Question 2: Describe either Behaviorism or the Identity theory. Explain some of the arguments for the position described, and some of the arguments against it. Is the view ultimately plausible?

Behaviorism is a theory which is based partly in psychology, and partly in philosophy. It is most often related to a materialist-type explanation of the relation of the two concepts 'mind' and 'body'. Materialist-type explanations generally involve the idea that the two concepts called 'mind' and 'body', are the same thing; simply put, the physical body itself, with a complex physical system, which gives rise to the substance we call 'thoughts' or 'mind'. The Behaviorist theory (in general), explains that the mind is actually processes of the brain.

In general, Materialism involves the concept that there is not any sort of real thing in the world, unless it is a physical thing. Minds do not exist, as insubstantial systems or incorporeal beings. For something to exist, or an event to be said to have occurred, it must have a physical basis. The Behaviorism theory has elements of this theory contained within it. Behaviorism involves the concept that the mind is not an incorporeal being, but is a series of events related to, and based in, a physical object (the brain/body).

The general Behaviorism theory involves reducing our concepts of thoughts down to behaviors of the body. The idea is that, what people mean by thinking about doing a thing is that they will behave in a certain way. The most obvious problem with the theory (which I have stated very simply) is that not everything that a person 'thinks' about doing, is actualized into behavior. It cannot be explained away that the person did not think a thing, when they claim to have thought, or felt a certain way, yet there were no outward signs (behaviors) of the person having felt that way, at the time. The theory answers this with the concept of being disposed to a behavior.

Being disposed to a behavior seems to account for 'thoughts' or 'feelings' which were not actualized. These were potential behaviors which were suppressed, or not acted upon at the time of the alleged feeling. This is made to apply to all thought-related concepts. Beliefs become potential behavior sets (dispositions to behave) of a person; emotions become potential behavior sets that a person could actualize at various times. This allows for the possibility that a person can have such concepts attributed to them, while not always acting as if they have these attributes.

One problem of this could be that there is not an objective way of discerning whether or not a person has an attribute associated with them, until they behave in that way (assuming that the person is not falsifying their actions). There only seems to be a subjective discourse possible, stated by each person, about the dispositions they hold for behaviors. This second-hand experiencing for the viewer of the explanation seems problematic, especially when considering that each person can be thought to have differing potential sets of behavior. The only way that this possibility of varying sets of behaviors could be comprehended by the viewer is if there is presupposed to be some universal set of sets of behaviors, which does not vary in it's quality. However, it does not seem to be the case that, even if behaviors are of the same style (for example, the corners of the mouth turning up, the teeth being bared, and eyes squinting), that two instances of the behavior will be interpreted to mean the same thing by all viewers. The same style of behavior could mean one thing to a viewer belonging to a specific social group, than to a viewer belonging to a differing social group.

Behaviorists could say that there are loose definition structures about these behavior sets. It could be claimed that is meaningless to say that a person 'interprets' actions in any way, but simply reacts to the viewed behavior by acting with their own sets of behavior. However, it is obvious that various social-specific sets of behaviors are reacted to in differing ways throughout the various groups. The same style of behavior may elicit one behaviors from one loosely-defined set, if viewed by a member of one social group, and a completely different behavior from a different set, if viewed by a member of a different social group.

It can even be said that behaviors in reaction to a viewed behavior will vary within social groups. Context is not even an issue, here, although context plays a major part in interpreting the meaning of behaviors. For now, it can be assumed that the context in which differing reactions to the same behavior, at the same time, in the same place, is the same context (objectively). For example, person X behaves with 'anger'-related actions, eliciting 'anger' behavior in reaction, from person A, and at the same time, eliciting 'fear' behavior in reaction, from person B. The interpretation (manifested in the reaction to the viewed behavior) of a viewed behavior is important for the person, as it affects interaction between persons.

Context hinders the interaction further, as it is obvious that there are behaviors which are reacted to in different ways in different situations, or at different times. This holds even for the same person. A person may react with a behavior from one set at one time, to a stimulus (behavior or otherwise), and react with a different behavior at a different time, given the same stimulus, if the context is different. This leads to possible confusion of behaviors, if no ability to interpret situations, contexts, and varying meaning of behaviors is presupposed.

As something seemingly 'mental' in concept as 'interpreting meaning' is denied by Behaviorist theory, it cannot be presupposed in a Behaviorist model. Therefore, there can not be said to be any way that a person could interpret a behavior which is strange to them (out of context, or odd to that social group). If a person behaves in a way which is strange to the viewer, the interaction becomes confused. If there were no universal ways of behaving, as there do not seem to be (based on the fact that people behave different ways in reaction to the same actions), then people would tend to view confusing behaviors, and so would ensue a chain of confused reacting behaviors, only able to end when the viewers ceased acting, and ignored the behaviors acted by the other. This does not seem solvable by the Behaviorism theory, unless the model of behavior is expanded to include some sort of meta-disposition, which includes the ability to interpret varying behaviors. This would also solve the problem of the seeming subjectivity of behavior sets across social groups, as the ability to interpret would likely rely on some universal or objective principals of possible behavior types. But to even consider something like a meta-disposition seems to be getting dangerously close to a non-physical 'mental' event, which is denied by Behaviorist theory.

A possible (but possibly weak) rebuttal to this could be that what seems to be an ability to interpret the action to 'mean' something is simply that it is an illusion that the behaviors could 'mean' anything. That the behaviors are simply actions and reactions to the environment. This does not seem to be the case, however. People don't seem to always act solely on the behavior they view, but on some interpretation of the viewed behavior. Take this common example of a person X speaking to person A, where X says "Do you like this dinner?", A replies "Oh... yeah, it's fine.", and then X says "You don't like it?". 'A' replied in a seemingly positive behavior to X's question-action, but X interpreted the words that were said as secretly a negative response. This example seems to show that there is an underlying meaning to behavior, which can be perceived and interpreted by the viewers of the behavior. If it is an illusion, then it seems to be one that has some objective validity, and which can hinder viewers of behavior by changing their response to actions. We could say that A was falsifying their behavior, and that they would otherwise have given a negative response to X's question, causing X's reaction to follow more logically. While A responded in a seemingly positive way, X's reaction does not seem to follow logically, indicating that X was somehow confused in their behavior (if there is no meaning), or that there was some underlying meaning, which X 'picked up on', causing the logically valid response to A's falsified behavior. We come now to the idea that there is actually information being shown to the viewers of behavior.

There seems to be some sort of transfer or interaction of information taking place at a more subtle level than that of viewing actions. People seem to be able to act as if they had more information than is being transferred simply by the behaviors being performed. As in the above example, people seem to be able to react with behaviors appropriate to the logical progression of information which is not being overtly conveyed through the behaviors of the other. This would indicate (on one hand) that there are very strong and subtle visual clues, that we are unable to fully explain, which are performed with the more overt behaviors, and which carry the context and social specific cues which allow the viewer to react in a logically progressive way to the actions being shown. This is the only possible explanation for this phenomena within the model set up by the Behaviorism theory. This would entail that Behaviorists have a large task ahead of them, looking for, studying and categorizing all of these subtle information cues. On the other hand is that this information is synthesized as knowledge within the viewer, based on what they know about the context, social set and overt visual information of the other. This second idea could also entail that the viewer has some 'purpose' for interpreting this information. This moves even farther from the Behaviorist theory proper, as there could be nothing like a purpose or intent, unless it is construed as a 'disposition to find and study information'.

This brings the question of 'intent'. Intent seems to be a thing which cannot be denied in totality, yet which does not seem (at first, at least) to be fully explained as a 'disposition'. There does seem to be a purpose or intent to most interactions, especially between persons. This seeming 'knowledge' or 'information' seeking is an intent to gain something, however small, about the environment and/or others. When stated in such a way, it seems as likely that intent could be such a 'disposition to gain information about something', but the term 'information' is problematic in that it seems to bring back a term which has no physical basis. What is 'information', and where can one find it? For that matter, what physical principal is 'disposition to behave' based in?

The constant changing of words from thought-related words to 'disposition to a thing' seems problematic. It begins to sound like a re-labeling or re-working rather than an actual re-accounting of phenomena in terms of physical cause-effect, as required by Behaviorist theory proper. The theory could have some plausibility, if it was extensively reworked, or if it incorporated some allowance of underlying information, possibly not based on physical cues, but perhaps to some degree of inner analysis and study within a person. As it stands now, it is implausible.

Philosophy 32.252
October 2000