Turkey - August 17, 1999 Earthquake - possibly 45,000 dead
This is from www.mceer.buffalo.edu
Structural Aspects
While thousands of people died in the numerous building collapses, the damage to reinforced concrete buildings was not surprising, nor unexpected. Similar types of damage were observed to a lesser extent in many prior earthquakes throughout Turkey. However, because these other earthquakes were in more remote, less populated regions, the message from earlier reconnaissance visits apparently did not resonate to the same degree.
The predominant structural system used for buildings in Turkey consists of reinforced concrete frames with unreinforced masonry infills. This structural form is used for all building heights and occupancy, from single-story commercial to multistory residential and office buildings. Frame-shear wall interactive systems are also used in new buildings. Industrial buildings are either reinforced concrete (cast-in-place or pre-cast) or steel frame structures.
A typical reinforced concrete frame building in Turkey consists of a regular, symmetric floor plan, with square or rectangular columns and connecting beams. The exterior enclosure as well as interior partitioning are of non-bearing unreinforced brick masonry infill walls. These walls contributed significantly to the lateral stiffness of buildings during the earthquake and, in many instances, controlled the lateral drift and resisted seismic forces elastically. This was especially true in low-rise buildings, older buildings where the ratio of wall to floor area was very high, and buildings located on firm soil.
Once the brick infills failed, the lateral strength and stiffness had to be provided by the frames alone, which then experienced significant inelasticity in the critical regions. At this stage, the ability of reinforced concrete columns, beams, and beam-column joints to sustain deformation demands depended on how well the seismic design and detailing requirements were followed both in design and in construction.
The damage to reinforced concrete buildings from this earthquake can be attributed to one or more of the following:
Foundation failures - Foundation failures were observed for a large number of buildings with large settlements, and in some cases, entire structures overturned (as shown in figure at right).
Soft stories - A large number of residential and commercial buildings were built with soft stories at the first-floor level. First stories are often used as stores and commercial areas, especially in the central part of cities. These areas are enclosed with glass windows, and sometimes with a single masonry infill at the back. Heavy masonry infills start immediately above the commercial floor. During the earthquake, the presence of a soft story increased deformation demands very significantly, and put the burden of energy dissipation on the first-story columns. Many failures and collapses can be attributed to the increased deformation demands caused by soft stories, coupled with lack of deformability of poorly designed columns. This was particularly evident on a commercial street where nearly all buildings collapsed towards the street. Soft first stories caused many residential and commercial buildings to collapse.
Strong beams and weak columns - Most frame structures have strong beams, remaining elastic, and weak columns suffering compression crushing or shear failure. In many cases, relatively deep beams were used with flexible columns, contributing to the strong-beam weak-column behavior.
Lack of column confinement and poor detailing practice - Most of the structural damage observed in frame buildings was concentrated at column ends. Unfortunately, confinement reinforcement virtually did not exist in these members, making them unable to maintain the required ductility. A number of detailing deficiencies were observed in the damaged structures. This included lack of anchorage of beams and column reinforcement, insufficient splice lengths, use of 90o hooks, poor concrete quality, less than full height masonry infill partitions, and frequent combinations of many of the above. These errors were often compounded by geometric irregularities such as eccentric beam-to-column connections that induced severe torsion in short perpendicular stub beams.A number of buildings directly sitting on the fault were also destroyed by the relative movements of the fault. It is noteworthy that an industrial complex being constructed 100 feet from the fault had very well confined columns with damage limited to spalling and large residual displacements.
Steel structures - Steel, being by far the most expensive construction material in Turkey, has been used rather sporadically in construction; only industrial structures rely on steel for their lateral load resistance. Some were damaged by this earthquake. A few collapsed. Typical causes for collapses include failure of anchor bolts at column bases and structural instability under overturning forces. Other evidence of damage include fracture of brace connections, buckling of braces, and local buckling in concrete filled steel hollow pipes used in wharves
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Lifeline Damage and Fire Following The Earthquake
Lifeline Damage and Fire: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake, August 17, 1999 by Charles Scawthorn, Senior Vice President EQE International, Inc.
Lifeline Damage - Lifeline damage was moderate to major, as follows:
Electric – power failed within minutes of the earthquake, but was generally restored to most areas within several days. Substations did not appear to be damaged, nor transmission lines or towers, except where the lines crossed the fault. The photograph at right shows a tower pulled over due to the conductors being put in tension at the fault crossing (right lateral fault displacement--fault is to north, or left, of the tower).
Telephone – service continued with only minor disruptions, and cell service was reportedly uninterrupted.
Gas – there is no domestic underground gas piping in the area. It is unknown as of this writing if there are bulk transmission lines in the area.
Rail – rail lines were buckled at fault crossings, but repairs were quickly effected, and rail service restored within several days.
Highways – roads and highways were generally undamaged except for several highway bridges intersected by traces of the fault – where this put the bridge in tension, spans were pulled off their beam seats, and the spans collapsed. The main motorway connecting Istanbul and Ankara passes along the north shore of Izmit Bay and close to Adapazari – in general, it was undamaged.
Water – The main source of water is the recently constructed Izmit Water Project, built and operated by Thames Water. It is the largest privatized water project in the world as of this writing, and replaces a variety of low quality sources for the various municipalities in the area. The wholesale system, which begins in the hills south of Yuvacik at a 60 million cu. meter reservoir impounded by a 40 m. high clay core earthen dam, was constructed in the early 1990's. The dam is uninstrumented, and experienced only very minor settlements, although the reservoir is reported to have experienced a 2 m. amplitude seiche. Water is conveyed approximately 4 km. from the dam to a water treatment plant, via a steel pipe of 2.2 m. diameter.
The water treatment plant is 440 million liter/day capacity (110 mgd) and employs a standard treatment process of aeration, flocculation/sedimentation, sand filtration and chlorination. Buildings, in-ground concrete balancing reservoir and equipment were undamaged, with the exception of fiberglass piping in the clarifiers, which are cantilevered downward approximately 3 m. In basins which were not in use at the time, and empty, these 'trident' pipes cracked and/or broke at their upper (base) end. However, sufficient capacity remained for the plant to operate. Daily demand at the time of the earthquake is 2,500 l/s but, following the earthquake, demand increased to 3,200 l/s, which was attributed to leakage along the transmission line. Downstream of the plant, water is conveyed to retail customers via a 2.2 m. spiral-welded steel pipe, which was reportedly undamaged except at clean-out connections at low points, where flanged fittings appear to have cracked at perhaps a dozen locations. The transmission line was being scheduled for a one day outage for Aug. 26 (ie, nine days after the earthquake) for repair of these leaks.
Approximately one km. downstream of the plant, the steel transmission line crosses the fault trace. This location was inspected and found to have approximately a 2 m. right lateral offset but, while some water flowing to the surface was observed (it was raining at the time, however), the pipe was reportedly undamaged at this location.
Impacts of the earthquake on water retailers and urban distribution pipe networks are unknown in detail as of this writing, but it was known that the retailers in general were able to store water in their local distribution reservoirs, but were unable to distribute it due to numerous breaks in the distribution system. Potable water needs were being served by tanker trucks supplied from the Izmit water treatment plant and from several naval vessels in the Bay, and by bottled water.
Wastewater – no information was available at the time of writing.
Fire Following Earthquake
A number of ignitions occurred in building collapses, but these were generally confined to the building of origin, due to the prevalent non-flammable building materials. The most dramatic fire was at the Tupras oil refinery, where it appears that two separate fires initiated during the earthquake, as follows:
A fire initiated in the Crude Unit, a primary processing plant in the Refinery, as a result of the collapse of a 90 meter tall, 10 meter diameter, reinforced concrete stack. The collapse of this large stack into the middle of the units caused extensive destruction, released fuel and was the primary cause of the fire within the process unit.
A second fire initiated in the Naptha tank farm, independent of the crude unit fire. It appears that this fire initiated as a result of sparks created by bouncing of the floating roof in one of the tanks, during the earthquake. The sparks ignited the Naptha. Such floating roof tanks are common in petroleum facilities, world wide. The crude unit fire was initially brought under control relatively quickly. However, the collapse of the stack also broke the pipeline from the burning Naptha tank, upstream of the block valve. This resulted in an unstoppable supply of fuel and the re-ignition of the fire in the crude unit. The tank farm fire enveloped 6 tanks, with the ensuing heat damaging other tanks as well. The fire in the tank farm spread to an adjacent cooling tower, destroying it. A second cooling tower was destroyed by the ground shaking itself.
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Social, Political Response: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake, August 17, 1999
by William A. Mitchell, Professor of Political Science and Director of Middle East Studies, Baylor University
Over the past quarter of a century, I have studied several earthquakes in Turkey. As an active seismic zone, Turkey frequently experiences devastating shaking. Again and again, buildings collapse, people and animals die, houses and settlements are rebuilt, and the public soon forgets. In the 1970 Gediz, the 1976 Lice, the 1983 Erzurum-Kars, the 1992 Erzincan, the 1995 Dinar, and the 1998 Ceyhan-Adana disasters, the emergency response was fairly consistent and predictable. Survivors on the scene were the first to begin search and rescue, with their bare hands, without lifting equipment, listening devices, sniffing dogs, or lights in the darkness. Local press and visual media were quickly on the scene, followed hours later by foreign search and rescue teams, then even later by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and governmental organizations. Usually the Prime Minister and/or President quickly arrive on the scene, asking the victims to accept this "act of God," and promising that the settlements and homes will be rebuilt quickly.
The initial response to the 03:02 hours, August 17 earthquake in Turkey was similar to the above response. The Prime Minister's national crises action center reportedly was activated on day one, followed by provincial and township crises center activation. But here is where this earthquake is different. The event was centered in Turkey's industrial and heavily populated region surrounding the Marmara Sea. About 15 million urban people, including some of the wealthiest, best trained, best educated, and professional elitist reside in the roughly 200 km belt stretching from Duzce (Bolu) in the east to Tekirdag in the west. Quickly, television and newspaper reporters descended on the scene and were broadcasting to the nation from town after town that suffered casualties and damages. Thousands of buildings were destroyed, and thousands of people died (15,032 officially, but an estimated 30,000 are unaccounted for). Professional search and rescue efforts were slow to respond, and the public viewed this live without censorship. For about two days, live cameras showed the enormous strain on the survivors and the lack of government or military response. The press was exceptionally critical about the lack of Turkish search and rescue and the slow response of the military to help. Several days after the earthquake, a reportedly 50,000 soldiers (asker) were helping in the disaster area. Many people perceived a disproportional amount of rescue equipment taken to the naval base at Golcuk.
The basic difference from all other earthquake disasters in Turkey is that the populace has mobilized massive public opinion that questioned the government and military institutions in Turkey. For the first time to my knowledge, the Army was consistently criticized for its lack of timely action (one person said the Army could have at least responded and helped direct the chaotic traffic resulting from people fleeing the area and thousands traveling to the area to search for family or friends) and credibility of the government. Governmental criticism was directed toward its inability to quickly and adequately respond for search and rescue, and for its alleged acceptance of or condoning corrupt contractors and builders. Local, provincial, and national officials were openly criticized as greedy people who took bribes and willingly permitted violations of zoning codes and construction codes.
On the positive side, unlike any past disaster events, there was overwhelming displays of humanitarian gestures from Greece. Greek-Turkish relations appear to have greatly warmed and improved due to the Greek response to the situation. The Greek Prime Minister, along with the mayor of Athens, quickly visited the site and conveyed personal condolences to the Turkish people. Additionally, a Greek search and rescue team, doctors, and volunteers for blood donations, along with an outpouring of Greek towns and clubs sending best wishes and various money and material donations, poured into Turkey .
In summary, this earthquake clearly demonstrated that improperly constructed buildings kill people. It also showed that Turkey is in dire need of an emergency management plan that is effective from top down, and bottom up. It needs to be created from scratch and practiced frequently. Further, the mind set of "fatalism" needs to be openly debated and studied. Finally, bribery and corruption need to be addressed and corrected. Shutting down a newspaper for a week because it "demoralized the public with its news coverage (The Radikal was very critical of the government response and it did show very disturbing scenes from the victims)" will not correct the problem.
This time, Turkey suffered a great loss, but the densely populated city of Istanbul (except for Avciler and about 900 people), with its 9 plus million people, escaped massive destruction and a high number of deaths. Severe earthquakes have been marching down the North Anatolian fault for years, traveling from the east to the west. Each one has gotten closer to Istanbul. The August 17 disaster may be a catalyst that motivates appropriate preparation for the next "big one."
Note: Professor Mitchell was also part of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute's (EERI) reconnaissance team. Additional information is posted on EERI's web site at http://www.eeri.org. MCEER is headquartered at the State University of New York at Buffalo and is supported by the National Science Foundation, the
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