Erik Growen
The United States new enemy to emerge out of the ashes of World War II turned out to be the country which almost single-handedly defeated the Nazi regime : the Soviet Union. The post war power plays by both the USSR and the USA almost led to direct military confrontations which neither war-weary country could afford to get into. With the advent of nuclear weapons the direct approach was taken away altogether and the Cold War era of intelligence gathering and covert actions began. These activities started primarily in Europe but soon shifted to a global level with the USSR and the US fighting for de facto control over countries within their spheres of influence initially, and later spilling into any country in which they saw the spectre of the other side gaining influence. In the era of growing international trade ties this meant almost every nation on the planet had the potential to become a covert battlefield. The targets shifted from Europe, which stabilized into two armed camps, to the so-called Third World where no means have been left unused by both sides in their efforts to wipe out each others influence by both overt and covert actions.
" Covert action may be defined as intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another for the purpose of extending political and economic control through means which are not visible nor acknowledged."(1)
It has become another foreign policy tool to be used along with diplomacy, aid programs and trade, only the means are far more insidious. The target nations are generally unable to defend themselves against the resources available to the major intelligence agencies who use a combination of tactics including assassinations, blackmail, the training of anti-government troops et cetera, to achieve their ends which in the case of the US is to maintain their predominant economic and political position they have enjoyed since the end of World War II.
The instrument created for this task is the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) which was created by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequently given more power to act almost independently from the government by National Security Council ( NSC ) act NSC-4/A which gave the CIA the ability to run psychological operations ( December 1947 ) and more importantly NSC 10/2 in June 1948 outlining covert political and paramilitary operation. This was a response to the February 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and rising communist unrest in France. NSC 10/2 allowed the CIA to undertake " propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugee liberation groups and support of indigenous anti-communist elements"(2) By 1953 this carte blanche led the CIA to be running operations in 48 separate countries.
As the 'Domino Theory' of one country after another falling to Communism took hold the CIAs emphasis shifted from being primarily intelligence gathering to covert actions to prop up friendly or destabilize unfriendly governments. The other factor which led them increasingly into other countries was the advent of multi-national corporations ( MNC ) which would establish a presence in a country and in times of crisis would call on the US government to protect them and thus overall US interests.
Both of these factors played a large part in framing US policy towards Latin America which has the unfortunate situation of being part of what the US considers its backyard and has felt itself therefore to have a free hand in disrupting the internal affairs of almost every nation south of its border. This reached new heights with the success of the Cuban revolution which was viewed as the first 'domino' in the sequence to fall especially with communist organizations springing up in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay. Even as early as the Truman administration in the 1950s the paranoia over possible communist influence could be seen. In NSC-141 which came out at the end of the Truman Presidency there is a statement " In Latin America we seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development which will make the Latin American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism and Soviet political warfare"(3) This unfortunately has led the US into backing some of the most brutal dictators in the world. The policy remained quite static as President Nixon reiterated on October 25 1971 : " The destiny of every nation within our inter-American system remains of foremost concern to the US."(4) One of the countries in the " vulnerable underbelly of the US "(5) is Chile which if it ever turned communist was seen as a potential staging area for subsequent invasions of its neighbours.
Chile, which gained its independence from Spain in 1813, had the longest democratic tradition in Latin America. There had been only three brief interruptions of civilian rule, the last being in 1925 and since 1932 there extended an unbroken chain of civilian democratically elected Presidents. Unfortunately the country was economically dependent on the US with US MNCs controlling all the critical areas of the economy. Chile received the highest per capita aid from the US of all the countries in the Western Hemisphere as well as receiving huge lines of credit from US banking institutions.
In the early 1960s a figure emerged in Chilean politics that began to worry the US government, Salvador Allende Gossens, the leader of a left-wing coalition party FRAP ( Popular Action Front ). The CIA and the State Department suspected Allende of favouring expropriations of foreign investment and confiscation of foreign owned or controlled properties. For this he was labeled a communist. This view led to three successive Presidents into a policy of electoral interference to keep Allende out of power.
The covert actions began in earnest in 1962 in preparation for the 1964 Presidential elections. In these two years the CIA ran 15 covert actions to secure the victory of the Presidency by Eduardo Frei Montalva leader of the Christian Democratic Party ( CDP ). 'Election' committees were set up in both Washington and Santiago made up of CIA and State Department personnel.
The teams came up with a two part plan of direct financial support for the CDP and another right-wing party. Money was passed into the CDP coffers through intermediaries without even informing Frei. They covered over half of the campaigns cost. The second part of the plan was a media blitz through radio, television, newspapers, posters, leaflets, et cetera. The message equated an Allende victory with Stalinist brutality. The CIA was so sure of victory the turned down an offer of $1.5 million from US business concerns. Agents were also sent in with $1 million to buy off politicians and labour leaders votes. They were quite successful and Frei won a clear majority.
Covert activity wound down somewhat during the years 1964 to 1969 but did not come to a complete halt. Around 20 covert actions were authorized in the time period mostly centred on propaganda against FRAP. $1.75 million was spent to influence the March 1965 congressional elections. Also during this time a covert relationship and liaison ties were established with Chile's internal security and intelligence services.
Under the Chilean constitution a President cannot be elected to successive terms so even though Frei was popular he had to step aside for the 1970 elections. Leading the CDP was now Radomiro Tomic who was more left-wing than Frei and in fact had made overtures to the Marxist left in the past. The National Party ( PN ) had at their head a 74 year old ex-President Jorge Alassandri who was the only candidate opposed to expropriations. A new coalition, the Unity Party ( PU ) was put together by Allende who stood for the nationalization of the copper mines, agrarian reform, wage increases and diversification of the economy.
The major players on the US side at this time included the Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry; a former journalist who covered Eastern Europe then became a diplomat under Kennedy charged specifically with the task of finding liberal anti-communists, CIA Station Chief in Chile Henry Heckscher; a CIA veteran of Guatemala and Laos, and CIA Director Richard Helm. The two most important, and ultimately behind the final decisions, were Henry Kissenger, Secretary of State who came up with the comment " I don't see why the United States should stand by and let Chile go communist merely due to the irresponsibility of its own people."(6)and President Richard Nixon.
Nixon ordered the CIA to influence the 1970 elections without consulting or informing the Departments of State or Defense, the Ambassador in Chile or the NSC. The CIA were charged with carrying out a 'spoiling' operation against the PU to prevent Allende's election on September 4 1970. In March the CIA and the now informed Korry authorized expenditures for the propaganda campaign. In July ITT Corporation met with the CIA and offered money for Alessandri's campaign. The money was channeled through intermediaries. As in 1964 the media equated Allende with Stalin.
Their efforts failed this time however as Allende won a slim majority in the election capturing 36.3% of the vote compared to 34.9% for Alessandri and 27.8% for Tomic. Due to the fact that Allende won a plurality of votes and not an absolute majority the congress, in a joint session, would pick between the first and second place finisher as to who would be President. This vote was slated for October 24 .
Just after the election National Intelligence Estimate ( NIE ) came out and concluded that " the US had no vital interests in Chile, that the world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende regime, and that his victory would not pose a threat to the peace of the region. What an Allened victory would do was threaten the cohesion of the hemisphere and represent an advance for Marxist ideas, a psychological setback for the US."(7) This information was duly ignored by Nixon and he ordered the CIA to make sure Allende lost the congressional vote.
They began to really explore the idea of a military coup against Allende if he won the vote. The problem was that the Chief of Defense, General Rene Schneider, was a staunch constitutionalist. As a result of this " the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators."(8) Through its military contacts the CIA identified two possible choices to back in the event of a coup. The first was ex-Brigadier General Roberto Viaux who led an abortive coup in 1969 as well as being leader of some right-wing civilian groups. The other was General Camilo Valenzuela the commander of the Santiago garrison. The two groups of around a dozen officers were in contact with each other but would not cooperate in any ventures together. Between October 5 and 20 the CIA met with 21 other officers as well but finally settled on Viaux as being the best of a bad lot. He was paid $20 000 but would not follow CIA orders so support quickly shifted to Valenzuela.
On October 22 the CIA delivered three .45 calibre submachine guns and tear gas grenades to his group. Six hours later General Schneider was shot in a bungled kidnaping attempt. A disorganized coup attempt followed and failed. The next day Gen. Schneider died of his wounds. Valenzuela was jailed then exiled and Viaux was exiled for their parts in the plot. Despite this setback the death of Schneider made the possibility of future coups greater.
This all came about due to a series of meetings between Allende's victory on Sept. 4 and Sept. 15. up to this point the CIA had been pursuing what it called Track I primarily a propaganda option which also included bribes et cetera. The last major operation under this title was the so-called 'Frei Gambit'. The objective was to keep Frei in power even though it was unconstitutional. How it was to work was to have Alessandri win the congressional election then resign immediately causing new elections in which Frei could then run. Korry, in an effort to pressure Frei into going along, made the following statement that Frei should know that " not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. [Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery...would be strictly illusory]."(9) Frei did not give in to the pressure and in fact made no attempt to stop Allende's confirmation by congress.
With the fall of the Frei Gambit, Track I was all but finished and Nixon began looking for other options. On Sept. 15 Agustin Edwards, the publisher of El Mercurio newspaper ( Chile's largest ) and also a Pepsi Cola bottler and long time friend of Pepsi Cola's President Donald Kendall arrived in Washington. Kendall, a friend and political ally of Nixon's got him an audience with the President in which he pleaded for action to stop any chance of expropriation. Later that day Nixon told CIA Director Helms that an Allende government was unacceptable to the US and instructed the CIA to take a direct role in organizing a military coup. There was also to be massive economic pressure brought to bear on Chile. The choices made were quite clear as Helms notes of his meeting with Nixon show: " One-in-ten chance perhaps, but save Chile!...not concerned risks involved...no involvement of Embassy...$10 000 000 available, more if necessary...make the economy scream."(10) Nixon directly said to Helms " Organize a coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the Presidency."(11) This was the beginning of Track II.
The CIAs instructions on Track II to Station Chief Heckscher read " Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain [the Frei Gambit] has been discarded. Military solution is objective."(12) There followed a three point list of objectives: a) collect intelligence on coup-minded officers; b) create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activates intended to provoke the left to give pretext for a coup; c) inform those coup-minded officers that the US Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct US military intervention.(13)
The CIA also had major ties to MNCs including ITT and Anaconda Copper both of whom stood to lose major assets if Allende's expropriation plans went through. ITT gave $1 million and Anaconda contributed $500 000 to the election coffers of Allende's rivals using CIA middlemen for the 1970 election campaign. Despite this effort Allende was confirmed by congress on Oct. 24 and was inaugurated on Nov. 3.
Nixon's response to the situation was stated " We deal with governments as they are. Our relations depend not on their internal structures or social systems, but on actions which affect us and the inter-American system. The new government in Chile is a clear case in point...We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us."(14) Kissinger even quipped to Chilean diplomats " I am not interested in, nor do I know anything about, the southern portion of the world from the Pyrenees on down."(15) NIEs on the situation played down any communist affiliations that Allende was supposed to have but they were ignored and the effort to remove Allende continued.
Despite this effort the PU won 8 more seats in March 1973 elections actually raising his plurality to 43.4%. On top of this a coup was crushed by loyalist forces under Chief of Staff General Carlos Prats who subsequently resigned and was replaced by General Augusto Pinochet.
During this time frame between the election and the coup in 1973 the Chilean economy came under attack by the US. A 'Chilean Task Force ' was set up to destroy the economy headed by David Atlee Philips. Allende's attempts to diversify the economy failed under US-led international pressure. The US cut exports leading to parts shortages, bilateral aid was cut to near zero, export-import bank credits were cut entirely, Inter-American Development Bank loans slashed and the World Bank was pressured to give no loans to Chile at all.(16) This policy was stated clearly in National Security Decision Memorandum ( NSDM ) 93 issued in early Nov. 1970. While this was happening the amount of money spent to train Chilean military officers rose.(17)
Other measures were taken towards fermenting a coup such as collecting arrest lists, key civilian installations and people who needed protection, government installations that needed to be taken and contingency plans for the new government. Money was also channeled into radical groups such as the Patria-y-Libertad and the Rolando Matus Brigade to ferment chaos.
One of the final acts was the support of the truckers strikes which paralyzed the country for months on end. There were two strikes the last running from Jul. 13 to the coup in Sep. 1973. This long strike could not have been maintained with union funds alone and it has been suggested that money the CIA was giving to other groups found its way to the truckers so the strike could be maintained.
The inevitable coup finally happened on Sep. 11 1973. Allende was executed along with his government and supporters through Operacion Limpieza headed by Gen. Pinochet. The General banned political parties, put congress on indefinite recess, began press censorship, elections were put off indefinitely and there was a denial of human and civil rights that led to mass 'disappearances'.
The CIA claims that it was not involved in the coup and had no fore-knowledge but this is easily disproved as US military attaches were in the field with Chilean army units participating in the coup. A Navy SEAL team was landed on the coast, 32 aircraft were deployed to Mendoza airbase in Argentina in case they were needed and a US electronic intelligence aircraft was flying over the Andes on the day of the coup. On Sept. 29 1973 the US government formally recognized the new government of Augusto Pinochet.
There was, of course, the denial of culpability from Washington. Kissinger in 1973 stated "The CIA had nothing to do with the coup"(18). Former Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer : the US had "bought no votes...funded no candidates...[and]...promoted no coups."(19) Then there is Nixon " As far as what happened in Chile is concerned, we can only say that for the US to have intervened in a free election and to have turned it around, I think would have had repercussions all around Latin America that would have been far worse than what happened in Chile."(20) In September 1973 Kissinger also said " The CIA was heavily involved in 1964 in the election, was in a very minor way involved in the 1970 election, and since then we have absolutely stayed away from any coups. Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic political parties and give them a basis for winning the election in 1976, which [sic] we expressed our hope that Allende could be defeated in a free democratic election."(21) These words are especially ironic when viewing the dictatorship that Kissinger helped to bring about in Chile that destroyed their long democratic tradition.
Covert actions were used by three US Presidents over 15 years to prevent a left-wing
government from being freely elected in the oldest democracy in Latin America. Not only was
the democratic process destroyed in Chile it was circumvented in the US as well. None of the
decisions taken towards Chile ever were taken to congress for approval. Almost all, if not all,
covert methods available to the CIA were employed in Chile in order to halt a perceived
communist threat that even other branches of the CIA, the ones responsible for the NIEs, said
did not exist but once put in motion the CIA tried every trick to get rid of Allende and in that
they were finally successful.
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