stated the liberalist tradition of human rights has its roots within Western political thought. Therefor human rights is a discourse rooted in European Christian culture.⁽⁷⁾

In Asia the discourse of human rights does not have the same philosophical underpinnings, it differs in a number of fundamental ways. The first, and arguably most important divergence in political and social culture is the focus on the individual; while the West has focused on the individual, Asia has not done so.

[T]here do seem to be some features of Asian civilizations that have set them apart from Western civilization. Probably the most significant of these is the Asian tendency to place more value on the collectivity and to be less sensitive than the West to the values of individualism.⁽⁸⁾

Rights are then conceptualized in terms of a group's, or society's rights; the rights of the individual can often be at odds with this communal approach to rights.

The second important cultural difference is the Christian infusion into Western culture. While the Judeo-Christian tradition has supported the notion of the sovereignty of the individual, it is its support of the secular political system that is relevant here. Through the notion that there is a separation between the spiritual and earthly realm the rights of religious freedom, and indeed much of the ensuing liberal tradition was permissible. Though obvious it is worth stating that Christianity has not deeply rooted itself in most of Asia.⁽⁹⁾

"When we set out to study 'politics' or 'religion', we are already making use of categories we assume are relevant, or may even take for granted."⁽¹⁰⁾

The moment we talk about different spheres for politics and religion we are making a differentiation that does not necessarily have relevance outside of the Western Christian political system. The result is that the states of Asia do not have the political culture to support the West's approach to human rights.

Human rights in Asia have evolved along different lines, with a great deal of variance between states, however there are some commonalties that can be drawn. The first is the entity in which rights are divested; rather than the individual the focus is on the state. Thus the rights are stated in terms of rights to stability. Developing hand in hand with the notion of societal rights are rights that are often associated with socialist states, such as rights to employment and housing. Lastly, and perhaps most important is the notion of economic development being a right.⁽¹¹⁾

The relevance here is that there is a belief that the West can push liberal political rights because is has achieved industrialized status. The logical extension of such an argument is that as the West had the luxury of developing without liberal rights, that they weren't possible until industrialization was achieved, then why should the developing world's progress be any different. A more extreme argument is that "Put simply, the human rights regime is viewed as an ideological resource of the 'West' to colonize the 'East'."⁽¹²⁾

However in response the argument, based firmly in Western legalism, is that the developing world has committed itself to human rights development by signing on to the UN Declaration. It must be stated that the issue is not quite so black and white. The East feels they hijacked by the West; while they had to gain entrance into the UN, they could not do so piecemeal and had to accept a human rights declaration that the '3^rdWorld' had no input to. As a result of their lack of input into the initial drafting of the UN Declaration the states of East Asia have sough to clarify their position through multilateral declarations on human rights, such as the Bangkok Declaration of 1993 which stated that "While the universality of human rights was acknowledged, they must be considered in the context ofnational and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds."⁽¹³⁾

From the outset of the UN discussions on human rights Canada has, in principle, supported the liberal approach to human rights. Canada was an original signatory on the UN Declaration, indeed a Canadian lawyer wrote the initial declaration. However, Canada has never gone much beyond a support in principle. Until the late 1970s the best that could be said was that Canadian foreign policy was pragmatic on the issue, which should be read as unwilling to risk their relations with other states. The focus of Canadian foreign policy was on furthering economic growth, membership in Western military, political and economic alliances, and the successful management of Ottawa's relationship with Washington.⁽¹⁴⁾

It was not until the late 1970s that the political leaders began to acknowledge that they had a moral obligation to pursue human rights abroad.⁽¹⁵⁾

Canadian action from the late 1970s has been quite inconsistent, the trend that developed was to punish states who abused human rights, but only those states that were inconsequential to Canadian commerce.

It was not until the conservative government, under Mulroney, that human rights became a "basic principle" of Canadian foreign policy. Under Mulroney human rights received more attention than it had under any previous government. In part the attention afforded human rights was due to the media's focus on human rights abuses, such as in the case of Tiananmen Square. In 1991 a human rights policy unit was created in CIDA in an attempt to link aid and trade with the promotion of liberal values. This new focus on human rights was not to last, with the election of the liberal government the rhetoric of promoting human rights was drowned out by Bay street's demands to increase economic ties with East Asia. In the Government Response to the Foreign Policy Review three main foreign policy objectives were listed:

1. Promoting Canada's prosperity and employment

2. Protecting Canadian security, within a stable global framework

3. Projecting Canadian values and culture

The promotion of human rights was lumped under the Canadian values and culture heading, if the order of appearance can be considered a ranking then the promotion of Canadian prosperity should be expected to take precedence over the promotion of rights; this is exactly what the liberal government has done. In a speech to students at Moncton University Chretien stated that Canada would not risk Canadian prosperity promoting rights in states where Canada's impact would be minimal to irrelevant.⁽¹⁶⁾

"Even before the joint Parliamentary foreign policy committee was drafted the government rejected its recommendation that Canada link trade and human rights."⁽¹⁷⁾

In fact the Canadian position has swung even further from placing trade on a higher level than rights. With the use of the 'Team Canada' approach Chretien has been able to avoid the issue of rights altogether. The Team Canada trips were promoted as business trips rather than diplomatic visits, as such foreign policy issues, like human rights, would not be on the table. The Canadian promotion of rights would be left to official diplomatic visits, where presumably trade issues would not be on the table. Unlike previous governments who paid lip-service to the human rights agenda, the Chretien government has eliminated the rhetoric gap through abandoning even the public promotion of human rights.

The Chretien government has claimed that it will promote human rights through Quiet Diplomacy, and through multilateral institutions, representing a victory for functionalism and liberal internationalism. Canada has abandoned any overt attempts to unilateral action against states that abuse human rights. The issues that will be explored in the following two chapters are the specifics, and appropriateness of Canada's foreign policy on human rights in Asia. The first paper will examine the theory of cross-cultural negotiations on human rights and the applicability of Canada's Quiet Diplomacy with regards to China. The second chapter will deal with the almost complete abandonment of diplomacy in favor of trade in the case of the country with one of the worst human rights records in the world: Indonesia.

CHAPTER 2

A CROSS-CULTURAL CASE FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY

CANADIAN - CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

In the 1994 Government Response to the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Policy Review the Chretien government reaffirmed that one of its three foreign policy goals was to promote and further human rights abroad. The Canadian Foreign Policy Review also identified the promotion of Canadian prosperity and international security as policy goals. As the promotion of rights is a stated Canadian goal, the question arises how it can best be achieved. An unstated policy within the present Canadian administration seems to be to pursue a new westward looking "Third Option"; the lynch pin of a move to the Pacific has to be China. In dealing with China, Canada has to come to grips with Beijing's human rights record; ignoring the cultural relativism argument Canada has supported the Western notion of human rights. As a stated foreign policy goal, the government of Canada is officially in pursuit of improved human rights in China. The problem is in finding a policy in which Canada's interests can be balanced, and in which rights can be promoted efficiently. As will be demonstrated, due to the unique Chinese culture, Canada has an opportunity through Quiet Diplomacy to exert a level of influence incommensurate with its relative power position. However it will also be shown that the Chretien government has failed to take advantage of its position.

It is appropriate to begin an examination of the Canadian-Chinese negotiations on human rights by focusing on their relative power positions. It should not be surprising that in every traditional realist category China by far exceeds Canada; China is larger in terms of production output, population and military strength. It would be ludicrous to claim that Canada, with a population of 30 million could use strong-arm tactics in negotiations with China, whose population has passed 1 billion. Setting aside the traditional realist indicators, the importance of China to Canada's economy has grown steadily. When Hong Kong is pulled into the People's Republic in 1997, China will become Canada's third largest trading partner, behind only Japan and the United States.⁽¹⁸⁾

The total trade numbers, compiled before the impact of the 1994 Team Canada visit could be included, indicated that China receives roughly 3.4 billion dollars annually in Canadian exports, while Canada has imported roughly 4.7 billion in Chinese goods. Furthermore, in 1994 Chinese direct investment in Canada outstripped Canadian investment in China. In comparison China's trade with the U.S. was worth well over 35 billion annually. When Canada is looking to extend its trade ties, and benefit from the emerging Chinese market, the government is unwilling to risk their trade by damaging relations with China.

While the effect that the traditional power indicators have on negotiations has been extensively studied by western academia, the effect of the different cultural discourses has received surprisingly little attention. There is no denial that China and Canada have vastly different cultures, however the impact that the cultural differences have on negotiations is somewhat less clear. The realist argument that is made is that both states will place a value on the issue being negotiated and will attempt to bargain to maximize their own benefits, however this statement itself illustrates some important problems in cross-cultural negotiations. Negotiators too often assume that their opponents operate within the same cultural framework. As Cohen states "Negotiation theorists' dismissal of the effect of culture springs from the assumption that there is a single, universal paradigm of negotiation and that cross-national differences are stylistic and superficial."⁽¹⁹⁾

Value and meaning are ascribed according to the bargainer's societal discourse, if the two discourses are different then a great deal of misinterpretation can ensue. The problem though is how one can identify when a negotiation is subject to such a cross-cultural misinterpretation. Raymond Cohen asserts that to find evidence of such dissonance "[a]typical occurrences are to be discarded and only those tendencies noted that repeat themselves over time in varying situations involving a changing cast of actors"⁽²⁰⁾

are to be examined. Surprisingly there has been very little written on the effect cross-cultural discourses have had on human rights negotiations. While this may be a reflection of the policy makers' desire for concrete position papers, it represents more fundamentally the myopic tendencies of western liberal paradigm of applying its framework globally.⁽²¹⁾

Beyond Raymond Cohen's work on cross-cultural communication, there are also important works by Gregg Walker and Stella Ting-Toomey, whose work on face-negotiation is invaluable. Furthermore there is literature available within the business negotiation literature, significantly Lucian Pye's contribution should be noted.

To commence an examination of the cross-cultural negotiations on human rights the Chinese discourse on human rights should be laid out. It is important to note that communist China has never ascribed to the "western bourgeois" notion of human rights, rather the state has always insisted that human rights were grounded in cultural assumptions that did not apply to China, to their "non-western" culture.⁽²²⁾

Human rights are a product of the western development of liberal thought, and remain firmly rooted within the liberal tradition.⁽²³⁾

Mao combined two attacks on the liberal approach to human rights, using both the Marxist critique, and the critique arising from collectivist societies to put forth a Chinese human rights discourse.

In short, one earns rights, and one earns them from the party. But even though rights can be earned, they are always subordinated to the interests of the state after those rights have been earned, inasmuch as another principle ­ the dictatorship of the proletariat ­ takes an even higher precedence. Accordingly, the party alone decides when the citizen may exercise a human right.⁽²⁴⁾

"The People's Republic of China leaders labeled human rights a bourgeois concept and treated any restraint on a challenge to the party's power and authority as counter-revolutionary."⁽²⁵⁾

It should be clear that the Chinese understanding of human rights is in direct conflict with the liberal approach. When discussing human rights with China, Canada must confront the issue that human rights are a culturally specific discourse. Raymond Cohen points out that there is a belief within American culture, and to a great extent within our own, that you can negotiate anything.⁽²⁶⁾

In different cultures this concept is alien, indeed there are many concepts that are not discussed. It is appropriate then to examine what the cultural differences are in terms of negotiating tactics.

Upon examining the writings on Chinese culture, and the cross-cultural negotiation literature, there are a number of characteristics of Chinese negotiating behavior that can be identified; traits that are often at odds with western negotiating tactics. These tactics include:

-Shunning legal considerations

-Strong emphasis on friendship

-Principles over details

-Willingness to end negotiations on a negative note

-Use of shame

These tactics have their roots in the different Chinese culture, in general terms, which will be explored latter, China is a high-context, collectivist culture which places a great deal of emphasis on the concept of face. Furthermore there is the uniquely Chinese notion of Guanxi which has grown out of the traditional patron-client relationships of Asia.

The first area that will be examined is that of the high-context versus low-context cultures. A low-context culture is one that places a great deal of emphasis on the spoken word. These societies, often referred to as information valuing, focus on the explicit meaning that is conveyed. In the low-context society "[I]ndirect language is strongly disliked straight from the shoulder talk is admired."⁽²⁷⁾

Within the low-context grouping the United States is held up as the stereotype, as a society that believes that one should say what one means. In opposition to the low-context cultural groupings are the high-context groupings which include amongst other states: China, India, Japan, and Egypt. To quote Cohen:

The high-context culture communicates allusively rather than directly. As important as the explicit content of a message is the context in which it occurs, that is, the surrounding nonverbal cues and nuances of meaning. People in cultures that put the group before the individual are acutely concerned about how they will appear in the eyes of others. Speech is therefore more about preserving and promoting social interests than transmitting information.⁽²⁸⁾

Some writers, such as Gregg Walker, posit that the high/low-context systems differ on a more fundamental level than the simple use of discourse. "Arguments embodies culturally bound values and manners of thinking. Not only do cultures speak differently, they think differently."⁽²⁹⁾

Arising from the inherent differences in the two systems are difficulties in negotiations. Cross-cultural negotiations are, as Cohen has shown, subject to misunderstandings. According to Professor Paltiel, Canada has certainly not been immune to such misunderstandings, the result of which has been frustration in dealing with the Chinese and the development of stereotypes.⁽³⁰⁾

An examination of the remarks of past Canadian diplomats to China have born this observation out. General Odlum went so far as to write in his memoirs, and in official communications with Ottawa, that the Chinese were predominately a devious and cheating people. "[T]he Chinese appeared to him to have no standards by which to teach honesty, and as well, that they had never looked upon it as having economic or even moral worth"⁽³¹⁾

As disturbing as the statement is, coming from a Canadian ambassador, it is hardly unique.

The high-context culture of China arises out of its collectivist nature. The importance that belonging to a collectivist society has on a person's world view, and as Walker states, its cognitive/discursive functions, is of central importance.⁽³²⁾

Within a collectivist society a person's relative position is of the utmost importance, in order to lubricate such a society the notion of "face" becomes very important. Ting-Toomey, who has written at length on the subject of face puts forward the definition:

The construct "face-maintenance" refers to the desire to project an image of capability and strength, or conversely to avoid projecting an image of incapability, weakness, or foolishness, and furthermore is a culturally induced motive that is heightened by threats to face, and that such threats are likely to result in attempts to either save or restore face.⁽³³⁾

While the notion of "face" is present in North American culture it is not nearly as vital as it is in high-context cultures. Within China face has a unique aspect, unlike in Canadian culture, "face" is outside of the control of the individual. Rather, face is something that is given or taken away by others. The important facet here is of the public / private split, an embarrassing act which is not recognized or raised by others does not lead to a loss of face within China. Hsien Chin Hu wrote in 1944 that:

Tiu-lien-"to lose lien (face)" is a condemnation by the group for immoral or socially disagreeable behavior. A serious infraction of the moral code of society, once come to the notice of the public, is a blemish on the character of the individual and excites a great deal of comment.⁽³⁴⁾

While the realist paradigm would assert that face is not an issue at the level of international politics, the evidence in fact points in the opposite direction. Pye states that the issue of face may manifest itself to a much larger extent in governmental level talks as they are not as subject to the proclivities of the market place, supply and demand, and competitive pricings.⁽³⁵⁾

Indeed, according to Paltiel "Face is very important in the international context."⁽³⁶⁾

It should not be surprising then, that there is an acute awareness within the Department of Foreign Affairs, and CIDA, of the importance of face to the Chinese.⁽³⁷⁾

The Chinese approach to human rights negotiations can in part be explained with the use of the concept of face. In 1996 Bonn was caught off-guard when China forcefully rebuked Germany over Bundestagg legislation condemning Chinese abuses in Tibet.⁽³⁸⁾

An examination of the relative power of the two states, and the value of their trade representing over 24 billion U.S. annually, does not provide insight into the apparent willingness of China to jeopardize such a vast quantity of foreign exchange. In fact China has been willing to risk potentially much more costly confrontations with the United States over human rights. Clinton's administration attempted to link Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, and further economic sanctions, with human rights negotiations. However, during a diplomatic visit to China to discuss a linkage between MFN and human rights, Beijing reacted adversely and expelled Warren Christopher. "In a public rebuke, P.M. Peng told Christopher that his attempts to force China to improve its human rights record or face higher U.S. trade tariffs were insulting"⁽³⁹⁾

The common denominator in each of the cases where China reacted so severely was a public attack on China's human rights policy. As has been shown it is a public statement that a party has behaved immorally that takes face away in the Chinese society. Thus, the actions of Germany and the United States were such to force China to suffer Tiu-lien, to lose face, China had to then react strongly to save face. One tactic that has been given a great deal of attention within the business negotiation literature is the Chinese use of shaming. "In the Chinese culture personal insults and flatteries usually become an integral part of the negotiating process."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Shaming is the direct attempt to take face away from the negotiating partner in an attempt to back the party into making concessions. Once again China's public actions can be more easily understood with this concept. The expelling of Warren Chistopher, the attempt to force a German change in domestic legislation, and the strong public rebuke of the U.S. and German positions should be interpreted through the concept of shaming. The actions that China took went far beyond those necessary to avoid talks on human rights, indeed their actions brought more attention to the issue of Chinese human rights, when shaming is considered the Chinese position is somewhat clarified.

If China's position was simply to avoid talks on human rights, then it could easily do so. By refusing to meet with foreign diplomats on the issue, and making it known that any attempts to broach the topic would result in strong economic sanctions China could effectively silence the international community. However the evidence demonstrates that China is quite willing to discuss human rights in certain conditions.⁽⁴¹⁾

Canada, is significantly weaker in its ability to coerce China than either Germany or the United States, yet it has been able to carry on a dialogue on the topic of human rights. In fact, with only one notable exception, the Canadian delegates who traveled to China to discuss human rights have been well received.⁽⁴²⁾

China has not attacked Canadian efforts to raise human rights issues, nor have they attempted to shame Canada. This Chinese policy must be taken in context, Canada has not tried to attack China publicly on human rights abuses, instead Canada has stated that it would raise the issue privately with Chinese leadership. Andre Ouellet stated in 1994 that "I believe that discretion is more productive than publicity [regarding human rights in China]..." ⁽⁴³⁾

The official Canadian position has, under the Chretien government, been to rely upon Quiet Diplomacy to discuss human rights with China. A central premise of the Quiet Diplomacy tactic is to avoid any public insults of the Chinese regime; Canada has been careful to avoid taking face away from the Chinese government. In fact the Canadian government moved to distance itself from the U.S. hard-line approach to Chinese human rights.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Canada has actively avoided the public sphere, where face is a strong factor, using the private sphere in which to discuss rights. Indeed, statements by Canadian officials have demonstrated that the issue of face is a real concern. "Raymond Chan, Chretien's secretary of state for Asia Pacific affairs, has made a particular point of stressing the need for a less moralistic policy in approaching human rights abuses."⁽⁴⁵⁾

Furthermore, Andre Ouellet stated that "exerting pressure can only strain relations and will be harmful to the settlement of problems between us."⁽⁴⁶⁾

The concept of face is one manifestation of the collectivist, high-context culture, another phenomenon that arises within such cultures is the difficulty of members of the society to say "no".⁽⁴⁷⁾

The People's Republic of China, and indeed South and East Asia, uses its language as a societal lubricant. Where a great deal of value is placed on face, it becomes difficult to say no, the use of which can be very insulting and shaming. As stated, discourse provides more than a mere informative function, it sustains the cultural system. To say "no" to a fellow negotiator can be seen as the worst kind of rudeness; it is an active, pre-conceived act of shaming. If pressed, the historical evidence as laid out by Pye and Cohen, demonstrates that individuals will often capitulate. "The problem is even more complex because the emotional importance attached to maintaining "face" produces a style of human relationships in which feigned compliancy is often the norm."⁽⁴⁸⁾

In this respect negotiators must be wary of the dangers of misinterpreting the unenthusiastic "yes", and they have to know when to stop a negotiation. Canadian delegations have misunderstood the lack of Chinese enthusiasm on issues that have been pushed on them by Ottawa. Indeed Canada has pushed China on human rights, winning a hesitant "yes" only to find out that the Chinese had no real intention of fulfilling what Canada thought they had achieved. In January 1996 the Chinese officials disclosed their willingness during three-days of meetings with government human rights officials from Canada, to allow the United Nations (UN) to look at rights issues in China.⁽⁴⁹⁾

While this was trumpeted within the press as a real concession won by the Canadian negotiators, in the end China used their pull in the UN to veto any condemnation of the Chinese record on human rights on March 5, 1996.

The policy implications of the cultural phenomenon of 'face' in China are important. As negotiators it is best to avoid a human rights debate on the principles of human rights, rather, specific issues should be dealt with; it is much more difficult for China to avoid fulfilling its commitments when specifics are being dealt with. By not meeting the terms of an agreement the other partner is able to make use of face, and coerce China into fulfilling the terms of the agreement. In the Backgrounder on the Team Canada visit to China, 1994, the statement on human rights was that "Canada continues to raise concerns over the detention of political dissidents and the general lack of political freedoms in China."⁽⁵⁰⁾

This statement seems to indicate that particular concerns would be raised on which Chinese compliance could be easily monitored and gauged. However, there is no way to tell if this was done, because of the closed door diplomacy there is no accountability.

Canada has been able to achieve a degree of success in negotiating human rights that exceeds its relative power position. Canada has successfully broached the topic and won limited concessions where neither the United States, nor Germany have been able to negotiate with China on the issue. The question that has to be addressed is why has Canada been able to win these concessions? The Peoples Republic of China far outweighs Canada in nearly every quantum of power. What is strange is that while China could of pushed Canada's interests aside it did not. Canada has been able to capitalize and make use of a specific aspect of the Chinese cultural system, that of friendship ties. Throughout South and East Asia, a unique method of social interaction has become rooted in their societies, that of the Patron-Client relationship. "The relationship is one of mutual benefits in which the patron expects labor, protection, defense, or some other reward in return for dispensing benefits to the subordinate."⁽⁵¹⁾

As the business literature has noted, there is a propensity amongst Asian leaders to do business with those they know. The American notion that business and friendship can, and ought to be separated is alien to the high-context cultural system of China. Furthermore, the Chinese conception of friendship, and what that entails goes far beyond the western understanding.⁽⁵²⁾

"Friendship in Chinese culture is not just a positive sentiment, it means sharing Guanxi; and therefor it implies the certainty of getting a positive response to requests for any special favors that may lie in the province of another to grant."⁽⁵³⁾

"Guanxi" is a peculiarly Chinese take on friendship, within the framework of the Guanxi relationship the two participants are expected to go to great odds to continue the relationship. Within the Guanxi relationship the more powerful partner is expected to try to meet the needs of the lesser; to fail to do so would result in a loss of face. While there is no certainty within the literature whether the notion of Guanxi can be readily applied to a state level, it has been shown to be extrapolated and realized at the corporate level. If it is realized at one extrapolation from the individual, then it should logically have applicability at the broader state level.

Canada has had a special relationship with communist China, the Norman Bethune legacy lives on. Canada has tried to include China in the international community, spearheading its admission into the United Nations, and is presently attempting to assist China with its application to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).⁽⁵⁴⁾

The members of CIDA, DFAIT, and the Government have all stated that they feel that developing a long-term relationship with China is of the utmost importance. "Ouellet told Southam News that Canada hopes to become China's special friend in the West - restoring the major role it had when Ottawa led the Western nations in recognizing China two decades ago."⁽⁵⁵⁾

According to the department of foreign affairs (DFAIT), "High-level visits assist Canada in its policy of developing a broadly based relationship, engaging China in four key areas: economic partnership; sustainable development; human rights, good governance and the rule of law."⁽⁵⁶⁾

The overtures that Canada has made to China, and the attempts to aid the state can be seen as the establishment of a Guanxi relationship. Paradoxically, by entering into such a relationship Canada has taken advantage of a social phenomenon that has worked against the negotiating styles of its western partners. Guanxi is a relationship of unequal partners and Canada has in practical terms assigned itself to the role of the supplicant.

Canada does not have the ability to exert direct control over China through any strong arm tactics. However the examination of Chinese culture has illustrated that there is room for maneuver, Canada can adopt a policy that will allow it to effectively raise human rights concerns. The tactic of Quiet Diplomacy is applicable in Canada's negotiations on human rights in states that it can not directly coerce. In an interview, Scott Wade, director of political and social policy at CIDA, stated that the tactic of Quiet Diplomacy is appropriate to the Canadian attempt to negotiate human rights with China.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Quiet Diplomacy should then take advantage of the cultural characteristics of China. As such Quiet Diplomacy should consist of:

1. Construction of long term relationships

2. Avoidance of public attacks on Chinese human rights

3. Concerted effort to broach the topic of human rights at every level of Chinese government, consistently and firmly

There is an important caveat that must accompany any recommendation for the pursuit of a Quiet Diplomacy policy, it inherently eliminates the accountability of Canadian foreign policy. The negotiators have the convenient excuse that human rights topics are being addressed behind closed doors, there is an obvious threat of abuse with such a policy. How then has the Chretien government made use of Quiet Diplomacy? The record of Canadian action is mixed, the problem that arises is that once again the issue is kept behind the doors and out of the media spotlight. Canada has achieved some limited successes in negotiating human rights with China, success should be measured in two areas. The first area of success is in actual movements in Chinese human rights policy that can be directly attributed to Canadian negotiations. In this case there are two:

1. Chinese legal reform with the assistance of Canadian legal experts.

2. Chinese guarantees to honor Canadian passports that are in the possession of Hong Kong citizens.

The second measure of success is in a state's ability to pass through the initial Chinese reluctance to discuss human rights to open up a dialogue on the issue at official levels. According to Paltiel, the Chinese expect to be attacked on human rights and are extremely defensive on the topic and avoid it as much as possible.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Indeed most states have been unable to achieve this end. Sitting down to discuss human rights with China should then be seen as a tangible success for Canadian foreign policy. (see appendix II for the list of recent Canadian delegations to China that have discussed human rights at official levels)

The Chretien government has achieved some measure of success in pursuing the Quiet Diplomacy track, however there are also some substantial failures of the current administration, the most significant of which is the Team Canada missions abroad. Certainly the two Team Canada trips to China were an economic success, and in contributing to a long term relationship the missions were a great triumph. However, in terms of Quiet Diplomacy and the Canadian goal of promoting human rights the trips were a drastic failure. From the outset Chretien has been unwilling to risk Canadian jobs for liberalist ideals, in a speech to the University of Moncton, he stated that Canada was unable, and thus should not attempt, to push China on human rights.⁽⁵⁹⁾

However, despite the rhetoric, Chretien was still bound by its stated foreign policy to pursue rights in its foreign policy. The solution to this apparent paradox was unique, by promoting Team Canada as a business trip, as distinct from a diplomatic visit, Chretien was able to push the human rights issue to the periphery of the Asian jaunt.

By agreeing in advance no to raise embarrassing questions in public, Prime Minister Chretien was, in effect, "giving" Li Peng some face, effectively enhancing the legitimacy of his regime. Perhaps the Prime Minister expected that this would establish a "special relationship" which would enhance Canadian business opportunities in China. Any "credit" gained, however, comes at the expense of those Chinese who rely on the West to reinforce their moral claims against an intractable regime.⁽⁶⁰⁾

During a state dinner for the visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng, Chretien stated "Team Canada succeeded with a focus on the No. 1 priority of all Canadians: bringing home jobs for Canadians. Co-operating. Pulling together. Working as a team."⁽⁶¹⁾

Canada has been reticent to push the human rights agenda harder because it perceives that it may lose out on the burgeoning lucrative Chinese market. However, Australia and other states have been willing to push significantly harder with no noticeable loss in market access to China.⁽⁶²⁾

In negotiating changes to human rights policies in Asia it is inevitable that the issue of cross-cultural negotiations will have to be addressed. Without an understanding of the unique cultural systems, talks are bound to be characterized by misunderstandings, the erosion of trust, and a lack of progress on the issues being debated. Unfortunately different systems of discourse have developed with completely unique takes on the issue of human rights. While the varying stands on human rights pose a problem for the negotiator, with a careful examination of the cultural system that the Asian states are emerging from, it is possible to plot a policy course that will maximize Canada's potential impact. As has been argued the policy choice that is most applicable for Canada in dealing with China is Quiet Diplomacy. However, Canada's use of Quiet Diplomacy has hardly been exemplary. With the desire to increase the Canadian job market and pursue a new Third Option, the lack of public accountability appears to have been abused by the current Canadian government. Unwilling to risk confrontation on human rights with China, Chretien has completely separated trade from diplomatic talks. In so doing he has also pushed the promotion of human rights to lower level dignitaries whose combined voices do not equal his own. The foreign policy of a state is read from the lips of the Prime Minister, not from the Canadian commissioner of human rights. With the increased trade ties Canada has an excellent opportunity to take advantage of Quiet Diplomacy, one the people of China can not afford Chretien to miss.

CHAPTER III

CANADIAN-INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS NEGOTIATIONS

OR

THE LACK THERE OF

The situation Canada faces over the question of linking human rights records and international trade can be no clearer than the case of Indonesia. In the face of over twenty years of blatant human rights abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, Canada has refused to take a moral stand and has instead done all what it can to increase bilateral trade between the two nations. By being s signatory to the UDHR Canada stated that it agreed with its provisions and would honour them domestically and join with other states in the multilateral enforcement of its tenets. One of these tenets is the right to self-determination which is guaranteed by international law (articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and Resolutions 1514 and 1541).⁽⁶³⁾

The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1541) is quite specifically relevant:

The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the UN and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.⁽⁶⁴⁾

As Canada believes in the Western notion of the universality of basic human rights, arguments such as cultural relativism ought to have no place in the discourse because they go directly against the whole concept of universality. This does not seem to be the case however. The West in general, and Canada specifically, have failed to uphold the principles of international justice in the face of potential economic gain. "The equation is simple: 180 million consumers inhabiting an enormous area of lucrative investment. The cultural sensitivity/tolerance argument is simpler still: Indonesia posses its own culture and concepts of justice, democracy and the rights of man; and the West, it appears, has come to understand this very well."⁽⁶⁵⁾

Indonesia currently ranks 104^th out of 174 states on the UN Human Development Index⁽⁶⁶⁾

but this is not the statistic that catches the eye of Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). They see economic growth rates that average 6.5% per year for the last 25 years⁽⁶⁷⁾

and a population of 189 million (1994). Even though only ~1/6^th of the population could be considered middle class consumers that still gives the class as much buying power as all of Canada.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Indonesia is Canada's largest export market in the ASEAN region with combined import/exports of >$1.1 billion in 1995. There are ~100 Canadian companies operating in Indonesia and the Canadian cumulative direct investment has reached >$6 billion.⁽⁶⁹⁾

These trade figures do not include goods which were transshipped through Singapore, or the service sectors which would add ~$200 million to the export figures. Indonesia has "an enormous natural resources base and a need to manage it."⁽⁷⁰⁾

Part of this 'enormous base' are the oil reserves in the Timor Gap off the coast of East Timor. They are believed to be even richer than all of Kuwait's oil reserves.⁽⁷¹⁾

These are of major international interest as they have yet to have been exploited.

For Indonesia's part, they are an export-oriented economy and therefore require a competitive business environment. There is also a need to present an image of a 'stable' business climate with a cheap and obedient work force (only India and Bangladesh offer a cheaper labour pool in the region).⁽⁷²⁾

These low wages are considered essential to maintaining a competitive edge in the global market. Canadian business and government have bought into the Indonesian economic miracle wholesale. As stated by the Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, Lawrence Dickenson: "Indonesia offers the best fit for Canadian economic interests I have seen."⁽⁷³⁾

Indonesia has had a bloody history since its independence and especially since the 1965 military coup by General Suharto who is still in power today ruling as a dictator with his family controlling every major economic activity in Indonesia. There have been three provinces (out of 27) which have been fighting for independence from Indonesia throughout Suharto's reign: Aceh (on the northern tip of Sumatra), Irian Jaya (formally West New Guinea) and Timor Timur (formally, and more commonly referred to as, East Timor).

The fighting began in Aceh back in 1953 with an Islamic rebellion that was defeated by 1962. The movement rebuilt however and there was a brief and extensively bloody rebellion again between mid-1989 and spring 1990 when the movement was utterly destroyed in a massive campaign that cost the lives of thousands of innocent civilians. All through 1990-91 thousands of corpses were discovered throughout the province.⁽⁷⁴⁾

The Dutch pulled out of Irian Jaya in November 1962 and a seven month long UN administration period followed lasting until May 1963. The UN promised a plebiscite on independence that was never held. In its place Indonesia put together what it called a consensus-building process that was supposed to be more culturally suited to the people of Irian Jaya. Local Councils were to vote for incorporation with Indonesia or independence after consulting with their constituents. What occurred was a unanimous vote to join Indonesia due to the presence of Indonesian troops at all of the so-called 'free' votes. The UN General Assembly actually approved the outcome and Irian Jaya was formally annexed in September 1969. What followed was over twenty years of guerrilla warfare by the various tribes in Irian Jaya against the Indonesian military and the logging companies which has cost ~300 000 lives (about 10% of the provinces total population).⁽⁷⁵⁾

East Timor's short-lived independence came about on the heals of the coup in Portugal when the Armed Forces Movement ceased power in Lisbon in April 1974 and made the quick decision to de-colonialize. Within East Timor there were three main political factions: Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) which was for the full independence of East Timor, UDT (Timor Democratic Union) which wished for a continued association with Portugal and Apodeti (Popular Democratic Association of Timor) which desired integration with Indonesia. By mid-1975 Fretilin was the dominant political force in East Timor. In July they won the Local Council elections with 55% of the vote with the UDT coming in second and Apodeti an almost non-existent third.

On the 10^th of August 1975 there was an abortive coup attempt by the UDT and Apodeti which led to war with Fretilin with Indonesia providing the UDT and Apodeti forces clandestine military supplies. After the failure of the coup Fretilin became the de facto government when the Portuguese Governor and his staff fled their posts. They declared the formal independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on the 25^thof November 1975.

Less then two weeks later an Indonesian 'volunteer' military force landed at Dili (the capital) and by April 1976 there were between 30-35 000 Indonesian troops in East Timor fighting ~3 000 soldiers of Fretilin's military organization, Falintil. The war was quick and one-sided although guerrilla actions occurred sporadically up until 1992. East Timor was formally annexed on the 15^th of July 1976. There followed military repression, mass starvation and disease and the interning into concentration camps of ~300 000 people, almost half of the entire population.⁽⁷⁶⁾

Throughout 1975-79 no international relief organizations were allowed into East Timor to document the genocidal campaign which included outright massacres (such as the execution of between 2-300 civilians in the village of Kraras 21-22^nd of August 1983) and Five-Year Plans which included provisions for the sterilization of 95 000 women and the transplanting of 6 800 Indonesian migrants to take over land cleared by the Indonesian military.⁽⁷⁷⁾

The most publicized atrocity, thanks to the presence of a few Western journalists, occurred on the 12^th of November 1991 when the Indonesian military open-fired upon a funeral march in downtown Dili. 271 civilians were killed, 382 wounded and ~250 disappeared. During the massacre ambulances arriving on the scene were attacked by the military and some units went into the hospital wards where the wounded had been taken and killed them there.⁽⁷⁸⁾

By the mid-1980s the armed members of Falintil had been defeated and on the 20^th of November 1992, Xanana Gusmao, their leader, was captured effectively ending armed resistance. The cost has been tremendous with an estimated 200 000 people killed (about 1/3^rd of the total population) since the invasion in 1975.

Things have not gotten any better in Indonesia, even today. In March 1996 Indonesia's own National Commission on Human rights confirmed reports of torture by members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Berseryata Republik Indonesia- ABRI). In the same month ~120 people were arrested in rioting in Irian Jaya.⁽⁷⁹⁾

13-50 East Timorese were arrested following 'violent disturbances' in Baucau (80 km from Dili) on the 10^th of June due to religious tensions between the local Catholic populace and the Indonesian Muslim transmigrants.⁽⁸⁰⁾

On the 27^th of July the Indonesian security forces raided the Jakarta office of the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) and deposed their leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was the elected head of one of the two legal opposition parties. When it appeared that she took the job seriously and might actually defeat President Suharto in the upcoming 1998 elections the decision was made to take her out of power. The PRD (People's Democratic Party) was also criminalized as communist and over 50 members were arrested.⁽⁸¹⁾

The continued spectre of a communist insurgency has been used since 1965 to justify the authoritarian government of President Suharto.

Indonesia has been called the world's most corrupt country⁽⁸²⁾

where there is a complete lack of respect for the "integrity of the individual to torture and disappearance, lack of respect for civil liberties including freedom of speech, press and assembly, lack of respect for political rights, racial, religious and other forms of discrimination and inadequate labour rights [and the ] use of judicial systems to suppress political opposition."⁽⁸³⁾

The use of torture is common place as are forced confessions which in fact are the principle source of evidence in the Indonesian court system.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Labour wages are a mere $0.30 per hour ($2.40 per day)⁽⁸⁵⁾

, where these minimums are actually enforced. An example of how the system can operate comes from Bata Shoes in 1979. Bata was paying its workers less than minimum wage so they formed their own union and went on strike. The union was crushed when Bata called in the Indonesian military to end the strike.⁽⁸⁶⁾

At least 2.4 million children are in the Indonesian labour force (not including those children under ten years old)⁽⁸⁷⁾

and in some of the industrial regions child labour represents 35% of the total work force.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Bonded labour has been used by logging companies in Irian Jaya where the worker is forced to buy everything at the company store at inflated prices, then must work off the debt thus gained.⁽⁸⁹⁾

In East Timor the invasion and occupation have made a once economically viable (especially since the discovery of the oil reserves of the Timor Gap) and self-sufficient state dependent upon the Indonesian government and foreign aid. There has been little, if any, improvement in the conditions of the Timorese in terms of infrastructure, education or health care. In fact East Timor has the highest infant mortality rate in the world. Through transmigration ~30% of the population of East Timor is now Muslim. This in a country where 80% of the non-transmigrants are Catholics and the rest are predominantly Animists, has led to religious tensions as well.⁽⁹⁰⁾

Although Indonesia has made some gesture towards the human rights concerns other nations, they have largely been symbolic and lacking any substance. For example Indonesia has ratified the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women but have never taken any steps what-so-ever to implement it. It is due to actions like these and the sheer brutality of the regime that the UN still recognizes Portugal as the official administering power of East Timor.⁽⁹¹⁾

Since the end of World War II Canada has stressed the importance of human rights both nationally and internationally. However, Canada's record seems to be based upon convenience and mutual economic advantage. Canada has only voted once against Indonesia since the invasion of East Timor on Resolutions against the Indonesian invasion of 1975. From 1976-79 Canada abstained from voting on yearly Resolutions against the military invasion of East Timor. This was apparently because "Canada has accepted de facto incorporation. In our view incorporation is an established and irreversible fact."⁽⁹²⁾

In 1980 Canada changed its voting pattern, after meeting with the Indonesian ambassador in Ottawa, to going against the Resolution and publicly siding with Indonesia. The line of reasoning was truly unique:

"While recognizing the irreversibility of the Indonesian occupation, Canada has not wished to condone any infringement of the principle of self-determination. On the other hand, implementation of the Resolution resulting in the withdrawal of Indonesian forces and authority would create considerable instability and be a threat to peace and security. It would also adversely affect the economy which in turn would create greater deprivation and hardship."⁽⁹³⁾

By this logic the withdrawal of the oppressive and brutal Indonesian military would mean increased hardship for the people of East Timor.

Just six months before the Dili Massacre (November 1991) Canada and Indonesia signed the 'General Agreement on Development Cooperation Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (with Annexes)'. In this trade treaty there was not a single mention of human rights but it did include reference to "the encouragement and promotion of relations between firms, organizations, institutions and persons of the two countries."⁽⁹⁴⁾

This sums up the driving force of Canadian policy towards Indonesia. The Dili Massacre did finally put a bit of a strain on Canadian-Indonesian relations but in spite of impressive rhetoric by Prime Minister Mulroony and his Ministers very little of substance was done. Canada joined other nations at the UN in condemning Indonesia's actions but no sanctions were even brought up for debate. New development projects were suspended (worth ~$30 million), but old projects were untouched. No new military export permits for Indonesia were issued. Even these relatively benign actions were overturned with the arrival of the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien in 1993.

The development project money was un-frozen and the suspension of military export permits was raised. In fact raised to staggering new levels. Within less then two years the Liberals authorized $5.7 million in military export permits, an amount roughly equal to that of the previous 14 years combined.⁽⁹⁵⁾

This in spite of statements by Andre Oullet (Foreign Minister) and Roy Maclaren (International Trade Minister) that "Exports of military goods are restricted to items where there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population. This restriction is scrupulously observed." As well Canada would "deny export permits that are destined to a country where they may be used to abuse human rights or where there are actual or immanent hostilities."⁽⁹⁶⁾

The problem is the government has no real idea as to the value of Canadian military goods going to Indonesia, or anywhere else in the world, as it is up to the individual companies which obtain military export permits to voluntarily report if the transactions actually took place. On top of that indirect military sales are not tracked (ie. through transshipment points such as Brazil, Israel, Italy or Switzerland).

Between 1994-95 the Canadian government spent $225 000 to promote trade with Indonesia.⁽⁹⁷⁾

Further trade links were developed at the January 1995 APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Council) meeting which Chretien hailed as the first step towards selling Indonesia a Candu nuclear reactor. The January 1996 'Team Canada' trade mission to South and South-East Asia netted $1 billion in trade deals with Indonesia. One month later the Canadian government sponsored a military trade fair in Jakarta (something that is not even allowed in Ottawa).

As far as development aid is concerned Canada has repeatedly stated that it would not enforce any kind of conditionality regarding aid to Indonesia. To stress this point CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), in June 1995, stated the "linking aid funds to human rights is not currently Canadian government policy."⁽⁹⁸⁾

CIDA aid is generally pointed to by the government to show that it is doing something concrete to help the people of East Timor but in fact it seems merely to be used to sooth government consciences.

All through the Chretien mandate there has been praise for the "stable political environment"⁽⁹⁹⁾

in Indonesia in spite of riots in East Timor while Team Canada was in Jakarta. With the fear that public criticism of the Indonesian human rights record might lead to diplomatic isolation, as our allies are all propping up the Indonesian military (especially the US, UK, France and Australia) and with CIDA towing the DFAIT line it has become increasingly obvious that foreign aid is now tied to economic advantage and foreign trade has taken preeminence over any concerns about human rights abuses. This in spite of rhetoric that "Development assistance will tend to be concentrated in countries whose governments pursue external and internal policies that are broadly consistent with Canadian values and attitudes."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The question becomes; can anything be done to force Indonesia to change its human rights deprivations or do we sit idly by as a country is ivaded and its populace systematically eradicated. Indonesia forces the choice between participation in their liberalized economy or insistence on the priority of human rights. For example in March 1992 Indonesia cut off its aid relationship with the Netherlands and disbanded the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the multilateral group if lenders, because it was chaired by the Dutch. This was in reaction to diplomatic prodding by the Netherlands for Indonesia to act to curb human rights abuses in East Timor.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

Some countries have chosen to take measures against the Indonesian human rights record but the actions have always been bilateral. In 1992, in reaction to the Dili Massacre, the US cut all grant aid training under their International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which had over 4 000 Indonesian graduates since the 1950s.⁽¹⁰²⁾

In 1993 Belgium refused to commit any aid to Indonesia as they could not get assurance that a human rights clause could be included in the deal which was worth $16.4 million. This is an example of the kind of conditionality Canada has refused to apply. Between 1993-94 the US undertook a review of Indonesia's position in their General System of [ trade] Preferences (international tariff setting mechanism) and just the threat of losing preferred status caused Indonesia to raise its minimum wage by 27%. Also in 1994 the US banned the sale of small arms to Indonesia. Ireland, Italy and Sweden have also announced arms embargoes on Indonesia but Canada remains strangely silent on the topic.

Canada has in the past called for international arms embargoes on Burma, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Croatia and South Africa but not on Indonesia. The reasoning appears to be that if Canada ceased to sell military equipment to Indonesia then the government would be hurting Canadian business and as well merely allow other states to fill the gap left by a Canadian pull out. This quest for 'jobs, jobs, jobs' has led to absurdities such as supporting Inco in its setting up in Indonesia in the belief that this would create jobs and help the economy but instead Inco has cut expensive jobs and operations in Canada while it has expanded its cheaper, and therefore more profitable operation in Indonesia. As was mentioned by the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia, formed after the IGGI was disbanded) meeting in 1994 by the World Bank vice-president for East Asia and Pacific Regions "no country had mentioned humen rights abuses in East Timor; instead donors showered compliments upon Indonesia for its remarkable economic progress."⁽¹⁰³⁾

Canada should not be part of this. The government ought to suspend the CIDA aid program and work with like-minded countries through multilateral agreements on trade and arms embargo issues. As well humanitarian assistance should, in the future, be routed through the UN which could decide on recipients on the basis of need and not on economic advantages to be gained by the donor state. Canadian NGOs and CIDA must work in accordance to the wishes of the people and not the government (ie. the people of East Timor or Irian Jaya and not to help the government in Jakarta to assert control over the populace). An example of how CIDA has worked against the people is its development of more efficient irrigation techniques for the coffee plantations which were created by kicking the indigenous farmers off the land and then paying them slave wages to work the land for the transmigrant Indonesian overseers.

This is all of course if Canadians and the Canadian government actually belive in the rhetoric of the past 51 years. "If a recipient government persists in systematically murdering and repressing the people of another state, then a donor country must question the benefit of maintaining [ such ] bilateral aid projects."⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

While Canada's stated foreign policy consists of three tracks, the present government is following one, the path of Canadian export growth. What the two papers have clearly demonstrated is that in a situation where the political leadership perceives that a trade-off may be necessitated on the trade front to promote human rights, it quickly backs away. The Team Canada trips to Asia have as their basis, the separation of international trade from other foreign policy issues, meaning issues of security and human rights.

The first paper illustrated that a trade-off between trade and rights is not necessary in some cases, such as China. Through the thoughtful use of Quiet Diplomacy, rights issues can be pushed strongly and effectively. Unfortunately the Chretien government has been willing to abuse the negotiating style to avoid pushing for human rights.

The second paper showed a situation where the Canadian government has much more clearly ignored human rights abuses in order to promote trade. The Canadian policy in Indonesia has dispensed with any conceptions of Quiet Diplomacy in favor of a policy of Silent Diplomacy to further the Canadian export driven agenda.

The arguments of cultural relativism are irrelevant as Canada, China, and Indonesia have signed and become members of the UN and must therefor adhere to the tenets of the Charter and the UDHR or cease to be members of the UN. Nowhere in these documents does it state that profits take precedence over justice, freedom, democracy and peace; Canada should not turn its back on these ideals. The creation of jobs on the backs of other people's suffering is not what this country ought to stand for.

END NOTES

1.

^1. Zehra F. Arat "Democracy: Human Rights in Developing Countries", Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, p.3.

2.

^2. Sharon Scharfe "Complicity- Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, the Case of East Timor", Montreal: Black Rose, 1996, p.8.

3.

^3. Stuart Hall "The West and the Rest", p.322.

4.

^4. Alison Dundes Renteln "International Human Rights- Universalism versus Relativism", London: Sage, 1990, p.46.

5.

^5. David Johnston "The Idea of a Liberal Theory- A Critique's Reconstruction", NJ: Princeton, 1994, p.13.

6.

^6. Ibid., p.13.

7.

^7. Margaret Ng, "Are Rights Culture Bound" In Michael C. Davis ed. Human Rights and Chinese Values, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.61.

8.

^8. Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 27.

9.

^9. Two important exceptions to this rule are East Timor, and the Philippines where Catholicism is deeply ingrained in the local culture.

10.

^10. Ashild Kolas, "Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion" In Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, no. 1, 1996. P. 52.

11.

^11. Claude Lefort, "Human Rights Today" In Michael C. Davis ed. Human Rights and Chinese Values, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p 28.

12.

^12. Eliza Lee, "Human Rights and Non Western Values" In Michael C. Davis ed. Human Rights and Chinese Values, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 87.

13.

^13. Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Negotiating Human Rights with China" in Canada Among Nations, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), p. 179.

14.

^14. Victoria Berry, Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy" in Robert O Matthews, Cranford Pratt eds. Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Kingston: Queens University Press, 1988), p. 58.

15.

^15. The 1975 CSCE Helsinki Accords led to individual parliamentarians attempting to link development aid with human rights.

Ibid., p. 59.

16.

^16. Edward Greenspon, "Canada Can't Sway China on Rights, PM Says: Lack of Influence Cited as Chretien Presses on with Plans to Forge Trade Links." Globe and Mail, March 19, 1994, A1,A2.

17.

^17. Paltiel, p. 181.

18.

^18. China and Hong Kong accounted for 1.95% of all Canadian Exports in 1995. This is twice Canada's exports to ASEAN, and makes China our 3^rd largest export market. Canada imported roughly 6 billion during the same time frame from China and Hong Kong.

Statistics Canada, Canada's Merchandise Trade (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1996)

19.

^19. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p.153

20.

^20. Raymond Cohen, "Deadlock: Israel and Egypt Negotiate," F. Korzenny, S. Ting-Toomey, eds., Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 137.

21.

^21.Western liberal thought has tended to emphasize the individual or the community, rationalism over mysticism, and traditional high political issues over "new security" issues. The focus has been on European systems and is only recently been critically examined in its applicability to non-western culture systems.

22.

^22. Liberties are one outgrowth of the adversarial tradition which developed between the citizenry and its leadership in 'Western parliamentary democracies. The west's perspective of human rights is one of freedom and individuality.

Jeffrey S. Conklin, Forging an East Asia Foreign Policy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), p. 49.

23.

^23. Jeffrey S. Conklin, p. 49.

24.

^24. Ibid., p. 13.

25.

^25. John F. Cooper, "Defining Human Rights in the People's Republic of China," in Human Rights in the People's Republic of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 10.

26.

^26. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: 1994), p. 34.

27.

^27. Raymond Cohen, "Negotiating Across Cultures," in C.A.Crocker and F.O. Hampson, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Unites States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.480.

28.

^28. Ibid., p. 490.

29.

^29. Gregg B. Walker, "Cultural Orientations of Argument in International Disputes: Negotiating the Law of the Sea," in F. Korzenny, S. Ting-Toomey, eds., Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 99.

30.

^30. Jeremy Paltiel, interview.

31.

^31. George Frederick McNally, Odlum: Canada's First Ambassador to China. M.A.Thesis, University of Alberta, 1977. P.27.

32.

^32. Gregg B. Walker, p. 100.

33.

^33. Stella Ting-Toomey, Mark Cole, "Intergroup Diplomatic Communication: A Face-Negotiation Perspective" in Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 80.

34.

^34. Hsien Chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of "Face"" in American Anthropologist Vol. 46, 1944, p.46.

35.

^35. Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbour: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1988), p. 31.

36.

^36. Jeremy Paltiel, Interview

37.

^37. Scott Wade, Carmen Perlin, Interviews

38.

^38. The German Bundestag passed legislation condemning China's human rights record in Tibet. China responded by canceling a planned visit to Beijing by the German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel.

Alan Cowell, Globe and Mail, June 25, 1996, A11.

39.

^39.

40.

^40. Lucian Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), p. 101)

41.

^41. Scott Wade, Director of Political and Social Policy, CIDA, Interview, Nov. 18, 1996.

42.

^42. Svend Robinson, Beryl Gaffney, and Geoff Scott were kicked out of China in January of 1996. They were performing a quasi-official investigation into human rights in China. When they made their intentions known to lay a wreath in memorial of the slain students in Tiananmen Square the delegation was told to return to Canada. As this was not an official delegation their treatment is not included in China's treatment of Canada.

43.

^43. CP, Vancouver Sun, July 30, 94, C12.

44.

^44. Dave Todd, Vancouver Sun, March 25, 94, A4.

45.

^45. Dave Todd, Vancouver Sun, March 16, 94, A1.

46.

^46. Jan Wong, Globe and Mail, November 18, 1991, A1.

47.

^47. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, p. 113.

48.

^48. Lucian Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style, p. 31.

49.

^49. Rod Mickleburgh, Globe and Mail, Jan. 27, 1996, A10.

50.

^50. Government of Canada, Visit to China and Hong Kong by P.M. Jean Chretien and Team Canada(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994), p. 27.

51.

^51. Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 3.

52.

^52. Lucian Pye, Chinese Negotiating Style, p. 23.

53.

^53. Ibid., p. 101.

54.

^54. Dave Todd, Vancouver Sun, March 25, 1994, A4.

55.

^55. Dave Todd, Vancouver Sun, March 25, 1994, A4.

56.

^56. Department of foreign affairs, Visit to China and Hong Kong by P.M. Jean Chretien: Backgrounder, (Ottawa: supply and services, 1994), p. 27.

57.

^57. Scott Wade.

58.

^58. Jeremy Paltiel, Interview, November 20, 1996.

59.

^59. Edward Greenspon, "Canada Can't Sway China on Rights, PM Says: Lack of Influence Cited as Chretien Presses on with Plans to Forge Trade Links", Globe and Mail, March 19, 1994, A1, A2.

60.

^60. Ibid..

61.

^61. Edward Greenspon, Globe and Mail, Oct. 14, 1995, A4.

62.

^62. Jeremy Paltiel, p. 181.

63.

^63. www.un.org/Overview/rights.html & www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapte11.html

64.

^64. General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), 14 Dec 1980.

65.

^65. Scharfe, Ibid., p.xii.

66.

^66. 'Visit to South and South-East Asia by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Team Canada- Jan. 8-20 1996- Background Information', DFAIT, 1996, p.57.

67.

^67. Ibid., p.52.

68.

^68. 'Canadian International Business Strategy 1996-1997 Overview', Supply & Services Canada, 1996, p.39.

69.

^69. 'Team Canada Background Information', Ibid., p.53-54.

70.

^70. 'Canadian International Business Strategy', Ibid., p.39.

71.

^71. Scharfe, Ibid., p.40.

72.

^72. William H. Frederick & Robert L. Worden (ed), Indonesia A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Lanham: Bernan, 1994, p.15.

73.

^73. Lawrence T. Dickenson 'Outreach Program Brings Home 21 Heads of Mission from Asia-Pacific Posts', Outreach, no. 7, 18 Apr 1995, p.13.

74.

^74. 'A Country Report, the Other Portrait of Indonesia, the Struggle for Democracy and Human Dignity', DEMO, Indonesian NGOs for Democracy, Jakarta, p.65.

75.

^75. 'West Paupua- Plunder in Paradise', Anti-Slavery Society, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series Report No. 6, 1990, p.59.

76.

^76. John Taylor "Indonesia's Forgotten War", London: Zed, 1991, p.88.

77.

^77. Ibid., p.53.

78.

^78. Scharfe, Ibid., p.60.

79.

^79. 'Indonesia, Irian Jaya: Recent Arrests', Amnesty International, May 1996, p.2.

80.

^80. 'Urgent Action', Amnesty International, 11 Jun 1996, p.1.

81.

^81. 'Indonesia, PDI Raid: Reprisals Continue', Amnesty International, 9 Aug 1996, p.1.

82.

^82. 'The Coming Crisis in Indonesia', Globe & Mail, 30 Jul 1996.

83.

^83. William H. Frederick & Robert L. Worden (ed), Ibid., p.262.

84.

^84. 'A Country Report, the Other Portrait of Indonesia, the Struggle for Democracy and Human Dignity', Ibid., p.6.

85.

^85. 'Wealth in its Grasp', The Economist, 17 Apr 1993, p.6.

86.

^86. Scharfe, Ibid., p.189.

87.

^87. Ibid., p.186.

88.

^88. 'A Country Report, the Other Portrait of Indonesia, the Struggle for Democracy and Human Dignity', Ibid., p.41.

89.

^89. 'West Paupua-Plunder in Paradise', Ibid., p.10.

90.

^90. "EIU Country Profile- Indonesia 1995-96", Kent: Redhouse, 1996, p.7.

91.

^91. Ibid., p.5.

92.

^92. Scharfe, Ibid., p.106.

93.

^93. Ibid., p.108.

94.

^94. 'General Agreement on Development Cooperation Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia', Treaty Series 1993/21, Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1994, p.4.

95.

^95. Scharfe, Ibid., p.151.

96.

^96. both quotes - Ibid., p.197.

97.

^97. Ibid., p.190.

98.

^98. Ibid., p.172.

99.

^99. 'Survey of Bilateral Economic Relations Between Canada and Indonesia', External Affairs and International Trade: Asia Pacific South Division, p.6.

100.

^100. 'Foreign Policy for Canadians', Canadian Secretary of External Affairs, Ottawa: Information Canada, p.12.

101.

^101. 'Indonesia- A Country Study', Ibid., p.263.

102.

^102. Ibid., p.334.

103.

^103. Scharfe, Ibid., p.171.

104.

^104. Ibid., p.174.

APPENDIX I

The following questions were asked by Ryerson Christie during interviews on Canadian - Chinese human rights negotiations:

Questions:

1) Do you believe that the Chinese have a unique way of negotiating? (Distinct from the Canadian approach)

2) To what extent does the notion of "face" or "Guanxi" come into negotiations with China?

3) Are there cultural aspects to Human Rights, should attempts be made to extend our liberalist notion of human rights to non-western states? For example should Canada attempt to push for the right of freedom of political expression.

4) How would you characterize the normal Chinese negotiator? In general terms are there common characteristics that you can identify with Chinese negotiators? For example are they "aggressive", "pushy", "patient" etc.

5) Should there be a linkage between trade and human rights in negotiations with China?

6) Do you believe that Canada has a "special" relationship with China?

7) Is the human rights situation improving within China?

8) Do you believe that intercultural negotiations with China can be prone to misunderstandings? Are there examples you can draw upon where a Canadian negotiating position was misunderstood by the Chinese Government.

9) Is entrance into the Chinese market of central importance to the Canadian effort to diversify trade, and expand within the Pacific market?

10) In negotiating human rights issues with China is Canada pushing human rights "principles", or is the state focusing on specific human rights issues?

11) At what level of Chinese government does the Canadian embassy address the issue of human rights?

12) Australia has adopted a more hard-line approach to negotiating human rights with China, would such an approach be suitable to Canada?

13) With the considerable difference in size and power between Canada and China, can Canada hope to influence human rights in China, and if so why?

APPENDIX II

RECENT HIGH-LEVEL CANADIAN DELEGATIONS TO CHINA

June 1990, Monique Landry, meets privately with a senior Chinese official at a meeting of the Asian

Development Bank.

June 1990 China's vice-minister of agriculture comes to Canada to talk with officials of CIDA

July 1990 de Montigny Marchand, under secretary of state for external affairs visits Beijing to meet with

China's minister for foreign affairs.

Autumn 1991, Barbara McDougall, meets Chinese foreign minister twice.

October 1991, Bill McNight, minister of agriculture, leads a trade mission to China.

April 1992, Michael Wilson, minister of International Trade, leads a delegation of 20 businessmen to China.

March 1993, Joe Clark, minister of foreign affairs, raises human rights issues with Chinese leadership in

Beijing.

January 1994, Raymond Chan, minister of state for the Asia-Pacific region, travels to China.

November 1994, Chretien leads Team Canada to China

November 1995, Max Yalden, head of Canada's Human Rights Commission travels to China to discuss

human rights.

January 1996, First "Official" Dialogue with China on human rights.

January 1996, Ross Agnes, foreign affairs director of human rights and justice, travels to Beijing to discuss

human rights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Arat, Zehra F. Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

1991.

Cohen, Raymond. "Negotiating Across Cultures" In Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to

International Conflict , Chapter 33. C. Crocker, F.Hampson, eds. Washington, D.C.: Unites States

Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

----------. Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy. Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.

Conklin, Jeffrey S. Forging an East Asian Foreign Policy. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995.

Davis, Michael C. Human Rights and Chinese Values. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Economist. "Wealth in its Grasp" in The Economist. 12 April, 1993, p. 3-6.

Evans, Paul M. Reluctant Adversaries. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.

Gecelovsky, P., T.A. Keenleyside. "Canada's human rights policy in practice: Tiananmen Square" In

International Journal. 5, Summer 1995, 564-593.

Hampson, F.O. Multilateral Negotiations. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Hu, Hsien Chin. "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face'" In American Anthropologist. No.46 (1944) 45-64.

Johnston, David. The Idea of a Liberal Theory: A Critique and Reconstruction. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1994.

Kai, Yang. Human Rights in China: History, Disputes and Regional Influence. Honolulu: North Pacific

Cooperative Seucrity Dialogue (Working Paper No. 9), 1992.

Kolas, Ashild. "Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion" In Journal of Peace Research. Vol.33, no.1

(1996. pp. 51-56.

Matthews, Robert O., C. Pratt. Eds. Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy. Kingston: McGill-Queen's

University Press, 1988.

McNally, George F. Odlum: Canada's First Ambassador to China. M.A. Thesis, Univeristy of Alberta, 1977.

Neher, Clark D. Southeast Asia in the New International Era. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Paltiel, Jeremy T. "Negotiating Human Rights with China" In Canada Among Nations: 1995, Chapter 9. M. Molot, ed. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995.

Pye, Lucian. Chinese Negotiating Style. New York: Quorum Books, 1992.

----------. China: An Introduction. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

----------. The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1988.

Renteln, Alison Dundes. International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism. London: Sage

Publications. 1990.

Scharfe, Sharon. Complicity: Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, the Case of East Timor.

Montreal: Black Rose, 1996.

Taylor, John. Indonesia's Forgotten War. London: Zed Books, 1991.

Ting-Toomey, S., F. Korzenny. Eds. Communication, Peace and Development. London: Sage Publications,

1990.

Wu, Yuan-li, et al. Human Rights in the People's Republic of China. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANGANIZATIONS' DOCUMENTS

Amnesty International. Indonesian PDI Raid: Reprisals Continue. ASA 21/56/96. 9 August, 1996.

----------. Urgent Action. 11 June, 1996.

----------. Indonesia, Irian Jaya: Recent Arrests. ASA 21/21/96. May 1996

Dickenson, Lawrence T. "Outreach Program Brings Home 21 Heads of Mission from Asia-Pacific Posts" in

Outreach., no.7, 18 April 1995.

Independent NGOs for Democracy. "A Country Report, the Other Portrait of Indonesia: The Struggle for

Democracy and Human Dignity" In DEMO.

"West Paupau - Plunder in Paradise" In Anti-Slavery Society, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series.

Report No. 6, 1990.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

CANADA

Canadian International Development Agency. Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights,

Democratization and Good Governance. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996.

----------. 'General Agreement on Development Co-operation between the Government of Canada and the

Government of the Republic of Indonesia', Treaty Series 1993/21. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for

Canada, 1994.

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians. Ottawa: Information

Canada,1970.

Department of External Affairs and International Trade. Survey of Bilateral Economic Relations Between

Canada and Indonesia. Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1990.

Department of Foreign Affairs. Canada's International Business Strategy, 1996-1997. Ottawa: Supply and

Services, 1996.

----------. Team Canada's Visit to South and Southeast Asia by PM Jean Chretien and Team Canada - Jan.

8-20, 1996 -Background Information. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996.

----------. Indonesia: A Guide for Canadian Business 1995-1996. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1995.

----------. Canada in the World: Government Statement. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1995.

----------. Visit to China and Hong Kong by P.M. Jean Chretien and Team Canada: Background Information,

Nov 5-13, 1994. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1994.

Immigration and Refugee Board. China: Economic Growth and Human Rights. Ottawa: Supply and

Services, 1993.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1980.

UNITED STATES

Frederick, William H. and Worden, Robert L. eds. Indonesia a Country Study. Lanham: Federal Research

Division, Library of Congress, 1994.

INTERNET WEBSITES

www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_in/2/6e.htm#sec2

www.amnesty.org/news/1996/index0196.htm

www.amnesty.org/news/1996/index0496.htm

www.amnesty.org/news/1996/index0596.htm

www.amnesty.org/news/1996/index0796.htm

www.amnesty.org/news/1995/Indonesia.95.12.08.txt

www.amnesty.org/news/1995/East.Timor.95.07.11.txt

www.best.com/%7Emlacabe/human-rights/links.html

www.best.com/~mlacabe/human-rights/seasia/indonesia.html

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ENGLISH/FORIGN/DISARM/EEA-stra.HTM

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/trade/cibs/english/overview.htm#SoutheastAsia/ASEAN

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/press_~1/96_press/96_188E.HTM

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/html/canada/27inaid.htm

www.io.org/amnesty/aipub/1996/ASA/32100396.htm

www.io.org/amnesty/aipub/1996/ASA/32103996.htm

www.io.org/amnesty/ailib/1996/SUM/3210196.htm

www.io.org/amnesty/ailib/1995/ASA/210395.ASA.txt

www.io.org/amnesty/ailib/1994/ASA/210594.ASA.txt

www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapte11.html

INTERVIEWS

Paltiel, Jeremy. Carleton University. Ottawa: Nov 20, 1996.

Perlin, Carmen. Department of Foreign Affairs: China Desk. Ottawa: Nov. 18, 1996.

Wade, Scott. Canadian International Development Agency. Ottawa: November 21, 1996.